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1. INTRODUCTION
Market performance is not only a function of demand structure and cost configuration of
the companies which serve a transport service. It also depends on the existence of differem
types of barriers obstructing free competence between operators. Some of them come
directly from the regulation conditions imposed by the governments but others do not
depend of this, although can have been generated as a consequence of past regulation
policies and that remain even after deregulated process. So, for example, one company can
have a dominant position in a deregulated coach market if it keeps the monopoly access to
an important coach station. The existence of this type of barriers can be affecting the
generalised cost carried by the users, and therefore the level of welfare they obtained.
Among the different state member we can find barriers which obstruct the free competence
in the transport sector. In the rail market we can find many different types of barriers. In
this line, one of main which is common in many state members is the existence of a
regulation which obstruct the free entry of new operators in the market. Other barriers are
different electric system or track gauge system. In the air sector again the regulation
obstruct in some countries the free entry of new operators. Another important barrier is the
limited capacity of airports, this affects directly to the slot distribution, which can
determine even the presence of one carrier in some airports.
The regulatory intervention has been a common place in the transport policies, but the
situation has changed in the last years. Kay and Thompson (1991) identify three groups of
circumstances under which market failures and inappropriate regulatory regimes can be
categorised:
Competitive solutions may not exist in circumstances where there is natural
monopoly and high-sunk costs of market entry.
Competitive solutions may exist but may not be achieved because incumbent firms
may be able to successfully deter market entry, encourage the exit, merger or
acquiescence of competitors and establish a dominant position.
Competitive solutions may exist and be achieved but their outcome may not be
considered desirable: this outcome is particularly true when externalities exist
(environmental problems), where information asymmetries between market
participants are important, where social concerns are considered relevant, or where
a more efficient arrangement of production cannot be sustained in the face of
market entry.
It is important to appreciate the difference between unavoidable failures that follow
directly from the economic characteristics of the sector being regulated and escapable
failures, which follow from the adoption of inappropriate methods of regulation. Salop
(1979) distinguish between 'innocent' barriers to entry, those that arise when incumbent
pursue policies that maximise short-run profits and the 'strategic' barriers, those activities
that subtract from short-run profitability but that are undertaken in the belief that they will
deter entrants and add to profitability in the longer term.
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blari_etliberalisationandthe withdrawalof the statehavefeaturesof virtually every
transportmarketoverthepastfifteenyears(ButtonandKeeler,1993).Thevariouseffects
of thesechangeson transporthasbeenmuchstudied.Nevertheless,theunderstandingof
thenatureof whatareoftentermed"deregulation"- with no or very,little regulationof
tares,entry,andexit - is still remarkablylimiteddespitetheconsiderablexperiencewe
have.Thederegulationof expresscoachingin 1980(UK) andthederegulationof aviation
in theUnitedStatesin 1978initiallyresultedin substantialfarereductionsassociatedwith
newmarketentry.However,theseinitial effectsof deregulationin reducingpriceshave
beenfollowedby increasingconcentrationi theindustW andpriceshaverisensteadilyin
teattermsandarenowsubstantiallyabovethelevelsto whichtheyfell in the inmediate
aftermathof deregulation.
Doesthismeanthat deregulation has failed? We are sure this is not the case. However, we
can argue that some competing hypothesis are not really fulfilled (Jaffer and Thompson,
1986), imperfect forms of competition and contestability (tbr example, Morrison and
Winston, 1987), oligopolistic structures (Kahn, 1988) or the existence of an empty core
problem (Button, 1996). It is interesting to remark that the intellectual position is not stable
and some of the leading figures who initially suggested that aviation may naturally be
contestable have subsequently changed their minds. "We now believe that transportation
by trucks, barges and even buses may be more highly contestable than passenger air
transport" (Baumol and Willig, 1986).
The concepts of competition and contestability are fundamental in the study of the debate
of the regulatory reform in transport policy. Baumol (1982) argued that contestabiiity is a
generalisation of the concept of perfect competition. Perfect contestability is not a
description of reality but a benchmark for desirable industrial organisation.
Barter (1992) describes two general types of barriers that we can find in a deregulated air
market obstructing the free competence between operators: structural and strategic barriers:
As structural barriers: Hub airport dominance: this means the control of major
airports by incumbent carriers and restricting the access for new entrants, ground
handling monopolies, the control on computer reservations systems
As strategic barriers: Airlines with large networks can offer selectively lower fares
in response to new market entry, on contested routes and raise fares on uncontested.
Also incumbent airlines can response to new entrants with collusive policies in
prices and/or capacity.
2. THE DEREGULATION POLICY IN THE US AND EUROPE
The regulation of civil aviation in many countries sought to control entry and exit of
carriers on routes and to set the prices, frequencies and capacity offered by the carriers.
This system became to be highly criticised as inflexible and incredible protective of those
they were supposed to control. This was the cause that the regulation came under scrutiny
among airlines and authorities. The changing of the system was possible depending on the
market to be reformed. In Europe the difficulties were harder because of the subsidiary.
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principle,bywhichtheneedof agreementbetweenthedifferentgovernmentsof theState
Membersisobliged.
The pressurefor deregulationwas very high in the seventies,and the Aviation
DeregulationActbecamelawin 1978.Thelawsuppressedthemajorityof thecontrolsthat
Civil AviationBoardhad,aswell it preparedfor theabolitionoftheCABin 1985.
Restrictionon routeaccesswas relaxed.It had a dramaticincreaseon the numberof
carriersprovidingscheduledservices.Theoverallconcentrationfell,but theconcentration
indexwasnot too differentto thepreviousperiodbecausethenewentrantweresmall
operators.Somenewoperatorswereexistingintrastateoperators,butoftentheentrants
werenewin theindustry.
Theavailabilityof discountfareswaspermitted.In thiscasethebenefitsof deregulationto
consumersconsistednotjust inareductionof faresto existingtravellers,butthepromotion
of abig increasein traffic figures.Trafficrosedramaticallyandin 1985theincreasewas
about50 percent respecto 1978,in spiteof the existenceof a stableperiodin the
recessiontime. Due to the increasedavailabilityof discountfares,morethan80%of
passengersin 1984weretravellingondiscountickets.
Manyof thefavourableoutcomesof deregulationpredictedby observersof theairline
industryhavein factbeenrealised,andthereexistsaconsensusto agreethatthebenefitsof
deregulationhaveoverweighedthecosts.Althoughthe designersof deregulationand
economistsin generalappearedto havepredictedaccuratelythe directionof welfare
change,they did not predictaccuratelythe presentstructureof the airline industry.
Deregulationhasenabledairlinestoreduceoperatingcosts,increaseloadfactors,increase
theavailabilityof discountickets,andincreasethenumberof flights,all withoutaserious
declineinserviceto smallcommunitiesor safety.However,thehub-and-spokemethodof
delivery,complexpricingstrategies,thedominanceof manyairportsbysinglecarriers,the
controlof computereservationsystems,andthegrowthof devicesthatinduceloyaltyin
theagents,suchasfrequentflyerprogramsandtravelagentcommissionoverrides,didnot
exist in the regulatedairline industryand were not predictedin advance.This fact
demonstratesthattheregulationtaperedthepossiblebehaviourof theindustry.
The deregulationof civil aviationin the US since 1978was takenplacein different
circumstancesfromthoseof Europe,butsomeremarkablelessonscanbelearntaboutthe
potentialgainsof asinglemarket,aswellassomeof thecostsincurredin theabsenceof
the former regulation.Anyway it is well known that some lessonsof American
deregulationarequitefarawayfromEuropeancase.Samecountry.,samemarketconfersa
relativesuperiorpositionto thepotentialgainsin theAmericancasein termsof revenue
passengers.A greatquantityof USdomestictraffic fallsinto thecategory"visitingfriends
andrelatives".Thisevidencecanbeseenaspartof culturalbarriersthatlimit theprogress
of thedevelopmentof thesinglemarketinsideEU. Averagejourneyslengthsareshorter,
whichmeansthattake-offandlandingcostsrepresenta largerproportionof totalcostsand
competitionfrom othermodes(suchas high speedtrains)is muchgreaterthanin the
Americanmarket.
Thepre-deregulationsituationinEuropewasaresultof internationalbilateralagreements
betweensomeMemberStateswithin EU andevenwith countriesoutsideEU, specially
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with US. Theseagreementsdeterminedboth the procedurest'or setting tares and the
maximum share of capacity that can be offered by airlines of each country. Bilateral
agreements permitted carriers to prepare a joint schedule and to pool revenue. In the
majority of occasions, agreements prevent route entry by any company except flag carriers.
The need for both governments to agree any change in the accord has reduced possible
global retbrms inside Europe. Proposals for reform of the industry were being made in a
situation similar to the American deregulation, but this approach was firstly opposed by
most European governments with self-interests in their own flag carriers. So it was
necessary to introduce more flexibility and competition into the existing system without
ruining it.
The following liberalisation agreements (see Button and Swarm, 1991) were set out in the
market before its complete deregulation. These have been like trials preceding to the full
deregulation and some airlines have used these experiences to operate in freer conditions.
In the sample that we have extracted it is observed that UK comprise the major agreements
achieved.
Table 1. Bilateral agreements. Pre-deregulation era in the aviation market in Europe
Countries Year Terms of agreement
UK and Netherlands 1984
UK and Netherlands 1985
UK and FR of Germany 1984
UK and Luxembourg 1985
UK and Belgium 1985
UK and Switzerland 1985
UK and Italy 1986
France and Germany. 1986
permitting free, route access and capacity.
airlines were left to set their own fare.
Permitting free route access, fares and capacity.
permitting free, route access, fares and capacity.
permitting free, route access, fares and capacity.
permitting free, route access and capacity.
permitting free, route access and capacity.
permitting free, route access and capacity.
The European liberalisation process has been divided in three packages. It permitted to
achieve carriers to set freely fares and to operate in any European country since April of
1997. The Commission proceeded carefully because of the opposition of national
governments that took actions protecting their national flag carriers in spite of the observed
differences in their performance. Most countries do not allow competition with the flag
carrier on domestic trunk or international routes. In effect, except in the UK, the
Netherlands and the Republic of Ireland, no flag carrier had in the past faced competition
on any route.
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Thefirst packageadoptedonDecemberof 1987cameinto forceon 1January1988.it
includedsomemeasuresto introducesomekind of flexibility in theaviationsectorand
establishedthe basisto obtaina gradualiberalisation.Airlines mayoffer fareswith
discountsbetween65and90percentof economyclassfor ticketswith certainconditions
andanothertypeof discountedfaresbetween45 and 65%of economyclass(Council
Decision601/87).A secondCouncilDecision602/87whichpermittedacapacitysharefor
oneairlineuntil 60%in 1990betweentwo countriesleavingtheequitablemarketshare.
Also a secondoperatorcanenterinto the marketundercertainlimits of traffic. As a
consequenceof thispackagesomesmallerairlinesentersomeimportantintra-Community
routes(CAA 1993).This reformalsopointedto focuson ownership.Somecountries
introducedor increasedtheshareof privatecapitalin theirflagcarriers.
ThesecondpackagecameintoforceonJune1990,includedmeasuresonmarketaccesson
intra-communityscheduledroutesandcapacityshare.Thirdandfourthfreedomsrightsare
appliedallaroundEuropeanCommunityand fifth freedomwithamaximumof 50%of the
capacityof the planeandfor flightswith origin or destinationin the county of the
company.The packageincorporatedsomeimportantpromisesfor the future.Member
Stateshavelegallyboundthemselvesto full liberalisationby January,1_'1993.Oneof the
principalmeasuresto ensurewastheendingof capacity-sharingarrangementsbetween
governments,which hithertoguaranteedsomeshareof traffic on particularroutes
independentlyof the efficiencyof thecompanies.On fares,thepackageincludesmore
flexibleconditionsallowingtodecreasethedeepdiscountfareswithouttherequirementof
governmentapproval.Thelowerlimit wasreducedto 30percentof thereferenceconomy
fare,comingfromthe45 per cent established in the first package.
Finally the third package entered into force in January 1_' 1993. It is formed by three acts
which constituted the completion of the deregulation in the aviation European market.
Airlines are free to set fares and stated conditions in which are going to be used. Until
April 1s' 1997 carriers could make cabotage into one state member up to 50% of capacity,
unrestricted from that date. The intention of this measure is to open the national markets,
allowing EU airlines to compete freely in a single market.
Perhaps the main barriers that exist yet to competition in the European market come from
the lack of slots at airports and which obstructs the enter of new competitors in same
conditions of the incumbents that hold them. This affects also to airports where is possible
to achieve slots in off-peak demand periods. The Commission therefore felt that rules are
needed on the allocation of slots to ensure that liberalisation is not undermined by barriers
against new entrants at congested airports. The actual regulation based on a Council
Regulation CEEC no 95/93 permit the existence of 'grand father rights" which is the
method that dominate in the European airports establishes also the principle 'use it or lose
it'.
So the slot control in the airports is now a way to limit competition and to establish a
stronger position of incumbents in the market. The effectiveness of the deregulation policy
depend on the measures that the Commission could design in order to regulate this airport
service. It is absolutely necessary, that these kind of facilities which are limited would be
allocated in the way most conducive to competition.
increasingcapacityairportst_ so.vethisprob'.:m doesnot seemto be the correctway,
becausetl:isrequiresheavyfir moralinvestrnerwithenvironmentalconsequencestoo,and
otherproblemcanariseastr::.ff: control.Lara is a scarce commodity that imposes very
restr'ngent limitations. The sk provision p: zsents the problem of peak demand. The
airport landing charges do not c mtribute to ef.iciency since they do not reflect the costs of
de!ays to other aircraft (costs o congestion), t has been estimated by the International Air
Transport Association (IATA) nat the delay,_ for more than 15 minutes due to congestion
are going to increase in figur ',veil above ae 25 per cent of the total flights in the next
years.
in Europe, the Civil Aviation _.uthority in I TK proposed a mechanism such that incumbent
airlines with a set of slots ab,.ve a threshol, would be required to surrender a proportion to
the scheduling committee w_'.c,h would port,nit the entry of new carriers to operate in the
market (see, European Corr nission, 1997). In the United States the Federal Aviation
Administration suggested as ,iternative tc create a market based on the willingness to pay
of the carriers to acquire the slot. These ::'stems include differential pricing and auctioning
of slots rather than the prose "t system of fllocating them.
As consequence of the liberalisation process, the European companies have adopted
different strategies in order .:o achieve a good position in the market.
One of these has been all. races and mergers. Fundamentally seeking increase the network
operated exploiting so ti e economies of density derived. With this strategy also cost
reductions are produced because ofjc ,nt services. Also, this is the way to entry in markets
where the slot allocation m: 2e no po sine to enter in the market.
So as exanlple, British Ai rays ac_ aired 49,9% of TAT, 10% of DAN Air and 100% of
British Caledonian in 19 ',. Air France acquired 100% of Inter, UTA or Swissair that
acquired 49,5% of SABE ,A in lC95. Or the agreements between Lufthansa and SAS on
route network, schedules • cketing frequent flyer program and cargo services.
The pricing strategies ha- been very important in this process, implementing a wider range
of discount fares to try to share tl-.e demand as much as possible fixing higher discounts for
more etastic segments. "-.'his may have could been used as an instrument of competition
between different operators in or.e market.
Finally this process has required that companies adjusted their cost structures overall flag
carriers twing to increase in efficiency in order to compete with potential or existing in fact
new entrants in the m xrk,:t. In fact, it has been observed important labour reduction in
many carriers during t! is :ericd.
3. DATA DESCF _PTION.
Given the present der ;utation of the airline industry, in which an ample pace of reform
has been introduced, a lo,:gical question to answer is how this reform has affected the
overall performance c :he industry. In order to do this, we are going to focus our attention
in how global deman, and prices have responded to this new state, trying to discuss how
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competition,airportdominance,existenceof alternativeflightsandothervariablesaffect
pricesanddemand.
This sectiondescribesthe selectionof the sampleto analysetheeffectsof theairline
deregulationprocessinsidetheEuropeanUnion.In theexistingliteraturetheobservation
thatiscommonlyemployedis theroute.Averagefares,or percentileyieldsareemployed
wheneveris possible,global demand, geo-economicvariablesrepresentingthe
characteristicsof theoriginandend-pointcitiesof therouteareamongthemostcommon
variabiesappearingin models.Theprincipalinconvenientof thiskind of studiesis that
they do not take into accountthe big heterogeneitythat can exist in the firms
characteristics,uchassizeof companies,airportcontrolin citiesof theroutes,costsof
airlines,amongothers.For thisreason,in additionto theroutelevelunit of observation,
observationstoroute-aMinelevelareconsideredin thispaper.
Wehaveemployeda crosssectionof theyear1994.Thisyearwasthelastone,for which
we couldobtaintheprincipalvariableswhichour modelincorporate.We pretendto
maintainthesampleasabasisforfuturestudiesthatcanbefulfilledusingmultipleyearsof
dataconformingapanel.
In the selectionof the sample, a three stage method was carried out. The criterion
employed in the first stage was used to decide which airports (origins and end-points of the
routes) are going to be selected. The sample includes 33 European clues (more airports are
involved, because some cities like London, Paris or Milan have more titan one airport). The
selection of the cities was done by the importance of the airports, selecting airports of all
the countries of the European Union and Switzerland. Once the cities were selected, the
second stage focused the attention in the selection of the routes. With 33 cities 528 pairs
can be formed, but for some pairs a direct flight did not exist in the year 1994. We selected
the largest routes for each city, and once a pair was selected, the symmetric pair was
automatically is included. Some routes were also included at random and in this way we
formed a sample of 414 routes. Finally in the third stage we selected the airlines that at
least had a flight per week in the route, forming a sample of 919 route-airline observations.
Basically, two cross sections can be used in the modelling work, one at route level and
other at route-airline level.
The differences between the two groups of observations are that in the route level we use
variables representing global concepts, like demand, average business class fare, average
high discounted fare and average tourist class fare. In the observations at route-airline
level, the individual demand of each firm and the differentiated fares if exist are used. To
capture the effects of actual competition, we include a dummy variable if the concentration
of the two firms is below a threshold figure. A more detailed of the description of the
variables can be observed in the models.
The variables were obtained from different sources. The principal sources that we used are:
Traffic by Flight Stage (1994) (publication from International Civil Aviation Organisation)
and OAG World Airline Guide (March, 1994) (a monthly publication with detailed
information on prices and timetable). Data as distance, number of operators, were obtained
from the ICAO publication Traffic by Flight Stage. Flight frequency, and the number of
indirect alternatives to any route and the fare in this case was obtained from the ABC
publications.
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4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGSONDEMANDANDPRICERESPONSES.
In this sectionwe presentand discussthe resultsof our analysisof the effectsof
concentrationof the market,airportconcentration and other factors on demand and air
tares.
On the demand side, the study requires a number of input assumptions. In some sense, we
can separate these assumptions in two different groups: external issues like population,
income, transport substitutes, etceteras; and internal issues like price, travel time, waiting
time, size of the plane, etceteras. Both components, of course, are important in the
estimation of the demand. It is usual to distinguish travel by the purpose for which it is
made.
There are two principal reasons to do that, first of both, there are some situations in which
institutions play an important role of certain kind of trips. To begin with this, think of the
business market segment. Business fares are mostly paid, not by the travellers themselves,
but by their companies, for whom expenditure on air travel is a pro-tax price, meanwhile
excursion fares are usually paid personally by holiday travellers out of post-tax incomes.
This was one of the reasons why airlines originally takes businessmen as a market segment
being in some kind indifferent to pay higher fares. Secondly, the sensitivity to changes in
prices and time varies according to the purpose of the trip. Some kind of trove! are more
mandatory, for example travel by work, than others that can be more discretionary,
travelling for holidays. For the same person, the time and space alternative sets are quite
different.
Air industry is almost an ideal place to study concentration and prices. There are many
works touching the topic of concentration and prices relationship with respect to the air
industry. Keeler (1990) was one of the pioneers. Our contribution to the subject follows
man?, patterns of the preceding papers. We try to explain how the concentration measures
raise prices and competition lower them. Our work supports these conclusions as other
studies that have been reviewed, but we focus our attention in the different contribution of
the concentration of the route, concentration of the airport and possible competition of the
indirect routes. This last item is very important because we firmly believe that there is
likely to be an increasing interest on hubbing as European airlines must adopt strategic
policies to compete effectively in the Single European Market.
Hubbing offers an airline a great number of competitive advantages in the new situation of
the transport industry in Europe. The most obvious one is the dramatic increasing of the
new markets that can be served for a fixed volume of output. Doganis and Dermis (1989)
present the following result: an airline with a network based on hubbing with one hundred
spokes can offer service in over five thousand city-pair markets.
Factors influencing demand are divided into geo-economic and service-related, the former
belong to the group of external variables, although airlines may be still able to control them
by selecting alternative markets to serve, the latter are internal to a given market.
The most common geo-economic variables used in the studies of demand are population,
income and distance. It can be seen in the literature review that there is no a uniform result
relating to the population effect. In some cases, as in Fridstr6m and Thune-Larsen (1989)
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and Fleming and Ghobrial(1994),populationelasticitiesareabove one.in others,as in
Rendarajuand Thamizh-Arasan(1992)populationelasticityisunder one.Anyway, thisis
nota surprisingresultbecausemany differentcharacteristicsofthedemand and population
can exist in the studies analysed. Some differences can also exist in the specifications of
the equations to estimate these results.
Something similar occurs when income elasticities are observed but in this case as Jorge-
Calderon (1995) suggested there exist some differences on income sensitiveness across the
different type of travellers. Business travellers tend to be less income sensitive than
holidays travellers, rellecting also their different price elasticities.
The distance is a variable that has a large influence in the determination of the demand. As
Russon and Hollingshead (1989) pointed out, the distance has two important effects with
different signs. If the distance increases the air travel begins to be more convenient, due to
the higher speed, comtbrt and safety, but at the same time absolute figures tbr traffic
decreases as more distant cities have a lower degree of social and economic interaction due
among other things to the increased transport costs. It appears a well known problem of
circularity. Hypothetically there will exist a limit figure d, for which shorter distances, the
convenience effect will outweigh the distance decay, making traffic increase; and for
longer distances the whole argument will be reversed. Taking these two effec:s into
account, Russon (1990) found that the traffic maximising distance for non-stop air trips
made by jets was about .360 miles.
The need to cross sea water has a critical influence about the competitiveness of other
modes of transport in terms of travel times and the possibilities of the service
establishment. A current and major example of how new developments can overcome some
geographical constraints and alter the modal split of the traffic between two cities is the
opening of the Channel Tunnel. The introduction of high speed rail services through the
tunnel has affected seriously the modal balance in London-Paris and London-Brussels
rO utes.
The service-related factors include some quality attributes of the service and the price. You
can use a large number of variables to measure the quality of the utility, as frequency, size
of the aircraft, travel of time, number of stops, connecting time, etceteras. Note that except
for some constraints as a limited fleet size, indivisibilities in aircraft size, congestion of
some airports, political interference in the objectives function of the firms, the airlines
would set these attributes where the marginal cost of each equals the corresponding
marginal revenue.
The frequency is perhaps the most important factor determining the service quality, in air
travel. A higher number of flights allows the company to be near the average passenger
desires of travel departures. The frequency has been used as a predatory device. Incumbent
airlines have been sometimes accused of responding to the entry of a rival company by
starting frequency wars, flooding the route with such extra capacity that the new entrant
find too difficult maintaining this new route profitable. Incumbents try to undermine a
competitor's service by the bracketing scheduling departures' practice. It consists on the
scheduling departures to take off just before and just after the rival's flights, Hanlon
(I994).
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Somerecentstudieshaveusedaircraftsizeasa qualityof servicevariable,thecommon
hypothesisbeingthatlargeraircraftarepreferredto smallerones.It couldbeexpecteda
priori thatthesensitivityto aircraftsizevarieswith thedistance,for asthetimespenton
theplaneincreasesthesizecanbeusedasa proxyof thecomt'or_utilky enjoyedby the
passenger.The resultsobtainedby the worksof Ghobrial(1993)and Pickrell (I984)
confirmthehypothesis.Bothauthorspresentsignificantandpositiveeffectsof thesizeof
theplaneondemand.
Traveltimecanbesplit in threedifferentcomponents.Thefirst of thethreeis thetime
spentgettingto theairportandfrom thedestinationairportto thefinal destination.This
oneis"knownastheserviceaccesstime.Thetimein theairport,checkinginandwaitingto
board,andthetimein thedestinationairportto pickup theluggageis consideredasthe
handlingtime.Andfinally thetimein theplanethatit ismeasuredasthetimethatelapses
fromboardingtheplaneto disembarkingin thefinal destination.Theserviceaccess_ime
varieswith theairportlocationandairportfacilitiesrelativeto theinitial origin-destination
cities.This time is linkedwith theconceptof intermodalityin the airportsbecauseit is
l_ighiyaffectedfor themodeof transportaffordableto go to/fromtheairports.In thecase
of theairportsconnectedby railways,theaccesstimeis inferiorbecauseof the leve!of
congestion of the roads in the majority of the cities of the more developed countries. The
handling time depends on the service levels of the airports and this is usually out of the
control of the companies. The on-board time is a function of the speed of tf_e piane.
Nowadays most of the jet planes travel at similar speeds and these are used uniformly
across the different routes. There are some exceptions with the supersonic planes, but these
are more appropriate for long-haul routes where the advantages of their superior speed
compensate their higher average cost of the service.
Fare is the most important variable in determining the total cost of a trip. Just as other
variables studied, the sensitivity of demand to fare changes will vary across passenger
types. Price eIasticity will depend on the income level of the passenger as well as on the
journey purpose. Higher income passengers and those trave!ling on business who normally
obtain their tickets paid tbr, will generally conform the segment of the market more
inelastic.
Airlines have responded to these different needs through marketing different fare-types.
Anyone who has bought an airline ticket will know it is possible to pay any one of a large
number of prices to fly a given route. Fares vary with time of travel, whether peak or off-
peak; with class of travel reflecting different on-board services, whether first, business or
economy; with the iength of stay at the destination reflecting in some cases the flexibility
of the fare, whether it exceeds a certain number of days or weeks, or whether it includes a
Saturday night; and with a whole host of other factors such as size of the travelling group
and the ages of any children involved.
Limits on reservation procedures are also very common, including requests to make full
payment at time of reservation, and establishing a minimum period for purchase prior to
the departure known as advanced purchase restrictions. There are also common penalties
when you want to alter the departure time or the date after the purchase. Further, more
focused restrictions can be imposed through the possible candidates to purchase a
determined fare, the eligibility conditions. These can vary from ranging in the age, the
social status, the peripheral regions. You can include in this group, special fares for
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children,or for peoplebelow/abovea givenage,or for students,or retiredpeople,or
citizensof adeterminedperipheralregion.
The multiplicity of fare categoriesis often so greatthat for scheduledserviceby a
particularairlineonaparticularoutetherecanbemorethan50separatefarespublishedin
airlinetariff manuals.Thevariationbetweenfarescanbesuchthatit is possiblefor two
passengerssittingnextto eachotheron thesameflight, andenjoyingexactlythesame
quaiityof in-flight service,to find thatoneis payingverymuchmorethantheother,in
someextremescasesevenmorethandouble.
Fareelasticitiescanalsobeexpectedto varywith thedistance.In thisrespect,thereis an
obviousphenomenathat hasbeencitedmanytimes,at shorterdistancesair transport
experiencetoughercompetitionfromothermodesof transport,sothatasdistanceincrease
fareelasticitiescouldbeexpectedto decrease.But evenin comparisonsof routesof the
sameor similar length,someconsiderabledifferencesexist. Within Europe,when
comparisonsaredrawnbetweencitiesin termsof thelowestavailablelevelsof businessor
standardeconomyfares,adeardistinctionemergesbetweencertain'highfare' andsome
'low fare' cities. Frankfurt,Brussels,Parisand Amsterdambelongto the first group.
Levelson routesto othercitiesin Europecanbeasmuchas50 to 75%abovethelevels
fromlow farecitieslike Athens,London,LisbonandDublin,Hanlon(1994).Somequite
dramaticcomparisonscanbedrawnwhenthevariationin faresfor individualroutesis
combinedwith thevariationin faresacrossroutes.Thisisspeciallytruewhenyoucompare
EuropeanfarelevelwiththecomparableonesinNorthAmerica.Wecanseein theworkof
Guaschand Spiller (1996),thefollowingtablethatcontainthe datafor explainingthe
anteriorargument.
Table 2. Fare comparison of similar US and European routes in-1995
Miles I Route Fare ($)
[
t87
216
211
302
311
853
887
Boston-New York
Washington-New York
London-Paris
Houston-New Orleans
Copenhagen-Oslo
Dallas-Minneapolis
Frankfurt-Madrid
106
157
214
89
296
425
727
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4.1Specificationof tile demandandpriceequation.
In the demandequationswearegoingto analysethe effectsof marketconcentration,
concentrationof the airports,distance,income,fare,existenceof seain the route,the
competitionof the indirectroutesandthe frequencyon the existingdemandin the air
trafficof theEuropeanUnion.They are based in a cross-section estimation of the carriers'
pertbrmance in the ),ear 1994. In some aspects this study is very similar to those described
in the previous section, except that we include the effects of competition and in some sense
airport tmb domination.
We would like to use similar previous fare variables used in Borenstein (1989). He
employed the 20 'l' percentile, the 50'" percentile (median), and the 80"' percentile fare paid
to the observed carrier on the observed route, but till this moment the state of the art in
Europe is completely different and we do not know which are the prices that user really
pay. For this reason we use the prices quite similar to those employed for him, but of
course we limit our attention at the published fares. The interpretation of the coefficients of
many variables is quite complicated, as it was seen in the previous section. We "know that a
single variable can have influence in more than one of the variables that are being used in
the models. In these cases we know that some of the hypothesis of the linear model are not
t'ulfi[led, the independence of the error and the dependent variables, producing biased
estimations. The umt of observation is an airline route pair in the year 1994.
In the price equation we are going to analyse how the European deregulation process have
affected to market efficiency.
The data set includes observation of the companies that had more than one flight per week.
The variables describing market structure are the observed airline's share of the passengers
transported in the market and the CR2 index, constructed from the shares of all carriers in
the market. The structure of the market at the origin-point airports is studied by the
airline's shares of passenger enplanements and the Herfindahl index of these shares. The
structure of the possible competition of the indirect routes is measured by the number of
flights that exist in each route that have one stop.
In the equation estimated coefficents are measured in logarittunic form and for this reason
can be interpreted as an elasticity.
We define here the variables and the expected effects are discussed:
Paxperf is the number of passengers carried by the company in the route. This variable
is expected to have a negative sign when it was used as endogenous in the price
equation.
Distance is the non-stop kilometres from one endpoint of the route to the other. One
would expect distance to have a positive effect in the demand, but this effect is not
clear. Also in the price equation this variable is expected with a positive sign.
Gdp is the gross domestic product of the origin city measured in ratios expressing the
relative position respect to the average of the European Union. The basic source for this
variable is Eurostat's 1994 "Yearbook of Regional Statistics". The per capita income
-12-
measurechosenis the averagefor the regionin whichthe airport is located.The
expectedsignispositivebothfor thedemandandpriceequation.
Competis thedummyvariablethatreflectstheexistingcompetition.It is oneif the
shareof thetwo mainoperatorsis lessthan0.98.Theexpectedsignfor thedemand
equationis positivebecausewecanassumethatthedemandishigherwhenthereexist
morecompetitiveforcesin themarket.In thepriceequationtheexpectedsignis the
oppositeexpecteingthat a higherlevelof competitionin a routemaycut taresan
increasefficiency.
Herfaeis theHerfindahlindexof themarketsharesof theemplanementsof thestart-
pointairport.Theexpectedsignisnegativein thedemandequationandpositivein the
priceequation,becauseof thepossiblemonopolyabuseof thecompaniesthatcontrol
anairport,limitingthecompetitionof thepossiblentrantsin themarket.
Fareismeasuredbytwodifferentvariablesthatyield twodifferentestimationsin the
pricemodel,thehighestdiscountedfarein therouteandtheeconomicfareintheroute.
In thedemandequationit hasbeenusedthetouristclassasareturnfare.Theexpected
signsin thedemandequationsarenegativebecausetheymeasurethepriceelasticities.
Fcis thenumberof flightswithonestopthatexistin theobservedroute.Wecanexpect
anegativesignbecausethisisasubstitutealternativeto fly betweentwocities.
Seais adummyvariabletakingthevalueof onewhenevertherouteover-fliesthesea.
Wecanexpectapositivesignbecausetheexistenceof sealimits thealternativemodes
tobecompetitive.
Freqis thenumberof directflights thatexistin theobservedroutefor eachof the
companies.Wecanexpectapositivesign.
4.2Demandequation.
Thedemandequationestimatedwith theentiresampleof individualobservationsi the
following:
logpaxperf = 7.018 + 0.664 log dist + 0.058 log gpd + 0.212 log compet
18.5 9.70 1.06 6.68
- 0.0091 log Herfae - 0.576 log fare + 0.002 F¢ + 0.016 Sea + 1.028Freq
-2.02 -5.503 -3.41 0.51 77.9
The explained variation is well above of 85% in the estimation. The income variable and
the existence of sea have not a significant impact and sometimes do not present the
expected signs. This result is not too rare because we are using in this estimation the
sample of individual firms.
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i'he recuitof distanceindicatesthatthepositiveimpactin termsot"traveltimedi/ferentiais
withothermodesof transportationoutweighsthenegativeimpactof a lesseninteraction
betweenthecities.Theimpactsof thevariablesmeasuringcompetitionandthedominance
of theairportpresentheexpectedsignsandtheyindicatequiteclearlythatconcentration
of theroutesandtheairport'sdominanceimplylesspossibilitiesto newentrantsto capture
some market share. These results confirm the hypothesis of the existence of barriers to
entry in the European market. How this issues must be tackled on ought to be a principal
task of the officials of the EU transport agency.
The number of flights with one stop present the expected sign and is quite significant. This
result confirms the idea that once an increasing emphasis on hubbing in the air market in
Europe wili be developed for some companies, these emerging indirect routes could
effectively compete with the direct-route market. So, in spite the net effect is not too big,
we anticipate that this result can be considered as the starting point to observe a dramatic
change in the network of the companies. It is time to re-route the point-to-point services
through a centrally located hub in the nowadays-European network.
The fare estimated parameters (price elasticities) are too consistent with the expectations.
We have obtained a range for price elasticity of-0.23,-0.57. The elasticity of the individual
demand obtained for each firm over the week frequency is positive and quite uniform
around one in the three estimations. The figure is the highest elasticity in absolute values
m_d it is in the line of the previous estimations of Jorge-Calderon (1995), Agar_vall and
Talley (1985), Talley and Schwarz-Miller (1988) and Ippolito (1981). They obtained
fi-equency elasticities of 0.94, l, 0.98 and 0.86, respectively.
In fact, demand seems to present unitary frequency elasticity because of the results that we
have obtained from the Wald test for each of the three models. In the specification of this
parameter we cannot conclude that this was different from one with the 95% confidence
level. This result is concordant with the hypothesis presented in the work of Agarwai1 and
Talley.
Now we can understand better the strategic behaviour that some companies seem to
perform in order to reduce the danger of potential entrants. We have mentioned before the
bracketing strategy of the departure's timetable. It is certainly true that this result can be
interpreted in other direction, which consists in giving more importance to the market
characteristics of the sample with high income travellers being served with more frequent
flights.
The following equation presents the results of the same structural equation using the route
as the unit of observation. In this case, we concentrate our attention with a different
approach. We are not interested in knowing the individual effects to the level of the
behaviour of the company, but the overall performance of the demand in the air industry in
the European market.
Iogpaxperf = 6,603 + 0.689 logdist + 0.009 log gpd + 0.094 logcompet
- 0.069 logHerfae - 0.544 log fare + O.O00Fc + O.O09Sea + 1.116Freq
-I._ -4.46 -o,o46 0.277 6_,s
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Welosethesignificantimpactof thedominanceof theairportandthenon-directroutes.
Theseeffectsare lost in theoveralldemandof the routebecauseit canbe seenasa
strategicbehaviourof thecompanies.However,therestof theeffectsareverysimilarto
thoseonesdescribedin thebeforehandmodels.Someclearpatternshavebeenobtained:
theunitaryfrequencyelasticity;thepositiveeffectof competitionondemand;seacrossing
donotgeneratedemand;demandispriceinelasticwith respectto everyfares,thisprovides
thrthersupportfor thehypothesisof relativelyhighbusinessorhighcompositionof traffic;
themostdiscountedfarespresentvaluesof priceelasticityin absolutevalueslesserthan
theeconomiclass.
Frequencyisanimportantattributeof theservicequalityandproductdifferentiation.When
planningtheserviceona givenmarket,Pollack(1982)determinedthattheairlinesfacea
trade-offbetweenfrequencyandplanesize.Pickrell (1984)andGhobrial(1993)have
reportedthat the demandis moreelasticwith respecto frequencythanto planesize.
Moreover,theycoincidein that frequencyshareis associatedwith morethana linear
relationwith the marketshare.For this reasonairlineswant to move for obtaininga
competitiveadvantagethroughhigh frequencyservice,this strategyis very suitablein
particularwith thehighyieldsegment,composedof passengerswithahighvalueof time.
Thisvariablewouldacquiremoreimportancein thedevelopingof thehubbingoperations.
Theneteffectof hubbingondemandwill dependontheextentto whichgreatertravelling
timesandthe inconvenienceof havingto wait in a connectedintermediateairportare
outweighedby theincreasein flight frequency.Anyway,in thederegulationof theU.S.
marketFleming(1991),Ivy (1993)andPhilips(1987)showthat the increasehubbing
causea dramaticincreaseof concentrationatthelargerairports.Empirically,otherauthors
asBerry(1990),Borenstein(1991)andGhobrialandSoliman(1992)detecta significant
effectof hubdominanceon therelativemarketsharein theroutestouchingthatairport.
Borenstein(1991)showedthatthetravellerswill preferto useanairlinewhichtheyhave
usedbefore.For this reason,airlinesawarenessin the regionis a factorto takeinto
account,speciallyin theEurope'sair industry,wheresomenationalbarriershavebeen
identified.
Thereis a mixedeffectwhenwespeakaboutthehubdominance.Foroneside,Morrison
andWinston(1990)haveshowedthathubairlinespresentahigherpropensityto enterin
newmarkets.Followingthisargumentonecansuggestthatstrongpresenceprovidesthe
airlineswith agoodbaseformwhichto enterin newmarkets.However,thiscanbeseen
from the incumbent'sperspective,asStrassman(1990)foundthatboth the numberof
endpointscitiesatbothendsof therouteandthenumberof incumbentswith ahubatone
orbothendpointslimit inasignificantwaytheprospectsof newentrants.So,it seemsthat
hubbing,throughproductdifferentiationandprobablysunkcosts,isagooddefenceagainst
entry.
4.3 Priceequation
In this sectionwe analysehow deregulationprocessin the Europeanair markethas
affectedto marketefficiency.Withthisobjectivewehaveestimatedapricefunctionusing
asendogenousvariablethefare.Wehaveestimatedtwo modelsfor touristfareanda
modelwherethe endogenousvariableis the higherdiscountofferedin the route.As
exogenousvariablewehaveincludedin thefunctionalform thevariabledistance,gross
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2omc_ficproduc_of theorigincity, theHerfindalindexin theroute,thedummyvariable
competandthe variableFc usedin the formermodelof demand.The resultsof the
esmnationtbr eachtarearethefollowing:
logy = 1.678 * 0.583 log dist + 0.307 log gpd -0.048 log compet +
o._l o.oi o.oi 0.009
O.101 log Herfae - 0.024 log pcz_perf - 0.0006 Fc
OlO[] O.OOJ OmO001
log desc = 2.29+ 0.461 log dist + 0.173 log gpd - 0.053 log compet +
0.23 0.02 0.02 0.01
+ 0.058 log Herfae - 0.033 log paxperf - O.0007 Fc - O.03 2 ntarpax
0.02 0,008 0.0002 0.012
As we could observe fi'om data for a same route there were important differences in the
fare level depending on the origin country. The positive sign of the variable gpd can be
reflecting this effect. This can be combined with the effects of the negative sign for the
variable compet, reflecting that the level of fare also depend on the level competence in the
origin market.
The value of the coefficient for the variable compet in the second model permits to
conclude that when competition is introduced in the air market the response of carriers
cutting prices is more important in the high discount fare class, than in tourist or business
class because the former correspond to more elastic market segment.
The variable Herfae presents a positive sign which is implying that airport control are
affecting to the level of the fare in the route. So the slot control in the origin airport appears
as a barrier that actually the liberalisation process has not eliminated.
Finally as we can observe by the sign of the variable Fe the existence of indirect routes
substitute determine the level determine the level of the fare in the direct routes too.
Both the variable distance (dist) and demand (paxperJ) presents the positive and negative
sign respectively as was expected initially.
As was observed initially from data the level of fare could change for a same route
depending on the origin country, so we can find that for a same pair origin-destine there is
important diferences in prices depending on origin where you bought the ticket. This can
be explained by two factors: on one hand by the level of income of the origin country in the
way that countries with high gross domestic output can present higher level of fares, But
also the level of competition in the origin market may be influencing this effect but with
the contrary sign, so routes with a high level of competition in the origin market present
lower levels of fare.
The level of concentration and consequently the level of deregulation in one route affect
directly and significantly to fare paid by users. So an important barrier that actually remain
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in the Europeanair marketis theslot possessionby incumbentcarriers.Thispermitm
manycasesto have a dominant position in the market even that represent a real barrier tbr
new entrants in the market. This can be limiting the complete development of the measures
carried on by the Commission to liberalise the market.
Market deregulation has greater effect on the fare of more elastic segments of demand. So
_iie deregulation measures has developed that carriers offers a high range of discount tare in
order to obtain a greater consumer surplus of the demand but that indirectly generate more
efficient situation in the market.
5. CONCLUSIONS
As a consequence of limiting the possibility of new entrants in the market because of the
privileges that flag incumbent airlines enjoy in their airports of their influence, there is only
a 6% of the continental routes that can be considered as competitive according to our own
definition of competition in the estimation of the models, and this one it is not too
stringent. In this case we have shown that the demand is below the levels it could be
achieved by the likely monopoly power that it is exerted by the pairs of national flag
carriers. In particular, it is necessary to develop a transparent policy trying to establish the
common-user access rights to the principal airport of the E.U.
The analysis shows that we have more goals to get by introducing initiatives to obtain more
competition in the routes and at the same time it is clear that competition is possible and
desirable to some extent. The airport at Brussels has the same landing capacity as London's
Heathrow, but only half of the traffic. Its refusal to create new landing slots, on ground that
there is not enough room, it is a serious barrier to entry that can be exploited by Sabena,
Belgium's national airline. In addition, some new entrants airlines complain that in many
cases the handling labour of the airports favour the national carrier. An E.U. directive
96/67/CE form 1996 intended to prevent monopolies in airport services, but this directive
in some experts' opinions has been watered down by the member states to the point where
it will achieve virtually nothing. Swifter justice and a stronger directive on airport services
would do much to help new entrants. To give newcomers a chance to break into new
routes, the Commission needs to create a proper market in slots.
In spite of the previous paragraphs we cannot minimise the real advantages and benefits
that European citizens enjoy in these years after deregulation, and that the real change is
going to be observed in the future after this year 1997, when we can say that the complete
market deregulation is fulfilled. The paper that can be played by the companies that till
now have developed their strategic movements to the competitive segment of regional and
charter services can be higher that the expectations that have been said by some analysts.
Cross entry and the signature of contracts with some companies can change the nowadays'
network, and some low-priced services can emerge from this new situation.
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1 INTRODUCTION.
This paper assesses how successfully liberalisation increases contestablity in the
European air transportation. Impacts on the customers and the airlines are examined.
Examination is based on the theories of contestability, strategic partnerships and
networks, and personal research. Liberalisation is the removal of statutory barriers
and opening up of the sector for competition. In the course &the 1980s-1990s, over
80 countries were involved in deregulation. The wider aspects of macroeconomic
reforms such as liberalisation of trade and prices and demand management are beyond
the framework of this paper.
Today the national public companies still provide an important share of air transport
service in Europe. A number of them continue to get subsidies. For the last ten years
or so, liberalisation pressures have been increasing in air transport. Several arguments
are commonly used in favour of regulation. The natural monopoly can be presented as
most beneficial. For this reason, in many western countries quasi-monopolies axe
common in utilities. Theoretically, regulation aims at accommodating the public
interest by reducing social costs of provision and upgrading benefits from externalities.
Protective regulation still manifests itself in pricing, restrictions on entry/e,'dt, capacity,
public investment, access to funding and taxes. But contestable pressures encourage
cost-benefit considerations and improve the match between the volume and the scope
of demand and supply. The administration becomes leaner, simpler and more flexible.
Besides, the inflationary pressures were attributed to the rigid framework of
regulation. Well, what are the best ways to liberalise air transport in Europe?
Out of 1,012 airports which are accessible to the international traffic, Europe has 380,
i.e. 37.5%. Ten busiest routes in the world include Paris-London in the first place and
Amsterdam-London in the fifth place. The London-New York route ranks second in
the world. Six states are most active in the EEC: the United Kingdom, France,
Germany, Netherlands, Italy and Spain. They account for about 25% of the world
total passenger traffic against approximately 31% in 1978. The United Kingdom, with
10.2%, holds the second place closely following the United States (10.3%). Japan
accounts tbr 6%. Between 1978 and 1988, the passenger traffic increased by 4.8% per
year in Europe, while it grew by 7% in the world. In North America it grew by 8.4%,
and in the Asian-Pacific area it grew by 10.4%.
In 1993, in terms of freight traffic, Germany, France, the United Kingdom,
Netherlands, Italy, Belgium and Spain accounted for one third of the world turnover
compared to 37.5% in 1978. On the basis of total turnover, i.e. passengers and
traffic, three European airlines are among ten largest in the world, i.e. Lufthansa,
British Airways and Air France. But only British Airways and Swissair appear
reasonably profitable. In 1991 at the bottom of the recession, there were almost no
openings of new routes in Europe, while about fifty, new routes were considered
common in the previous years. At the same time, many secondary routes were closed,
and orders in new planes fell by 43%.
By the year 2,000 the number of annual flights in Europe will increase from 3.6 million
to seven million. The express courier service is expanding by 15% per year. Certain
Europeancitiesarebecominghubsfor multinationals,e.g.Brussels for DHL, Cologne
for TNT and UPS. But the annual losses associated with congestion were estimated at
_4 million per year for British Airways, DEM200 million for Luflhansa, and FFR2.00
million for Air France. For the mid-1990s, the annual cost of congestion in Europe
was estimated at approximately $5 billion. It appears that this can double by the year
2,000. The majority of flights in Europe use the space of at least three states. For
example, the Amsterdam-Nice flight uses the national spaces of Netherlands, Belgium,
Luxembourg, France and Switzerland. Noise reduction lengthen the routings to avoid
flying over the towns at low altitudes. Price competition is tough between 40
competing carriers in North Atlantic which represents about one third of the turnover
for ,,he European airlines. The American airlines benefit from air deremalation in the
USA and service about 70% of traffic with France.
Concentration and globalisation are on the way. The European carriers have to
compete with the American giants and the ag_essive Asian companies. The Asian
fleet is most modern, and staff is two or three times cheaper. Co-operation agreements
are popular in order to limit expenses. Atlas Group in I968 and KSSU Group in 1969
were among the first to develop strategic partnerships. Later British Airways, Alitalia,
KLM, Sabena and Swissair collectively created the electronic booking system Galileo.
In 1987 Air France, Luflhansa, Iberia and SAS established the Amadeus system. The
European companies make joint purchases, exchange aircraft or jet engines, co-
ordinate pilot training and exchange managers. The European companies need
partnerships because they cannot develop global airline systems on their own.
The European Commission of Civil Aviation decided that a single centre of air traffic
control would be installed in Brussels. A better radar cover and harmonisation between
42 control centres would result. The USA covers the territory twice as large as Europe
using only 20 control centres. In 1993, several relevant programmes were launched.
One of them was ARTAS (ATC radar tracker and server) for which Thomson-CFS
had to design a single radar system in order to replace about 30 existing systems. IBM
and [DE (Interactive Development Environments) had to provide a software platform
common to all European air control systems. There was a project of the European
compulsory incidents analysis system, similar to the ,_nerican Aviation Safe W
Reporting System.
Official goals can be imposed on the public airlines from outside. However the
unofficial objective of corporate survival tends to remain dominant. Many of the
airlines survive due to preferential access to capital funding, tax exemptions, restrictive
national regulations or bilateral agreements. For a long time, the European public
airlines have resisted the advent of effective competition using their influence on
political and legislative decision making. The European customers do not seem to care
if they are transported by foreign companies, provided the prices and the quality of
service improve.
2 METHOD.
The aim of liberalisation is to leave the market find the prices and configuration of
services, by removing controls. Several objectives are pursued:
l to use contestability to determine costs, outputs, prices and the market structure;
2 to replicate contestability when it is insufficient;
3 to establish a set of guidelines for the European and national regulations; and
4 to assess the impact on the industry.
The analytical method is based on the theories of contestability and strategic
partnerships and networks. The following working assumptions are made:
1 Competition can be promoted or contestable conditions can be created.
2 Barriers to entry and exit can be minimized.
3 Quasi-monopolies can be ended, resulting in better allocation of resources.
4 Contestability creates oppommities for innovations and dynamic efficiency.
Consumer surplus in the European air transport is lower than it could be, and
consumers' wants cannot effectively guide the allocation of resources and future
supply. Consequently, there is a scope for improving the range of services so that they
better reflect the evolving demand. Biased pricing results in poorer services and
enhanced costs. Tariffs did not appear to encourage the best use of the air transport
facilities. The rates of growth in the European airports have been lower than in the of
the world. Moreover, the tariffs provided suboptimal guidance for corporate
investment/divestment decisions. The institutional and motivational constraints
checked the diffusion of benefits from new investments. In a more contestable
environment, the demand would become more elastic, and the customers could reap
higher benefits. The highest mark-up is attained under quasi-monopoly. But under
growing contestability, new entries are encouraged. Capacity and provision of services
expand beyond the level which assures the highest unit mark-up. This is advantageous
to the customers. Liberalisation increases capacity supply and diversify the range of
services.
The theory of contestability provided basis for the endogenous determination of cost
functions, and market structures. The market structure is considered sustainable if at
the existent prices costs are covered and there exists no output-price combination for
potential entrants that can yield economic profits. Entry costs represent the critical
mass of minimum investment which a firm must make before it can assume operations
(Ansoff, 1987).
The Sherman Act (1890) enacted anti-trust legislation. Big firms' efficiency had been
rationalised by economies of scale. The role of regulation was seen as setting legal
constraints on natural monopolies. The adverse effects of rivalry were emphasized in
the context of predatory competition. However the perfectly competitive model is not
applicable to the air transport because the important economies of scope originate
from indivisible transport infrastructures which provide multiple services
simultaneously. It is essential is to make entry and exit as free as possible. In
diversifyingthe rangeof services,emphasisfromlargescalefor oneserviceshiftsto
multi-servicepartnershipsandnetworks.Rapidadvancesin informationtechnology
andtelecommunicationshelpto widenchoicesfor thecustomers.
The behaviourof existingfirmsand likely entrantsis treatedasymmetrically.The
presentfirmstry to meethetotaldemandattheexistingprice.Thelatententrantscan
coveronlya fractionof demandat theprice. It isassumedthattheexistingfirmsdo
not reactimmediatelyto thenew entrantsofferinga lowerprice. The shorterthe
reactionof theavailablefirms,thelesstheopportunityof aprofitableentryto succeed.
Successof potentialentriesdependsonthepriceaftertheentry.
The originaldissertation(Briand1995)coversthe assumptionsand mathematical
formulationof identicalcost functions,representativefirm, static and dynamic
framework of ultra-free entry, and the primacy of potential competition. It has been
shown that the contestable assumptions are either too restrictive such as the absence of
entry and exit barriers, or logically incoherent e.g. the non-reaction of existing firms to
new entrants. Despite its imperfections, the theory plays an important role in the
renewal of the market structures and provides guidelines for regulation. Contestable
pressures are considered effective when the market requires little regulation.
The framework of strategic networks is complementary to contestability in finding
new market configurations. The purpose of flexible strategic partnerships is to respond
quickly to the accelerating change in customers' preferences, competition and
technology. The concept of strategic partnerships focuses on positioning firms in the
production chain so that value to the customers can become optimal (Webster, 1992).
The most significant feature of deregulated sectors is that the price differentiation
increases for short distances but decreases for long distances. It seems that stronger
price discrimination on short distance trips is conditioned by a finer segmentation of
the customers. The important test of deregulation is whether the consumer surplus
and other indicators of collective well-being improved.
3 DISCUSSION.
In October 1978 President Carter published his Airline Deregulation Act. The US
experience was important for subsequent deregulation in other markets. In 1986 the
European Court of Justice ruled that the Competition Articles of the Treaty of Rome
should be applied to the EC air services. In December 1987 the European ministers
agreed on a three-year programme of gradual liberalisation. Entry was made a little
easier, with a number of airlines allowed to operate in the dense markets. A
considerable freedom was granted for carriers to serve thinner routes with small
aircraft Capacity and pricing restrictions have to be eased. The airlines from one
country would be able to hold up to 60°,/o of the capacity in each city-pair market. The
airlines with lower costs would be able to introduce lower fares and practice discount
fares.
Finally, there have been significant moves towards competition throu_ granting of the
Fifth Freedom Opportunities. The classification of international traffic was set by the
ChicagoConferenceon InternationalCivil Aviationin 1944. In five categories of
traffic, the nationality of the airline counts, not the nationality of the passengers. The
First Freedom grants the right to fly over another country without landing. The
Second Freedom allows a technical stop in another country for refuelling or repairs.
The Third Freedom gives the right to take passengers or cargo in the home country of
the airline and carry them to a destination in a foreign country. The Fourth Freedom
gives the right to bring passengers of a foreign origin to a destination in the home
country. The Fifth Freedom means the right to collect passengers or cargo from other
countries and take them to a destination that is not in the home country of the airline.
Most countries grant the first two freedoms. But since the following three freedoms
involve the establishment of scheduled airline services, these must be granted on the
bilateral basis. The Bermuda agreement linked the Fifth Freedom to capacity. However
the Fifth freedom is commonly not granted. This puts a limit on changing networks,
and restricts displacing through competition.
For example, Virgin Airlines is unable to compete for Air France passengers if the
United Kingdom is not part of the itinerary. The airlines should be in the position to
choose hubs and experience fair competition on a route-by-route basis. The USA can
permit a European carrier to conduct a service to New York via Montreal, but carriage
of traffic only between Montreal and New York is not allowed. In the Second
Bermuda Agreement the USA accepted a number of such services east of London.
The new American approach is to remove from bilateral agreements regulation of the
Fifth Freedom traffic, frequency and capacity. Airlines from one EC country were
allowed to carry traffic between points in two other countries, providing not more than
30% of the up-lift consisted of locally originating traffic.
The United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium and Ireland favour the open European
sky. The domestic market from the Heathrow airport used to be the monopoly of
British Airways. Now access to others is much easier and there are virtually no price
controls. Since 1983, the UK signed a number of bilateral agreements for air services.
These agreements allow open entry, intense price competition and they are almost
completely free in capacity scheduling. But the Mediterranean countries prefer to
carry their own and numerous foreign tourists without competition. Yet in June 1994
France was forced by Brussels to open its Orly airport to British Airways and its
subsidiaries such as TAT. In addition, the most profitable Paris-Toulouse and Paris-
Nice routes were given to competition. This change can have serious financial
consequences since the generated surplus was used to cross-subsidize deficits on many
routes with public service characteristics.
Operational costs of the European airlines are higher compared to their American and
Asian rivals. The air links are considerably shorter in Europe. The number of highly
profitable routes is limited. Social constraints are stronger in Europe. However in
September 1992 the USA and Netherlands signed an open-sky agreement which allows
their airlines to fly without restrictions in the air space of both countries. This
agreement allows the USA to better control the transatlantic traffic flows. In 1994
Lutlhansa signed a similar agreement and other agreements can follow. Bilateral
agreements appear to be favourable to the American airlines. The American airlines
have secured 19 fights over the coastal traffic in Europe. Therefore, Brussels would
like to be able to negotiate by itself.
Thefollowingareasseemmostimportantfor regulation:predatorypricing,ticket
conditions,financialtransparency,safety,and allocationof airport slots. The
predatorybehaviour impliesacceptinga short-termlossleadingto a monopolistic
position.Theattractionof suchstrategyis reducedby extendingtheperiodof loss.
Besidesroutingsandnetworkconfigurations,lotallocationiscritical.Airlinesserving
a particularoutewill not becompetingfairlyunlesstheyhaveaccessto equivalent
slotsat eachendof the link. Theusualmethodof slotallocationat the European
airportsis basedon 'grandfatherrights', i.e.if anairlineuseda particularslotat the
sametimelastyear,it will get theslotthefollowingyear. Schedulingcommitteesat
theairportsaremadeupof representativesof themajorairlines,e.g.BritishAirwaysat
Heathrow.Thisputsnewentrantsat adisadvantage.Sincetheslotsareallocatedto
airlinesratherthan to routes,the big carriershave the flexibility to deal with
competitiononeachspecificroutewhilethesmallerairlinesareunableto respond.
Theairportswill retain several monopoly characteristics. Baggage handling, ticketing,
duty free sales, accommodation and catering are airport services. The passengers
cannot leave the airport for a drink or a snack. The interests of the airport operators
will not completely coincide with those of the customers or local inhabitants.
Customers need to be directly represented in the decision making on running the
airports. Since the airports have significant impacts on their environment, there is a
need to take the inhabitants' views into account.
4 CONCLUSION.
The purpose of this paper was to outline priorities for liberalising European air
transport. Although the empirical evidence from the US air industry has not fully
supported all contestability assumptions, prices have fallen, networks have expanded,
and the customers have benefited. More slots have been created and competition
increased. Both price and quality of service appear to be better in America than in
more regulated markets.
Similarly, the increased competition in the United Kingdom has improved services. Up
to the 1990s, the liberalisation of air transport in Europe did not seem very effective.
Protection of the incumbent public airlines appears to be detrimental to the customers
and the taxpayers. But while competition is on the rise, some governments still
continue subsidising their national carriers, e.g. Air France. The sheltered markets exist
in quite a number of countries. They result in redistribution of consumer surplus to the
providers of air services.
However, successful companies use market segmentation and positioning to match
supply and demand. Under pressures of liberalisation, there is a definite move towards
globalisation. With over 400 alliances worldwide, the industry is changing to meet the
needs of global market. Priorities for liberalisation were outlined such as removal of
restrictions on route access and capacity related to the carriers' nationality, ending
national public monopolies over air transport. Private companies or partnerships
appearto provideservicesat lowerfinancialcosts,transactioncostsandsocialcosts.
Thecustomersexpresspreferencesfor wideningthechoiceof competingcompanies.
In liberalisedmarkets,theregulatoryauthoritiesneedto preventpredatorypricingand
price collusion, maintain high safety standards,make obligatory insurance
arrangementsto compensatethe customersin caseof airlinesgoing bankrupt.
Regulationwouldsafeguardthe fair allocationof slots.Mechanismsareneededto
ensurethatthecustomers'andenvironmentalists'viewsareadequatelyrepresentedin
decision-making.It ismostencouragingthatthecustomersarereapingrewards.
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1 INTRODUCTION
On April 1st, 1997 the formal deregulation of :he airline industry within the European Union
(EU) was finally completed. Since that date, any technically qualified EU (plus Iceland and
Nornvay) airline could operate in any region of the Union, even in wholly domeszic routes,
without restraints either on fares or capacity. Th:s was the final step in a large process started
at the mid-1980s, after the success, and as a :onsequence of, non-European deregulation
experiences.
One of the most defining particular features of this European process has been its two-level
pattern. Previous air transport deregulation expe:-iences in the US, Canada and Australia taught
European countries that prior to, or instead of, embarking on a complete deregulation of the
whole industry., governments should test it on a _mall range. First, at a strict nationai level, by
means of liberalising agreements negotiated between pairs of countries (particularly UK,
Ireland. Belgium and The Netherlands) which abolished controls on market ent U and tariffs.
And second, by harmonisation measures at the EU level, as intended by the three deregulation
packages released in 1987, 1990 and 1992 (CAA. 1993).
Despite their common intention, the effects of th:_se two different deregulation levels are not
always multiplicative. In already liberalised routes, the harmonisation measures brought fewer
improvements, and decreases in fares were only c0servable in those routes where the bilateral
schemes that intended to maintain duopolistic righ:s for national carriers were removed.
The literature on European air transport deregulation has frequently addressed the study of the
effects of this process by focusing on the specific impact of concrete liberalising measures (for
example, Puke, 1991, or McGowan and Seabright, 1989), and particularly, on airlines' cost or
efficiency parameters (Encaoua, 1991). Our note. however, specifically focuses on prices and
extends the work by Betancor and Jorge-Calderdn (1996) in order to anaIvse the complete
deregulation process on a same set of individuals (routes) during nine consecutive years.
Even reckoning that it is still too early to evaluate the effects of the latest measures, this note
intends to assess empirically the results of the first phase (1986-1994) of the European airline
deregulation in order to draw some conclusions on what kind of results are expected during
the next five years, according to the pace and effectiveness of the process so far.
To do this, we use a panel sample of 44 city-pair 5ntra-EU scheduled routes and estimate
different standard price equations to evaluate the relevance both of the deregulation packages
of 1987, 1990 and 1992 and the liberal bilateral arrangements that several countries had agreed
on before.
The remaining parts of this note are divided as tbilows. Section 2 characterises the leading
features of the European deregulation process and the context in which the main measures
were adopted. In section 3 we describe the empirical model used to assess the effects of the
deregulation process on prices. Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of the results from model
estimation and, finally, section 5 summarises our main conclusions.
2 TIlE EUROPEANDEREGULATIONPOLICY
WhentheTreatyof Rome was signed in 1957 the huge differences among Member States' air
transpcrt industries made it impossible to reach an overall agreement on how this sector should
be regulated. Therefore, only the general principles on competition were enforceable for this
market.
These differences widened during the subsequent years, since the absence of homogenous
provisions and poticy guidelines encouraged many governments to pursue particular objectives.
Bilateral agreements, either to facilitate competition or to consecrate barriers to entry
according to national conveniences, were settled all over Europe (Caves and Higgins, 1993).
This situation sparked several conflicts between tile European Commission (EC) and member
states until 1987, where, as a consequence of a resolution of the European Supreme Court, the
first liberalisation package, was released.
The package only applied to inter-European scheduled operations and comprised several
regulations, all enforceable from January 1st, 1988 First, Council Directive 87/601 regulated
the pricing policy for intra-European scheduled flights. Several fare--elves were created,
allowing for up to sixty-five to ninety percent discount for certain restricted-conditions tickets.
Council Decision 87/602 allowed capacity-distribution agreements between existing carriers
and softened the conditions tbr new entrants, although several limits were imposed on these
agreements to avoid unfair competition practices.
This decision also let governments authorise second operators at the intra-European Ievel for
certain high density corridors and created traPfic rights between regional and central airports,
even though these measures had not been contemplated in existing bilateral agreements. It also
allowed airlines to carry passengers between states different from that of the nationality of the
carrier with an upper limit of thirty percent of capacity (fifihfi'eedom righls), l
Finally, Council Regulations 3975/87 and 3976/'87 defined competition rules for air transport
and authorised Commission to guarantee block exemptions regarding certain agreements
among carriers as joint planning and capacity co-ordination, revenue share, tariff consultations,
allocation of slots, joint ownership of computer reservation systems and land assistance
services. Block exemptions should expire by January 31st, 1991.
The second deregulation package was released in June 1990 and included three important
measures. Council Regulation 2342/90 replaced the existing fare-zones system by a more
flexible one, which determined that member states should approve airlines' prices according to
well-defined criteria: long-run carrier's costs, a fair margin on costs, adequate compensation to
capital, consumer's benefit, the market competitive environment and the need to prevent
predatory, practices. The double approval system was replaced by a double disapproval one,
under which both countries had to disapprove a fare in order to reject it
The freedoms of the air. as agreed in the Chicago Convcntion (1944). are: First Freedom. or the right of the
airline of one country to fly over the territory, of another country..Second Freedom. or the right of an auriine to
make a stop m another country due to technical reasons. Tturd Freedom, or the right of an airline to c,arry
traffic from its home country, to another country. Fourth Freedo_n.or the rigltt of an airline to carry, trailic from
another countr," to its home country. Fifth Freedom. or the right of an airline to carry, traffic bet_e_n t_vo
foreign countries on a route beginning or ending in its home count_,. Sixth Freedom, or the right of an airline
to carD' tr,_c between two foreign countrtcs via its home country, and. Seventh Freedom. or the right of an
airline to carry traffic bet_veentwo foreign countries without stopping in its home country.
CouncilRegulation2343/90setnewconditionsfor entryto scheduledintra-Europeanroutes
andfor capacitydistributionagreements.Multipledesignationwasallowedfor somehigh
densityroutes.Thirdandfourthfreedomrightswereapplicableall overtheCommunitywhilst
limitsto fifth freedomrightswereamplifiedup to fifty percentof seats.CouncilRegulation
2344/90extendedblocksexemptionsuntilDecember31st,1992.
OnJuly23rd,1992theCounciladoptedfivemeasureswhichconstitutedthethirdpackagein
theliberalisationof EUaviationindustryandcompletedthemarketorganisationof thissector.
Theintentionof thispackagewasto openupnationalmarketsbyallowingEuropeanairiinesto
competefreelyinanintegratedmarketwithprice-settingsubjectodoubledisapproval.
CouncilRegulation2407/92onthelicensingof air carriersdefinedthecriteriato berequired
by nationalauthoritiesfor grantingoperatorlicences.It includedsector-specificruleson
licensingof air carrierswhichaimedto establishlegalandeconomicstandardswhileensuring
theabsenceof discriminationby nationality.Morespecifically,it dealtwitheffectivecontrol,
majorityshareholding,solvencyrequirements,periodicfinancialmonitoring,andrequirements
for acommoncertificateonsafetyfitness,
CouncilRegulation2408/92onaccessfor air carriers to intra-European air routes abolished
most of previous restrictions. This regulation on market access granted fifth freedom rights and
authorised conseculive cabolage between EU airports. It also eliminated capacity-sharing for
airlines on routes between member states. As from January 1st, 1993 airlines were able to fly
from place to place within another state. However, cabotage was introduced in phases. Until
April 1997 airlines could offer a maximum of fifty percent of seats in a stopover in another
member state. From that date, the restriction will be dropped.
Finally, Council Regulation 2409/92 on air fares and rates for air services established that
airlines were free to set fares as from January 1st 1993, only with some safeguards intended to
protect consumer and industry interests. Other regulations in the third package as Council
Regulation 2410/92 and 2411/92 contain amendments regarding the application of the rules on
competition to undertakings in the sector and extend again the limit of some block exemptions.
In conclusion, the European Commission has committed itself to full liberalisation of air
transport by the end of the transition period (April 1st, 1997). Therefore, increased
competition will come about gradually as the transition period allows free market access to EU
air carriers and the freedom to fly wherever they wish within the EU territory.
3 THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
This section studies the empirical effects of the above described deregulation process on prices.
To do this, the city-pair route is selected as the primary unit of analysis and a panel data sample
of 44 international intra-European routes for the 1986-1994 period is constructed. We just
consider passenger traffic of scheduled airlines, for which data are available and comparable
from international reliable sources.
The routes in our panel dataset exhibit different degrees of liberalisation during this period. For
example, in 1986 most of continental routes departing from UK had been already liberalised as
a result of liberal bilateral agreements, especially with Ireland, Belgium and the Netherlands.
Othercountriesreachedthe_esortof liberalbilateralagreeme':tsm lateryearsin oursample
period,whereastheremainingroutesstayedhighlymonopolisedor duopolisedbynationalflag
carriers.
Thus,themainpurposeof thissectionis to investigatetheexistenceof distinctandsignificant
empiricaleffectson pricesdueto thisderegulationprocess,bothat theparticularrouteIevel
dueto bilateraliberalisationandtheoveralleffectof the 1987,1990and1992deregulation
packages.We use differentprice definitions,correspondingto different tare structures
currentlychargedbytheairlinesandstudytheirrelationshipwith theregulatoryregimefaced
ineachrouteandothersupplyanddemandfactors.
Thestandardcompetitivemodel,togetherwith previousnon-Europeanair transportdere-
gulationexperiencessupportthemainpredictionthatwe test.In principle,we expecto find
that,in case&the effects of deregulation being statistically significant, the level of competition
will increase. In terms of price, this implies that fares in deregulated routes, as compared v_s ci
vts to regulated ones, should be lower. Alternatively, other measurements of competition could
be used. For example, we expect that the average number of competitors must be larger in
deregulated routes, the number of discount tariffs offered to travellers must be higher and the
volume of discounts, calculated with respect to a standard tare must be also larger in
deregulated routes (provided no change in the standard tare).
We have controlled by demand variables, such as the number of passengers carried and supply
variables, such as the number of flights. We have also used the load or seat factor, (which
allows us to calculate the supplied capacity) and a density variable for each route. The
availability of a panel dataset has also allowed us to test tbr the existence of fixed-effects at the
route level. These effects could be interpreted as non-observable route characteristics (such as
traNc type, safety, cultural links .... ) whose omission, if relevant, would yield inconsistent
estimates.
3. i Sample selection
We have selected 44 international intra-European city-pair round-trip routes by using three
criteria. Table I in the Appendix shows the selected routes, their number of order within the
densest international scheduled European routes, their distance in kilometres and the
regulatory regime the?' have maintained during the sample period 1986-1994.
The first criterion to include a route in our sample is its representativeness in intra-European
scheduled passenger traffic, z Table 1 indicates that 26 out of our 44 routes are within the 75
densest routes in Europe according to ICAO Statistics. We have included six of the top ten
routes and ten of the first 25 most important ones. The inclusion of, for example, all 75 densest
routes would have biased our sample against the two following criteria.
The second criterion used in the sample selection was a geographical one. Though it was not
possible to include at least one route by each EU member, we tried to select all types of
traffics, from each possible point of departure/destination in the European Union. The average
distance between the selected cities/airports is about 600 kms, but we also have 17 routes with
" Although Austria told Sweden were non-EU members at the beginning of our sample period, the existing EU-
EFTA agrcements allow us to apply them the same criteria as the other EU routes.
lessthan500 kmsand another17with morethan 1000kms.To theextentthat it could
constituteanimportantdistortionwhenanalysingprices,wehaveexplicitlytakenintoaccount
theeffectof distanceonourestimates.
Thethirdcriterionusedin theconstructionof the datasethasbeentheregulatoryregime.
Apartfrom the deregulationpackagesof 1987,1990and 1992the routesincludedin our
samplefacedifferentregulatoryregimesdueto the existenceof differentypesof bilateral
agreements.AsshowedinTableI, in25casestheroutesareconsideredregulated,in thesense
describedabove.Another17routesarederegulatedoverthewhole1986-1994period.Note
thattheapparentselectionbiasin favourofUK routesisduebothto completethepanelwitha
similarnumberof regulated(568%)andderegulatedroutes(38.6%),in orderto avoidlater
estimationproblems,and to take into accountthe leadingrole of LrK in air transport
deregulation. The remaining two routes are partially deregulated during the period, since its
deregulation was not completed until 1988.
In conclusion, in terms of observations our panel consists of 396 observations (44 routes
during nine years) although the presence of missing values renders an effective sample of about
200-250 observations for most of our pe,'-formed estimations.
3.2 Data sources
In order to carry out the analysis described above, data from traffic and fares corresponding
just to scheduled flights at the route level of aggregation were needed. Data on passengers,
flights, seat factors and number of operators within each route were obtained from D'affic by
Flight Stage, a yearly survey produced by ICAO, from years 1986 to 1994. Data on fares were
collected from the ABU World Airline GuMes, 3 a monthly publication with detailed
information on prices.
Due to the extended practice of price discrimination existing in the air industry there is not a
unique price definition, even within a same route. Therefore, to select the price, we proceeded
at a two-stage level. First, we got the local currency level of the four most relevant fares,
which are present in almost all routes selected. These are the standard Tourist fare (Y-class or
Economy class), the Excursion fare (E-class), the PEX fare and the SPEX fare. Second, to
make it possible to compare these prices both at country level and across-time, we deflated
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them all at 1986 prices and then converted the resulting figure to a common currency.
The Excursion, PEX and SPEX fares constitute discount fares with respect to the standard
one. Thus, as a final stage of the analysis, we calculated the percentage of discount of these
three fares with respect to the standard Economy fare and the number of other existing
s Later renamed as 0.4 G II'brld Airline Guides (1990-1994). The figures on dus source provided the domestic
currency,rotmd-trip fare between two cities tltrough the shortest route. In certmn cases, when the rotmd-trip fare
was not available we simply doubled the single-trip one. It was not possible to obtain an average fare for each
year. Therefore. we decided to select a single month as representative for the nine-year period. To avoid
distortions due to the Summer and Chrisunas seasons (where most companies modify their tariffs) we chose
November. and when multiple fares existed, we got the lowest one searching the ltighest incidence of the
deregulation process.
Since it is one of the official currencies used by ICAO (which also provides official exctmnge rates) and given
the large number of UK routes selected, we finally chose the sterling pound. Alternatively, to check whether the
currency, choice was critical, we also repeated all our estimations using ECUs and a European-averageprice
index. Our qualitative results did not chmlge with respect to those finally reported in die Appendix.
disc_unthres.Usually,thesetaresarerestrictedto certainconditionsrelatedto cancellation,
connectionto otherflightsandnumberof daysstayingat destination,in thesensethat the
lowerthetare, the stricter the conditions. A complete and detailed description of the sample
can be tbund in the _bllowing section.
3.3 Data description
Table 2 shows the distribution of the number of passengers by years in our sample, according
to the type of route considered. Note that, although the average annual growth tbr the period
is about 20 percent, this figure is misleading, since years 1990o1991 experienced negative
rates, mainly as a consequence of the world situation, particularly, the Gulf War and the
subsequent fuel price shock, since both phenomena froze the expansion of the airline industry
during these years.
The distribution of passengers carried in regulated and deregulated routes is almost the same
and it is maintained during the period. This contributes to consider that the impact of demand
factors in our estimations will be fairly represented. A similar conclusion can be drawn form
Table 3, which shows, within our sample, the distribution of the number of flights by types of
routes. As expected, the partial correlation coefficient between passenger and fligt_ts variables
is very high (0.9087), although the observed load factors are not, as illustrated in Table 4.
Witi_ regard to the number of competitors within each route, we consider they are defined by
airlines with more than 5,000 passengers a year or, in weak demand conditions, by airlines with
a significant share of the market. ,_rlines within the same industrial group are not considered
as separate competitors.
Table 5 exhibits two additional important features. First, the comparison of regulated and
deregulated routes shows that for all years the average number of competitors is always larger
for the second group and this difference is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence
level according to standard mean tests. This relationship favours our expected results. The
second feature, however, is that the last column does not reflect an increasing number of
competitors year after year, so that the effect of the deregulato_ packages does net appear to
be represented in this table.
This result is contradicted by last column of Table 6. The average number of discount tariffs
increases from 1986 onwards, although the last three years of the sample show a moderate
decline. At the same time, deregulated routes appear to offer, on average a larger number of
discount tariffs, in accordance with Table 5.
Table 7 illustrates the evolution of tares distinguishing between regulated an deregulated
routes. In order to make the comparison possible, the figures represent real 1986 sterling
pounds per kilometre, and have been calculated using the criteria defined above. 5
A common feature shared by the four types of fares is the fact that the deregulated ones are
always larger than the corresponding regulated tares. These results coincide with those of
Table 8, although referred to the percentage of discount calculated with respect to the standard
tare. However, since this result may be affected by the fact that the average distance in
5 Note that we ignore economies of scale in this first ceteris partbus comparison mnong fares. They will be
considered in next section.
deregulatedroutesis smaller(seeTablel), detailedeconometric estimations, controiling by
this and other factors are required.
3.4 Model specification
Our aim is to examine the relationship between each route's characteristics, the level of
deregulation affecting it, and a given price variable. To do this we use the panel database
(i= 1..... 44; t= 1986 ..... 1994) described above and estimate both pooling and panel regressions,
where the dependent variable is the tare (in different forms) or some other related variable.
Several functional forms were investigated in preliminary regressions but below we only report
results corresponding to the linear and log-linear specifications, which yielded the best fits.
Apart from those described before, these models have made use of the following variables:
• DEREGULATION
• DISTANCE
• DENSITY
• LOAD FACTOR
• FLIGHTS
• DISCOUNT
FARES
• INCOME
• OPERATORS
• YEAR 87- 94
• Y-FARE
• E-FARE
• PEX-FARE
• SPEX-FARE:
Dummy variable that captures the effect of liberal bilateral agreements. This
variable takes value 0 in regulated routes and 1 in deregulated ones.
Distance between cittes of origin aud destination in kms.
Dummy variable that refers to tile average number of passengers in a route. The
variable is equal to tl whe,_ there are on average 100.000 passengers or less in a
given route. In other cases, the variable takes wtlue [.
Average load factor
Number of one-way flights on each route.
1Different types of discount fares available on each route, independently of
operators.
Index of per capita GDP of the countD'.
It includes operators with more than 5000 passengers a )'ear or with a significant
part of the market when the route suffers from weak demand.
Dunurty variables that arc equal to 1 on the specified ?'ear. They capture time and
deregulation packages effects.
Cheapest Economy airfare (round trip) in constant 1986 sterling pounds.
Cheapest Excursion airfare (round trip) in constant 1.986 sterling pounds.
Cheapest PEX aiffare (round Irip) in constant 1986 sterling pounds.
Cheapest SuperPEX airfare (round trip) in constant 1986 sterling pounds.
In the case of pooling regressions the estimation have been performed by OLS with error
correction methods in order to get estimates robust both to heteroscedasticity and error
autocorrelation problems. Since we depart from reduced forms models, an omitted-variable
test has also been carried out, allowing us to reject the hypothesis that most of our models do
not have important omitted variables.
In the case of panel data analysis, we have estimated cross-sectional time-series regression
models, including fixed-effects (within routes) and random effects (mixed) models. _ In
general, the model is specified as: y, = ct + IBX_,+ rh + e_t, where y_t corresponds to the price
variable, X, refers to the explanatory regressors (including dereguIation variables), rt_ stands
for the (unobservable) individual effect, and t:, is the random error.
6 Wc ltave used the stmtdard Breusch azld Pagan Lagrange multiplier test for razldottt effects, aztd Hausmazl's
specification test on tl_e appropriateness of the random-effects estimator.
4 RESULTS
We have firstly estimated a model where the fare in levels is the dependent variable; its results
are reported on Table 9. Our four fare-variables, Economy (Y), Excursion (E), PEX and
SPEX are regressed against a set of explanatory, variables chosen after pertbrmmg several
previous estimations, the most important one among these, for our purposes, being the
dc:'eguhlt/o_J variable. Two types of models are considered, Model 1 and Model 2. They differ
in that the second type incorporates variables in logs when feasible, thus it is a model in
double-tog tbrm.
The deregulation variable behaves as expected only for the Y-tare. It seems that deregulated
routes enjoy lower economy fares. According to parameter values from Model 2, such a fare
would be 7 percent cheaper on average for deregulated routes. For the E-tare and PEX-t'are
results are not conclusive and very much dependent on the type of model chosen. Only tbr the
SPEX-fare there would not be any difference between types of routes.
Some year-specific regressors are only significant for the Economv and PEX-fare. There seems
to be a trend to reduce these fares at the beginning of the period. Bearing in mind that in 1987
a first package of deregulation measures was introduced at a European level, this could be
interpreted as a preliminary effect of European air transport deregulation. Nevertheless year
1992 brought with it new increases for the economy tare followed in the subsequent year by a
decrease in the PEX-fare.
For the rest of control variables we find ti_at distance has a direct effect on tares. As expected,
travelling on longer routes would be more expensive tbr all types of fares considered. The
density variable is playing an important role only for the Y-tare case; Economy fares would be
higher on denser routes, while the rest of tariffs would remain similar. The greater the load
factor the smaller the level of prices, this could also be anticipated as higher load factors allow
a reduction of unit costs and, hence, of fares. Finally, as it was also expected, wherever the
national income is higher passengers must face also a higher level of fares.
The analysis of discounts in Table 10, implies that deregulated routes offer smaller discounts
for PEX and SPEX fares, while it appears that there is no significant difference for the E-tare.
These results must be interpreted in connection to those of Table 9, Since the percentage of
discount are worked out in relation to the Y-fare, and this one becomes smaller on liberalised
routes, we could also expect getting similar (E-fare) or lower (PEX and SPEX) percentages of
discount. It seems that airlines operating in more liberalised routes have a narrower margin to
offer price discounts, and therefore, these discounts expressed as percentages, are actually
similar or even smaller.
Economies of scale might induce greater discounts according to the distance variable, while the
discount on denser routes would be smaller only for the SPEX tariff. With respect to the
number of flights and load factors variables it seems that they might be increased through a
discount pricing policy. Again, the national income variable is playing an important role in the
same sense as in results from Table 9, except for the SPEX-fare, that behaves independently of
tNs index variable.
Regarding to time effects, it is important to point out that all the estimated parameters for the
SPEX-fare exhibit a negative sign, whilst for the PEX-fare most estimates present a positive
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one.Accordingto thisresultit wouldbehappeningthatthe levelof discountbr tt_e former,
affected mainly by the first deregulation package, was initially decreasing. However, just after
the last two pieces of European liberalisation were passed, discounts for the PEX-fare were
increasing. This result might be interpreted as a positive market response if one bear in mind
that the PEX-fare is not so much restricted as its counterpart SPEX. Nevertheless the impact
tbr the SPEX-fare is not always significant, and tbr the PEX-t'are the last year considered in the
database does not capture any significant change, so we cannot be certain about ti_e continuity
of this change.
The most striking impact of deregulation is reported on Table 11. The range of discounted
fares available tbr passengers selection is much wider, around 87 percent higher, on routes
where liberal bilateral agreements are applied. This increasing number of discount fares appears
also to be the effect of European air transport deregulation packages. Time variables are
significant from 1989 onwards and, although the effect takes a lag of a couple of years to
appear, it stands until 1994. Competition among airlines, as the variable number of operators
indicates, takes place through availability of quite a good number of different discounted tares.
Finally Table 12 refer to panel regression estimates when Hausman tests indicate that fixed
effects might be important. This is only the case of the percentage of discount for the E-fare in
logs form Taking into account fixed effects, it happens that the percentage of discount is
similar between both types of routes. This finding would support previous pooling estimation
results.
5 CONCLUSIONS
In this note we have carried out an empirical assessment of the effects of deregulation on the
pricing policies of the European air industry from 1986 to 1994 for the scheduled passengers
traffic. Our basic unit of analysis is the city-pair route, since we also consider this as the basic
unit of competition for this sort of traffic. Two types of deregulation effects have been
modelled. First, strict route-deregulation effect, according to the existence or not of liberal
bilateral agreements between the countries involved in any single route. Second, a pure time-
deregulation effect, according to the progressive influence of the European Commission
deregulation packages that came into place at years 1987, 1990 and 1992.
To capture these effects we compare different price definitions over forty-four different
international intra-European routes consecutively observed for nine years. In order to make the
comparison valuable, we control not only by deregulation variables, but also by several supply
and demand variables, such as passengers-kms, number of flights, distance, load factor and per
head income. We also control by unobservable individual effects that may possibly affect the
validity of the estimated coefficients.
In terms of fares in levels we can only confirm that the basic standard fare (Y-fare) is around a
7 percent lower in those routes where liberal bilaterals are in force, whilst the SPEX-fare
would be similar. With respect to other fares our econometric results are not conclusive. Once
special features of routes are bore in mind including fixed effects, it happens that the effect of
liberal bilaterals in Europe seems to be very weak.
When percentages of discount with respect to the Economy fare are calculated, we have
surprisingly found that these are always lower in routes subject to liberal bilaterals, but for the
E-fare. There is also an important difference between the PEX and SPEX-fare in terms of the
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Europeanliberalisationprocess.Tile discountappliedto the tbrmerhasbeenincreasingat
some points in time, though the trend tbr the last is to experienced lower percentages mainly at
the beginning of the period. Thus the impact of the European deregulation process, if any, has
not been the same as the one exerted by liberal bilateral agreements.
However, the most striking impact of such bilateral agreements has been the proliferation of
tariffs, allowing passengers to choose among a greater range of tares that could be now on
average 87 percent higher. Airlines are nowadays working with a greater number of discounted
tares, this might also indicate they could be now getting lower yields if these tariffs were
actually widely available in terms of seats being offered on a discount basis. This information is
not published in Europe, however significance of the toad factor parameter and relevant
literature ['or the United States case (Keeler, 199l) would support it. In relation to the
European deregulation packages, it is also the case that effects on levels of fares have been
negligible so far. Again, its impact is tbund in the greater number of fares that are now
available to passengers.
[n conclusion, our work shows that the effects of the air transport deregulation process in
Europe have been much more gradual than other non-European experiences. This is so
because the European process has been phased in over a lengthy period and the nature and the
intensity of government inte_'ention varied enormously between different countries. This
makes that the first two years of the Single Market (1993-1994) had not seen a uniform
flourishing of competition across the European Union, either between the major carriers or
from new entrants or existing smaller airlines.
However there is one caveat to our conclusions and an important starting point for future
work. Since European airlines' yields by route are not publicly available we have restricted our
econometric analysis only to fbur types of fares. For none of these variables, competition in
European skies has taken the form of generalised price decreases as a result from the
application of liberal bilateral agreements or the European deregulation process itself
However, we have found an important impact in terms of a newer and wider catalogue of fares
among which passengers could better accommodate their preferences. Only if these are also
widely available tbr most flights would have airline deregulation improved matters.
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Table 1. Sample routes.
City-Pair No. of Distance legulation regime
Route order (Kms) (1986-1994) ,
1 Paris-London 1 365 C,:regulated
2 London-Dublin 2 450 F ,:'regulated
3 London-Amstcrdatll 3 _ i. [ ,:regulated
4 London-Bcusscls 5 351) zregulated
5 Madrid-London 6 1244 .egulated
6 Mih'm-London 10 979 .egulated
7 IVladnd-Fmnkfun 15 1422 'artially deregulated
8 Paris-Frankfurt 17 471 'artially deregulated
9 Viemla-London 19 1272 "_egulated
10 Barcelona-London 24 1145 _,egulated
I1 Atl_ens-London 27 24[2; Regulated
12 Barcelona-Frankfurt 29 1092 Regulated
13 Milan-Frm_kfurt 33 512 Regulated
14 Stoekholm-Fraa!ffurt 37 1222 Regulated
15 Madrid-Lisbon 43 513 Regulated
16 Manchester-Amsterdam 44 484 Deregulated
17 Madrid-Brussels 50 13 l_ Regulated
18 Athens-Frank_rt 57 180 Regulated
19 Stockholm-London 6 I. 147 Regulated
20 Milan-lB russels 62 70 Regulated
21 Athens-Brussels 65 20; Regulated
22 Manchester-Brussels 68 53 Deregulated
23 Barcelona-Lisbon 70 99 Rcgulated
24 Barc:lona-Bmssels 73 10 , Regulated
25 Manchester-Dublin 74 2t Deregulated
26 Stockholm-Brussels 75 12 " Regulated
27 Liverpool-Dublin - 2" Deregulated
28 Cardiff-Dublin 2 ) Deregulated
29 Pans-Brussets - 2: ' Regulated
30 Leeds-Dublin 3( . Deregulated
31 Cardiff-Amsterdaln - 3:- _ Deregulated
32 Cardiff-Brussels - 4_: Deregulated
33 Leeds-Amsterdam . 4 Deregulated
34 Leeds-Brussels - 4 Deregulated
35 Tees-side-Amsterdam - 4; Deregulated
36 Liverpool-Amstcrdmn - 5: Deregulated
37 Liverpool-Brussels < _ Deregulated
38 Vienna-Frankfurt - _ ) Regulated
39 Vienna-Brussels - ' " Regulated
40 Paris-Lisbon 1 '0 Regulated
41 Milan-Lisbon - I :3 Regulated
42 Athens-Lisbon - 2 _0 Regulated
43 Stockhohn-Lisbon _ '6 Regulated
44 Vicmm-Lisbon 31 _0 Regulated
SO URCES: Tratfic by Flight Stage (ICAO). 1986- I" 94 'and The Single European
Aviation Market (CAP 654), (CAA, 1995).
13
Table 2. Passengers by route type
Year Re t.,ulated Routes Derek, ulated Routes
thousands in % % _rowth thousands in %
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
5,326 47.7
5,813 52.0 9.1
6,422 47.0 10.4
5,883 39.6 -8.3
6.555 44._ 11.4
5,957 43.5 -9.1
6,909 44?3 15,9
7.226 45.5 4.5
12,917 43.8 78.7
% _rowth
5,849 52.3
5,372 48,0 -8.1
7,240 53.0 34.7
8,982 60.4 24.0
8,1)70 55.2 -10, 1
7,749 56.5 -13.7
8,489 55.1 9.5
8,654 54.5 1.9
16.568 56.2 91.4
Table 3. Flights by route type
Year
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
Regulated R,mtcs
thousands in % % growth
66,206 53.4
69,009 54.2 4.2
76,316 48.1 11.0
68,785 40.7 -9_
77,309 49.3 12.3
74,292 35.4 -3.9
86.996 45.2 17. I
95,548 47.2 9.3
98,658 43.6 3,2
Deregulated Routes
thousands in % % growth
58.184 46.6
59,101 45,8 1.5
81.238 51.9 37.4
102,115 59.3 25.6
81,753 50,7 -19.9
85.935 64.9 5.1
104,780 54.8 21.9
107,449 52.8 2.5
129.194 56.4 20.2
Table 4. Average seat factor by route type (in %)
Year Regui.ted Deregulated Both types
Roo: :s Routes
1986 57 _'- 55.2 56.3
1987 61.; 51.8 56.8
1988 60. : 58,8 59.6
1989 58.5 54.9 56.7
1990 6',. _ 52.5 56.9
1991 55 -'. 53,4 54.4
1992 55 -; 53.2 54.3
1993 57 _ 53.1 55.1
1994 56, 57,3 56.7
Table 5. Average nun::_er of competitors by route type
Year Regulated Deregulated Both types
Routes Routes
1986 2.8 3.0 2.9
1987 2.2 2.8 2.5
1988 2.2 3.2 2.7
1989 2.3 2.8 2.5
1990 2.2 3.0 2.6
1991 2.3 3.8 3.1
1992 2.6 3.3 3.0
1993 2.2 2.8 2.5
t994 2.6 2.8 2.7
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Table 6, Average uumber of discount tariffs by route type
Year Regulated Derek 'ulated Both
Routes Routes types
1986 2.41 3.75 3.08
1987 2.70 5.53 4.12
1988 2.78 6.56 4.67
1989 3.08 6.53 4.81
1990 4.38 3.76 6.57
1991 4.43 6.83 5.63
1992 8.04 922 8.63
1993 7.63 8.94 8.28
1994 6.63 972 8.17
Table 7, Average filres by route type (in £/km)
Tourist fare
Year Regulated Deregulated Both
Routes Routes
1986 0.38 0.48 0.43
1987 0.36 0.44 0.40
1988 0.33 0.41 0.37
1989 0.33 0.41 0.37
19911 0.35 0.45 0.40
1991 0.35 0.49 0.42
1992 0.39 0.53 0.46
1993 0.36 0.51 0.43
1994 11.36 I1.5 l 0.44
Excursion fare
Year Regulated Deregulated Both
Routes Routes
1986 0.23 0.32 0.27
1987 0.2 [ I).32 0.26
1988 0.20 0.28 0.24
1989 0.2 [ 0.26 0.23
1990 0.22 0.29 0.25
1991 I).23 0.35 0.29
1992 0.23 0.34 0.29
1993 0.22 0.32 0.27
1994 O.21 0.38 0.29
PEX fare
Year Regulated Deregulated Both
Routes Routes
1986 0.19 0.30 0.25
1987 0.19 0.32 0.25
1988 0.18 0.28 0.23
1989 O. 16 0.27 0.22
1990 0.16 0.29 0.22
1991 0. t6 0.27 0.22
1992 I). 17 0.29 0.23
1993 0.16 0.29 0.22
1994 0.16 029 0.23
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Table 7. Average fares by route type (ill £/km) (cont.)
SPEX fare
Year Regulated Deregulated Both
Routes Routes types
1986 0. I0 O. tO
1987 O. 14 0.26 0.20
1988 O. 18 0.23 0.21
1989 0, 15 0,20 0.17
199(1 O. 14 0.22 O. 18
1991 O, 15 0,22 O. 19
1992 0.14 0.21 0.18
1993 0.14 0.21 0.18
1994 0.14 0.2l 0.18
Table 8. Average discounts by route type
(in % with respect to standard fare)
% Discount of excursion fare
Year Regulated Deregulated
Routes Routes
Both
types
1986 34.3 28.0
1987 33.9 13.5
1988 33.3 25.8
1989 31.8 25.3
1990 33.5 29.0
1991 31.2 26.1
1992 33.1 31.0
1993 30.6 31.0
1994 31.0 24.5
31.1
23.7
29.5
28.6
31.3
28.7
32.0
30.8
27.8
% Discount of PEX htre
Year Regulated Deregulated
Routes Routes
Both
types
1986 47.1 37.7 42.4
1987 49.8 25.1 37.5
1988 49.2 30.2 39.7
1989 53.5 33.6 43.6
1990 54.9 38.4 46.6
1991 52.4 43.9 48.2
1992 53.9 45.4 49.7
1993 53.7 43.0 48.3
1994 52.7 42.8 47.8
% Discount of SPEX fare
Year Regulated Deregulated
Routes Routes
Both
types
1986 72.6 72.6
1987 67.4 34.5 51.0
1988 62.0 40.9 51.5
1989 66.4 48.4 57.4
1990 64.9 53.0 59.0
1991 63.0 52.4 57.7
1992 65.3 60.7 63.0
1993 65.0 56.9 60.9
1994 62.0 58.9 60.5
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1. INTRODUCTION.
The European liberalisation process in the air industry has changed the conditions for
carriers to operate in this market. Before this, it was a market were limitations to
competition existed as in the domestic markets where in many cases there was a legal
monopoly, or in the intraeuropean market where airlines operated with bilateral
agreements between states to share the market.
The three liberalisation packages have eliminated the legal barriers to competition to
established a situation of complete freedom of entry and exit for European carriers in
any domestic or intrastate market, into the philosophy of the Treaty of Rome.
In this paper we study cost structure of air carriers with the main objective of analysing
how the liberalisation process has affected efficiency in the production of European
companies. By studying the existence of economies of scale in the industry, we can try
to predict how the companies of this sector will response to the measures of the
Commission. The main question to answer is if the size of the air carriers can affect to
efficiency gains in costs and production.
Market structure can be affected by existence of economies of scale in the market which
could bring possible tendencies of concentration in the market, and that could be answer
to the bilateral agreements, joint ventures and acquisitions that can be observed actually
between air carriers along European market.
Section 2 describe the sample of 22 airlines, 13 from Europe and 9 from North America
for a period of six years since 1991 to 1995, that has been used to carry out this study.
Data has been obtained from ICAO and IATA publications.
Section 3 presents a parametric analysis as an approach to analyse the efficiency of
airlines. So for the period 1990-95 there still exists a gap between the performance of
European amines and their American counterparts, both in terms of productivity and
unit costs. Although it can be observed that European are covering in terms of costs to
American levels.
Although for the clmracteristics of output in air transport it might be estimated a
desegregated cost function, the absence of information to make this have lead us to
estinaate an aggregated traslogaritmical cost function. As consequence, its necessary to
define correctly what is understood by economies of scale and how to determine it from
an aggregated cost function. Section 4 presents an Econometric analysis carry out to
estimate a cost function for the industry. The use of traslogaritmical cost function
specification and the cost share equations is used as a standard methodology to estimate
trmxsport cost. This is because is the easiest to estimate and interpret (the arguments of
the function are in logarithms). The disadvantage comes from the number of coefficients
to estimate.
The analysis of economies of scale with the traditional form and corrected following
Jam and CortEs (1996) and Oum and Zhang (1997) are compared in section 5. So the
presence of economies of scale is notably reinforced if the correction of the effect of
changesin outputandnetworkoverotherexogenousfactorsproposedis perIbrmed.
Also in thissectioncostcomplementarityandtheeffectof publicandprivateownership
is analysed.Finally residualsobtainedfrom the estimatedcostfunctionareusedto
estimatethepotentialcostreductionsthatinefficientairlinesmayachieve.
Section6presentsthemainconclusionsof thispaper.
2.DESCRIPTIONOF SAMPLE.
Datausedin this studycorrespondto a sampleof 22 airlinesfromEurope(13)and
NorthAmerica(7 from US,and2 fromCanada),andit coverstheperiod1990-1995.
Thecriterionto selecthesamplewasinitially to includeall themainworldairlinesthat
reportedfinancialint'ormationto the InternationalCivil AviationAuthority (ICAO)
during that period in order to havea sufficientlylargedatabaseto obtainreliable
estimates.
However,theanalysisof a largertentativesamplein whichairlinesfromotherregions
werealsoincluded(SouthAmericaandEastAsia)revealedtheexistenceof significant
differencesacrossregionsfor somerelevantparameters.Thus,for example,crewwages
aresubstantiallylower for somedevelopingcountries(e.g.IndiaandPakistan)thanin
otherregions.Fuelcostsperkilometrearehigherfor Asianairlinescomparedto average
values,speciallyfor Japanesecompanies.This latter resultobservedin our initial
samplehasalsobeenreportedinotherworks(ICAO,1992).
Thesedifferencesin cost structuresandpricesmakeefficiencycomparisonsamong
companiesfrom different regionsa difficult task, sinceairlinesdo not operateon
commonenvironments.Initial estimationsusingthewholesamplewerenotsuccessful
in obtaininga costfunctionthatsatisfiedrestrictionsto haveeconomicmeaning.We
decidedthento reducethesampleto EuropeanandNorthAmericanairlines,whichare
relativelysimilar in theircharacteristics,althoughstill thereexistsomedifferencesin
thepricestheypayto factors.
OriginalcostdatafromICAOpublicationswereanalysedfor thoseairlinesincludedin
• e sample,in order to detectand filter potentialerrors.Someinconsistenciesand
outlierswereindeeddetectedandcorrectedwerepossible.In othercases,it wasdecided
to dropdirectlyall observationsfrom airlineswhosereporteddatacontaineda large
numberof temporalinconsistencies(Aviaco,CrossairandViva Air). Anotherairline
exctudedfromthesamplewasVirginAtlantic,dueto its specializationon transatlantic
routes,whichmakesit differentin itscoststructureto non-specialisedcarriers.
Summingup,aftercorrectionsandfilters,theavailablesamplefor estimationis formed
of 105observationscorrespondingto 22airlinesfor theperiod1990-1995.Thesample
cannotbeusedasa panel,sincefor mostof theaminesincluded,financialinformation
wasnotreportedto ICAO in particularyears.Only 8 companiesreporteddataevery
yearof theperiodcoveredbythesample.
The tbllowing table offers a full description of airlines used in this work. In order to
assess their relative sizes, information from 1995 on total output (measured in available
ton-km produced) number of planes and employees is presented in table 1:
Table 1: Airlines included in tile sample (1995 data)
Output Number of Number of
Region Name (nlill. Avail. Ton-km) Planes Employees
British Airways 18,428 [ 234 5 I, 178
Lu fthansa 16,844 269 33,240
Air France 13,711 156 37,323
KLM 10,871 80 25,307
Alitalia 6,368 149 17,982
Swissair 5,096 66 17,733
Europe Iberia 4,964 109 23,617
SAS 3,581 150 17,648
F in nair 1,909 40 7,414
Olympic 1,670 60 9,140
TAP 1,600 37 8,226
Austrian 1,037 28 3,862
British Mi,dland 513 33 4,013
American 34,864 635 83,463
United 33,053 556 81,160
Delta 26,350 539 66,302
Northwest 20,663 380 45,517
North USAir 11,329 394 ' 41,033
America Continental 9,637 314 29,175
TWA (*) 7,977 188 24,160
109Air Canada (*)
Canadian (*)
5,861
4,722 _ 80
19,055
13,677
Note: (i) Data arc from 1994 (1995 not available),
An immediate observation derived from table 1 is the disparity on average in airlines'
size between Europe and North America. A closer look reveals the existence of four
very large US airlines (American, United, Delta and Northwest, producing more than
20.000 million ton-kin a year), while in Europe only British Airways, Lufthansa, Air
Frmlce and KLM have output levels that reach the American average. Meanwhile, there
are a number of small airlines in Europe, producing less than 2,000 million ton-kin. In
order to take into account this heterogeneity in the sample, some individual
characteristics of each airline are used in the econometric estimations to control for the
fact that airlines are diverse in size, type of routes in which they operate, and some other
factors.
Data sources
There are three types of information in our database: costs, outputs and structural
variables. First, we have data on airlines' total costs and their distribution in different
categories of expenditure, according to ICAO classifications: labour (only pilots,
copilotsaitdothercockpitpersonnel),energy,insurance,capitaldcprc ,',ion, interest
payments, maintenance, airport and aid-to-flight charges, services o passengers,
administration and other costs. This information was obtained from tl ICAO annual
publication Financial &atistics. We also collected data on average ages paid and
number of employees for different worker categories, from the ICAO ! ,blication Flee:
& Personnel.
Financial data published is already transtbrmed from national curt 'ties, in whic-
airlines report the data, into US dollars by ICA0. Exchange rates aployed in tl-a
transformation are carefully chosen in order to avoid misrepresentatic _ of data in 1_S
dollars. However, it must be always kept in mind that rapid currency, .luctuations ira
short period may significantly alter the validity of the transformatior :: the sense _ ,at
the costs of an airline may be understated (overstated) if the cur ncy in which it
operates has suffered a large devaluation (revaluation) against the dol .r.
In order to eliminate the effects of inflation, all financial data is d :flat,_d to 1990 real
values by using national GDP deflators. The choice of the instrum at o deflate data is
also a non-neutral matter, since some of the airlines' costs c e rational (labour,
administration, materials and the like) while others have an in:er" ational nature by
definition (e.g., flight equipment, airport charges). Which is the adec ate deflator to use
then? Ideally, one should deflate each category with the correspondi: .' index con idered
appropriate. However. the way in which ICAO aggregates the a: :nes' expe :diture,
tbllowing a functional classification, makes it impossible to proce d in this dcection,
since in a single category, there may exist a mix of labour, materia and other ypes of
costs. Theretbre, we have opted for the use of national deflators, o _he basis ".rot most
costs are nominated in local currencies, therefore subject to natio, ..1 rates of aflation.
We believe the bias introduced by the use of a general deflator (e: US consu net price
index or US GDP deflator) would be larger than the one we m "' be causi g by the
choice of national indexes.
Other type of information included in the sample concerns airlim, level of output and
other individual characteristics. These variables were obtair d form the IATA
publication Worm .4Jr D'ansport Statistics (WATS) which reports :oth tota! production
of airlines in terms of total seats-km/ton- "km offered, and the act, _1 passe ger-kmeton-
kan performed. Published data is presented separately for passeng r and c: .go services,
and it is also differentiated in the part that airlines produce on egular a d on charter
services.
In this work, we have opted for using measures of output that re" :'_'sent t .tat production
that airlines offer in the market, instead of choosing actual dema,: :d ser ices. Although
in many studies on the industry, output is defined in terms of _asse gets and cargo
effectively transported, we believe a correct definition of output ,hen .-ying to analyze
efficiency and technical characteristics (economies of scale, scot . den: :ty, etc.) must be
based on the real levels of production and not on demand. An zirlinc with a very low
load factor may be as efficient in terms of production as anothe airlir _ with exactly the
same characteristics but a high occupancy rate (although the fir:t wi probable need to
revise its marketing strategy). However, if we use actual hum er of passengers
tra.nsported as the measure of output, the second airline will show as rare efficient.
Therefore,wewill be usingavailableton-kinasthemainmeasureof output,which
includesbothpassengersandcargo.For theeconometricestimation,we usethe two
typesof outputseparately,andtherewedefinethepassengers'ervicesoutputin terms
of availableseats-!.anandcargoservicesin termsof availablecargoton-km.
Fromthe\VATSpublication,wehaveobtaineddataonairlines'outputs,butalsoon
structuralcharacteristics,uchasloadfactors,averagestagelengthof routes,average
speeds,numberof departures,numberof planes,andpercentageof charterservices,
whichareusedascontrolvariablesinourestimations.
3. NON-PAI/,4,METI:LICANALYSIS.
A first simpleapproachto theanalysisof theefficiencyof airlinesis thecomputationof
someratiosthatallowusto stadytherelativepositionof companiesin termsof unit
costsandfactors'productivity.Here,wereportresultsonthefollowingindexes:
b.
C.
d.
Unit Cost (Total real cost/Ton-kin)
Labour unit cost
Energy unit cost
Capital unit cost
All unit costs used here are defined in terms of US cents per total available ton-km. The
first index is the more relevant, since it reflects the total performance of an airline in
terms of how costly is for it to produce a ton-km. However, when making comparisons
an_ong airlines based on this index, it must be remembered that this is only a rough
indicator for efficiency, since many factors affecting airlines' performance are left aside.
The other three indexes are components of the total unit cost. They may be useful to
indicate where do observed differences in total unit cost come from.
The labour cost repomed here corresponds to all employees. Although not reported in
the ICAO Financial Data publication, where only cockpit personnel cost is separated as
a single item, it is possible to obtain information on expenditure on all worker
categories from the Fleet&Personnel publication.
Energy cost is taken directly from reported data and it includes aircraft fuel and oil.
Capital cost is defined as the sum of flight equipment insurance, rents for leased
equipment, maintenance and overhaul expenditures (excluding labour costs spent on
these tasks), and depreciation and amortization of flight and ground equipment.
The difference between total unit costs (a) and the sum of the others indexes used here
(b+c+d) corresponds to the unit cost of materials and other services consumed by
airlines. This input includes flight-related charges (airport, en-route facilities and station
charges); and goods used in the production of passenger services, ticketing and
promotion,andgeneraladministration.Again,labourcostsaredeductedfromall this
categories,usingthereportedaveragewagesandnumberof workers.
Therelativeimportanceof eachof thecomponentsmaybeassessedby their shareson
totalcost,whicharereportedin table2:
Table2:Averagedistributionoftotalcostbytw.peofexpenditure(1995)
Europe NorthAmerica
Labour 31.2% 27.6%
- Pffots/co-pilots (6.5 %) I (7.2 %)
- Other personnel (24.7 °,41 i (20.4 %)
Energy 9.1% t 12.1%
Capital 17.2% i l 8.4 %
IVlaterials & other services 42.5 % i 41.8%
- Fligtit-reiated charges ! (2 l. 3 %) I (I 7. 7 %)
The indexes computed to analyze the productivity of different factors are the following:
e. Kilometers-Flown per plane.
fi Hours-Flown per pilot.
o Available ton-kin per employee.
The first index represents the productivity obtained by airlines from their planes, in
terms of kilometers produced. Many other indexes may be built as alternatives to this
one. or as complementary indexes (e.g. number of departures, hours flown, or ton-kin
per plmae or per seat), but we believe this is a fair representation on the intensity of
aircraft use.
The other two indexes are related to labour productivity. The first of them (f) identifies
the productivity of pilots, who constitute one of the key categories of airlines'
enlployees. The second offers information on the overall performance of workers, in
terms of total production per capita. Untbrtunately, there is no information available on
tile actual number of working hours for all worker categories, which would allow a
more refined estimate of productivity.
Cost and productivi O' differentials between Europe and North America
It is common wisdom in the airline industry that US airlines have higher productivities
than airlines in Europe and other regions, which makes it feasible for them to produce
with lower unit costs. This is also a fact that has been reported in some comparative
studies. As an example, Windle (1991) uses a total factor productivity approach to
conclude that US airlines have a productivity advantage of 19% over European
comparable carriers. In terms of unit costs, the advantage of American firms is
estimated by this author in a 7% (data used in estimations correspond to a sample of
airlines in 1983).
Our iadcxesindicatethat in theperiod1990-95 there still exists a gap between the
pertbrmance of European airlines and their American counterparts, both in terms of
productivity and unit costs• Although not very refined, since there are factors not
controlled for, a graphical analysis of the cost and productivity indexes easily reveals
this gap. Figures 1-4 present together the averages for European and American airlines
for each of the unit cost indexes computed, and their evolution over the period.
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European airlines is still significant in the 1990% (see figure I). On average, in 1995 the
unit cost per ton-kin produced was 37.7 cents for US firms, while European firms have a
cost of 49.4 cents, i.e. 3 I% higher. Although these figures are revealing, it must be
remarked again that they should only be regarded as indicative, since they are not
controlled by airlines' characteristics, namely average route distances, points served,
etc. Evolution of unit cost over recent years reveals an interesting fact: there is a
decreasingtrendin theEuropean airlines' cost from 1990 to 1995. Thcretbrc, it seems
tlmt European airlines are converging in terms of costs to American levels.
Figures 2-4 present the evolution over the same period of the different components of
the unit cost. It is observed that the main source of difference between both regions are
thc labour costs. In 1995, a European firm spent 17.1 cents per ton-Mn produced on
labour, while this cost was 10.4 cents for American firms. Energy costs are very. similar
for both groups and they present a common downward trend, although there is again a
small gap in thvour of American airlines.
Capital unit costs were higher tbr European firms in 1990, but in the six-year period
covered m the sample, these costs have been reduced in Europe to almost match
American level in 1995. Finally, the remaining component not shown in the figures
(unit cost of materials) is again higher for Europe: 19.2 cents per ton-kin, against 15.8 in
America.
Summing up. the gross comparison of unit costs between regions indicates that, in 1995,
there is gap of 11.7 cents per ton-kin in favour of American airlines. From this, 6.7 cents
correspond to labour, 0.5 to energy, 1.1 to capital and 3.4 to materials and other
services.
Going now to the productivity indexes, it was possible in this case to compute the
values for a longer period than the sample used in the study. Figures 5 to 7 present these
indexes and their evolution for the period 1984-1995:
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Figure 5 shows the index related to the productivity of planes, in terms of kilometers
flown per year. American airlines present a more intensive use of their aircraft, with a
value of 2.11 million km per plane a year, against 1.95 million for European airlines.
While this index reveals a different productivity of planes, no sound inference on
efficiency should be made without analyzing the number and length of routes served,
and the type of planes employed.
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Figure 7: Ton-kin/Employee
35O
30O
250
200
150
100
50
0
e
_.e.e"
84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
-_American average- "---Eurol_anaverage-_ i
The productivity of labour is presented in figures 6 and 7. The analysis of the hours
flown per pilot reveals two interesting trends: first, although during the 1980's the
American pilots were working more hours, during the 1990's there is no significant
difference between pilots' productivities between Europe and America. This
convergence has been achieved mainly by a reduction in the working time of American
pilots. Second, it is observed a slow but steady rise in the productivity of European
pilots. While in 1984 they were working on average 216 hours a year, in 1995 this
figure has risen to 258 hours, even more than the American average for that particular
year.
Finally, figure 7 shows the more interesting fact revealed by the productivity indexes:
there is a significant gap in terms of ton-km per employee between Europe and
America. In 1995, while an American carrier was producing 380.5 thousand ton-kin per
employee, a European firm obtained only 273.8 thousand, i.e. 28% lower. This lower
labour productivity explains, at least partly, the labour unit cost difference observed in
figure 2 above.
Indexes in figure 7 also show trends that are interesting: European firms seem to have
been steadily improving their labour productivity over the covered period, and specially
in the 1990's. Production per employee in European carriers increased in the period
1984-1990 at an annual average rate of 3%, while in the period 1990-1995 this rate rose
to 7.2%. Meanwhile, American airlines' labour productivity has fluctuated over the
period. While in some years at the end of the 1980's there was a decreasing trend, from
1990 onwards the productivity of employees has been growing steadily and it has been
maintained above the European level. Technology improvements and a more efficient
use of labour may be the likely explanations for this increase in employees' productivity
in the airline industry as a whole during the 1990's.
4. ECONOMETRICANALYSIS.
An estimationof a costfunctionfor theairlineindustryis carriedout in thiswork, in
orderto havea completepictureof the performanceof carriers,onceall possible
exogenousthctorsarecontrolledtbr.Furthermore,thecostfunctionprovidesrelevant
infornlationaboutthe industry(returnsto scaleanddensity,cost complementarity,
substitutionelasticitiesbetweenfactors)andit allowsusto testsomehypothesisabout
ownershipandchangeof regulationeffects.
A translogspecificationischosenfor thecostfunctionto beestimated.This functional
/brm is the most common in the analysis of cost structures across industries, and in
particular, it has been previously applied to the air sector by many authors. Caves,
Christensen and Tretheway (1984); McShan and Windle (1989), and Baltagi et al (1995)
are examples of translog cost functions specifications to analyze the US air industry.,
while Gillen, Oum and Tretheway (1990) have used it for the Canadian market.
A two-output specification is used for the cost function, considering passenger and
cargo services provided by amines as different products. Although passenger services
are the main output of the air industry, cargo services should not be considered as
merely residual in the activity of general carriers (we have not included in our sample
cargo-specialized firms, as Federal Express for the US market). Moreover, the inclusion
of cargo services as a separate output allows the analysis of the possible existence of
economies of scope.
Structural variables are included in the specification of the cost function, in order to
control tbr factors which are somehow exogenous to firms. These are variables that may
be modified by airlines in the long run, but once a network structure is chosen, they
cannot be easily changed in the short run. Variables included are: average stage of
length, number of points in the airline's network, load factors for passengers and cargo,
and the percentage of total output performed by charter flights. An alternative
specification for these variables, in the form of hedonic functions for the output t was
considered, though it was finally abandoned since it did not improve the results reported
here.
The functional form we estimate then is:
1
+V, 8sp lnP, lngp +Z_ d,e lng lnYe ,-ap InLFP+_._ InLFC+._c_,CHART
+ A.m,slIn A VSL+ 2,,et In NET+ u
The concept of hedonic functions is simply to use a re-definition of output in which production
characteristics are integrated. Thus, for example, if a level of passenger-kin (Y) is produced under
determined values of load factor, travel distance, cities served, etc. (q), q2, q3, -..) a more parsimonious
way of using all these variables is by defining a hedoni¢ output:
In ¢ = In g + _ _fl,q_
The new variable do may be used as the output to include in the cost function. Hedonic functions have
been used for example by Gilten et ai (1990).
I0
whichis theusualspecification of a translog cost function, with two outputs plus a set
of structural variables to control tbr individual effects. Four inputs are considered:
labour (L), energy (E), capital (K) and materials/other services (M). The variables'
definition is the following:
Y_ : Passengers' output (available seat-km)
Yo : Cargo output (available ton-k.m, freight and mail)
PL : Average wage (all worker categories included: pilots, other cockpit
personnel, cabin attendants, maintenance and overhaul, ticketing and
sales, other personnel).
P_ : Price of energy (total fuel&oil cost per kilometer flown).
P_ : Price of capital (capital cost per plane. Costs included are flight equipment
insurance, rents for leased equipment, maintenance and overhaul,
depreciation and amortization of flight and ground equipment).
PM : Price of materials and other services (cost per departure. All remaining
costs not considered in the three other inputs are included here).
LFP: Passengers' load factor.
LFC: Cargo load factor.
CHART : Percentage of total output (passengers and cargo) performed by non-
scheduled flights. This variable is used in levels and not in logs since for
many airlines in the sample it takes a value of zero or close to zero.
AVSL : Average Stage Length (total km-flown/number of departures).
NET : Number of network points served by the airline (this information was
obtained directly from the airlines, it corresponds to the actual number of
network points for year 1996).
PUB : Dummy variable, value I if the airline is a public company. For mixed-
capital airlines, the rule is to consider them as non-public only if private
capital share is larger than public and there is evidence that no golden
shares or other mechanisms exists for public owners to influence board
decisions.
A residual u is added to the cost function specification, and it is assumed to be lid
N(0,o_-'). Parmneters to be estimated are _o,%oh, %, _c, a_, _3i, "t'_j(i.j =L,E,K,M), 6ip , 6ic ,
_._,)-_, 3._h,)._,._, )_,,c,.Since it is assumed that factor prices' cross-products are symmetric,
(i.e. y_j=yj_), a total number of 32 parameters are to be estimated. As it was mentioned in
the section describing our sample, a total number of 105 observations is available. In
order to obtain more degrees of freedom, we follow the common practice of including
the equations representing the share of each input over total expenditure (S_-= P_ X/C).
For the translog cost function, these equations have the form:
It is possible then to obtain more efficient estimators by adding disturbances to this set
of equations and estimating them jointly with the cost function. Since, by definition
LS_=I, only tl_ree of the four share equations may be used simultaneously.
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Thesystemof equationsisestimatedby full informationmaximum-likelihood(FIML),
usingtheassumptionthatdisturbancesfollowamultinormaldistribution.All variables
areexpressedasdifferenceswith respecto theirmeans,sothatelasticitiesand other
parametersto analyzeindustrycharacteristicsmaybedirectlyobtainedfromestimated
coefficients.
Sinceall observationsaredeflatedandexpressedin realvalues,theyareconsideredas
comparableoutcomesof a commonindustry,cost structure.Estimationis then
performedby poolingall observations,withoutany temporaldimension.As it was
mentionedabove,thepossibilityof treatingdataasapanelisnot feasible(asit wasour
firstintention),sincetherearetoomanymissingobservationsforairlines.
Consequently,all airlines' individualeffectsnot capturedby the set of structural
variablesandtheactuallhctorpricelevelswill bepresentin theresidualterms(u). We
consideredthepossibilityof includingdummyvariablesfor eachcompanyto capture
thoseindividualeffects,but no satisfactoryresultswereobtained.Therefore,for the
airlines'efficiencyanalysis,theresidualsu are used as the main tool. Although for each
airline, its individual value of u for a particular year may also be affected by random
shocks, we believe they are highly intbrmative on the efficiency achieved by each
company. After controlling for all possible structural factors, significant positive values
tbr u are indicative that the cost of the airline is repeatedly above the efficient level
indicated by the cost function.
Two arguments reinforce in our case the possibiIity of interpreting the complete residual
u as the result of companies' outcomes in terms of efficiency. First, random shocks that
might be affecting to airlines (e.g. depressing effect of the Gulf War on passengers'
traffic, sudden price rises, etc) are likely to be affecting in a similar way to all European
carriers perfonning international scheduled services, since all of them operate in very
similar markets. And second, the possibility of observing some residuals for each
company allows a reduction of the risk of making wrong inferences if a systematic
pattern is detected.
5. ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND OTHER RESULTS.
This section presents the results obtained in the estimation of the air industry cost
function. A full description of estimated coefficients, standard errors and performed
tests may be found in the appendix. Before studying the efficiency results, some
characteristics of the industry which are derived from the estimated function are
presented and compared to others in previous works.
Returns to density a_d returns to scale
Definitions followed here are those common in the literature, although there still exists a
debate in the profession about the more adequate measure. Returns to density are
defined as the effect on costs of a proportional increase in all outputs considered,
keeping network size and other characteristics as constant. They are measured by the
inverse of the sum of the elasticities of costs with respect to outputs. Meanwhile, returns
t2
to scalearcdefinedastheeffectof aproportionalincreasein outputsand network size.
For our sample, the following values are obtained:
- Returns to density: D = (ev, + ew) "t= 1.057 (s.d. 0.0548)
- Returns to scale: S = (eyp + arc+ e,,o,) -I= 1.198 (s.d. 0.0773)
In both expressions above, e, represents the elasticity of costs with respect to variable i.
The obtained results indicate the presence of slight economies of density and scale for
airlines, similar in size to those of previous works. Caves et al (1984) report returns to
density between 1.21 to 1.29 for US carriers, while Gillen et al (1990) find values that
lie between I.I 5 and 1.26 for Canadian firms. In our case, returns to scale are higher
than returns to density, since we obtain in our sample that an increase in the number of
points served results in some net cost savings.
According to Oum and Zhang (1997), these traditional measures studying the presence
of economies to scale suffer from a fundamental drawback, which may explain why
there seems to exist a contradiction between the constants returns to scale obtained in
the literature and the observed trend to larger airlines and more concentration in the
industry (see appendix I). The point is that other structural variables apart from network
size may have been overlooked in the computation of returns to scale. Changes in output
or in network configuration may have an effect on some structural variables, which are
supposed to be constant when analyzing returns to scale.
In order to try in our work the correction proposed by Oum-Zhang, the following
auxiliary equations are estimated by OLS (between parenthesis, t-statistics):
In LFP = 4.2 - .00_I2In Y_+ .024 In NET - .062 In Pt," .0049 in Pa+ .0015 In P_ + .0743 In Ps_
(58.6) (-.48) (1.25) (-2.9) (-.257) (.066) (6.366)
In LFC = -.47 - .0065 In Y=+ .089 In NET + .696 In PL+ •178 In Pe - .0377 In PK+ .0581 2nPs_
(-.80) (-.I37) (.678) (5.74) (1.948) (-.0527) (8.258)
in AVSL = 6.268 + .294 In NET- .382 In PL," .133 In PE+ .0213 In P_:+ .457 In P,,,
(17.2) (6.997) (°4.42) (-1.736) (.277) (8.171)
Two separate equations are estimated for load factor of passengers (LFP) and cargo
(LFC) and an equation for the average stage length (AVSL). Contrary to the case of
Oum and Zhang (1997), our equations for load factors indicate that the effects of output
and netv,ork size are not significant, therefore there is no need to correct for them.
However. the average stage length is positively affected by an increase in the number of
points served. Taking this effect into account, we compute a corrected coefficient to
determine the degree of returns to scale:
- Full elasticity: F = (cvp + eve + e,,, + ce,,_l c_l,,,) -_= 1.576 (s.d. 0.13398)
Although the obtained coefficient would be indicating the existence of large returns to
scale, it must be considered that its standard error is relatively large, therefore it has not
been estimated very precisely (a 95% confidence interval would include values from
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1.31to 1.84).Moreover,the cost elasticitywith respectto averagestagelength
estimatedin oursample(ec_v_= -0.682)seemsto belarger,in absolutevalue,thanthe
oneobtainedin otherstudies.Caveset al (1984)reporta valueof-0.148 tbr the US
case, and a non-significant positive value of 0.006 in a different work (Caves et al,
1987). Gillen et al (1990) report a value of-0.18l for the Canadian case. The high
elasticity in our sample may be originated by the /'act that we are including airlines of
very different size and type of network served. Since we believe its value may be
affecting to the estimated coettlcient lbr economies to scale, it is simply presented here
as an application of the correction proposed in Oum and Zhang (1997) to our sample of
airlines.
Cost complementarity
Another salient aspect which may be analyzed from our two-output specification for the
cost function is the possible existence of cost complementarities between products. In
order to study if the production of one of the products has effects over the marginal cost
of production of the other product, the cross derivative of the cost function with respect
to both outputs may be analyzed. For the case of the translog function:
Since we are only interested in checking the sign of this expression, and by definition,
O:C C
=--(ape + a pct _ )
OY_OYc YvY_
the first term on the RMS of the expression above is always positive, it suffices to
estinaate the value of the second term. From our estimated parameters we obtain:
%¢ + % % = 0.0327 (s.d. 0.072473)
The positive sign obtained would be indicating that no cost complementarity exists
between the two products considered (passengers and cargo). However, again it is
important to observe that the standard error for the estimated coefficient is large,
therefore it would also be possible to accept a null coefficient or even a negative one.
No clear conclusion may then be provided from our cost function about this point.
Public Ownership
One hypothesis we are interested in testing on our sample of European and Aanerican
airlines is the existence of a negative effect of public ownership on firms' efficiency.
Although this question has been previously analyzed by other authors, it is interesting to
revise if privatizations which have taken place in some countries and the general process
of liberalization have had an impact on improving the performance of publicly owned
airlines. As a benchmark of reference, Windle (1991) estimated that European airlines
had 10.5% higher unit costs compared to US firms in 1983, due to government
ownership.
In our cost function, we capture the effect of public ownership of airlines with a dummy
variable (PUB) with value one for public firms. A positive sign for the coefficient
associated to this variable (%o_) will be indicating higher costs for public airlines, and
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moreover, we may be able to quantify the efl%ct lbr an average sized career. From the
estimated cost function:
c%,u = 0.0742 (s.d. 0:0653)
As it is the case for the cost complementarity analysis, although the coefficient presents
indeed a positive sign as it was a priori expected, its standard error is not small enough
to discard completely the possibility of a null effect. A 95% confidence interval yields
values for c_l in the range (-0.056, 0.205). Although this interval is suggestive of the
likely presence of a positive effect of ownership on costs, we cannot state
unambiguously its presence in our sample of airlines.
Keeping in mind this caveat, if the actual estimated coefficient ap, b may be assumed to
be valid, it would be indicating the presence of a cost difference of 7.7% between a
public airline and a private one, for the average firm size in the sample (i.e. an airline
with an average output level of 9,763 mill. available ton-km). Compared to the 10.5%
value reported by Windle (199l) referred to 1983, the smaller value obtained in our
sample tbr the period 1990-1995 could be indicative of an improvement in the outcomes
of publicly-owned European airlines. However, the detected cost-augmenting impact of
public ownership on costs would lead to recommend more privatizations in the sector
for those countries that still keep their flag airlines as government-owned firms, if they
want to improve their efficiency.
Efficiency results of individual airlines
Residuals obtained from the estimated cost function axe used here to estimate the
potential cost reductions that inefficient airlines may achieve. Since the complete value
of the term u in the cost function is interpreted as departure from the efficient frontier,
on the assumptions mentioned above, by definition we obtain positive values for u but
negative for others. Therefore, the negative values reported in the following table must
be interpreted as the cost savings that highly efficient firmg are already obtaining with
respect to the average frontier in the industry.
There are some surprising results in table 4, which seem to contradict some common
wisdom in the European air industry. These are namely the high efficiency values that
Alitalia and Olympic show, and the large potential cost reduction obtained for
Lufthansa. Our reading of these results is that one should be extremely careful when
interpreting comparative studies between firms from different countries, since the
simple fluctuation of exchange rates may be introducing distortions on the firms'
observed outcomes. For the case of Lufthansa, Oum and Yu (1997) have concluded that
an appreciation of the German mark may be the main cause of the low position in the
world airlines" efficiency ranking obtained by them for this company using 1993 data,
and a similar effect is found in their work for the Japanese company JAL.
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Table 4: Potential airlines' cost reductions
Europe North America
'Air France 8.14% Air Canada 9.72%
Alitalia -8.88% American 6.._5 go
Austrian 7.70% Canadian 2.85%
Briiish Ai_vays -5.31% Continental -3.44%
British Midland -0.99% Delta -4.84%
Finnair i 5.74% Northwest -3.66%
1
iberia i 1.o.69 Fo TWA -5.54%
t
KLM -7.63% United 3.14%
' ' 1
Lufthansa I 8.59% USAir 14,35%
Olympic -10.71%
SAS 24.56%
Swissair -3.73%
TAP 13, 19%
Our suspicion is that the same currency effect may be the cause of our .'suits for
Alitalia and Olympic, on the opposite direction to that of Lufthansa. In fact, .raring the
period 1990-1995 both the lira and the dracma have suffered considerable de Jreciations
against the dollar. The lira was devaluated several times and finally excludc:d from the
European Moneta_ System in 1992, and since then it has followed a decre:,sing trend.
In 1995. its value against the dollar was around 25% lower than at the begir:;ing of our
covered period. A similar pattern is observed tbr the dracma, which lost aro,zp, d 30% of
its value against the dollar during this 6-year period. Estimated efficient) .'sults for
both these companies are then likely to be affected by this rapid fluctuati n of their
national exchange rates, and should not lead to conclude that Alitalia and ¢ ympic are
highly efficient airlines.
A final exercise performed using the residuals from our estimated cost fmction is to
analyze the existence of some temporal variation on the efficiency patterns. This cannot
be done for all individual firms, since it has been mentioned several times along the
work that there are many missing observations in our sample, so that for come airlines
only 2 or 3 observations out of 6 may be available. Instead, we have opted for
computing for each year the average value of residuals of those companies for which
data are available. This is done separately for European and American firm: to compare
the evolution of airlines' efficiency in both regions. The obtained averages ",re presented
in figure 8.
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The absolute value of averages should not be interpreted as the potential cost reduction
of the region for that particular year, since averages are computed over a changing
number and mix of companies, therefore the presence or absence of a extreme!y
(in)efficient firm may affect the results. The idea of these averages is simply to check if
any systematic trend is observed.
As a matter of fact, the analysis of figure 8 seems to indicate the presence of a
decreasing pattern in the evolution of the residuals' averages, both for Europe and North
American amines, although for the case of Europe the observation corresponding to
year 1994 seems to lie away from the general trend. The interpretation of these trends is
that airlines in both regions have been improving their outcomes in the direction of
becoming more cost efficient during the period 1990-1995.
6. CONCLUSIONS.
A descriptive anaiysis shows differences between European and North American
airlines during the period 1990-95, both in terms of unit costs and productivity.
American firms have lower unit costs, and this is mainly due to labour unit cost
differentials, but also to some energy cost advantage. Productivity per employee is
also muct_ higher for American airlines, although from 1990 onwards, this is not the
case for piiots, wl_ich work a very similar number of hours per year to piiots
employed by European airlines.
European firms seems to have improved their performance over the period in terms
of unit costs and productivity. Labour cost has been constantly decreasing from
1990 to 1995, probably through workforce shedding and some improvements in
employees' productivity. Indeed, the indicator showing the production per employee
has substantially grown during the period, although there is still a large gap when
compared to American levels.
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Theestimatedtranslogcostfunctionprovidesmorereliableefficiencycomparisons,
in thesensethatall exogenousfactorsaffectingairlines'productionarecontrolled
tor. Somefindingsfrom our estimatesare relevantto be mentioned:first, mild
returnstodensityandreturnsto scaleareobtainedtbr theindustry,withcoefficients
of 1.06and 1.2,respectively.However,the presenceof economiesof scaleis
notablyreintbrcedif thecorrectionof theeffectof changesin outputandnetwork
overoti_erexogenousfactorsproposedby OumandZhang(1997)is performed.In
thatcase.avalueof 1.58isobtained,althoughwebelievethishighvaluemaybein
partaffectedby thelargeelasticityof coststo averageroutedistancethatweobtain
m our work (-0.68). Another tectmical result is that no significant cost
complementaritybetweenpassengerandcargoservicesisdetected.
Regardingtheeffector"publicownership,we estimatethat for an averageairline
producingan outputof 9,800million ton-kin a year, thereexistsa 7.7%cost
differentialif thecompanyispubliclyowned.However,theestimatedparameterto
checkthiseffectis onlyweaklysignificant,thereforetheresultshouldbecarefully
taken.[n maycase,thevalueis in therangeof thatreportedinotherstudies(Windle
(1991)obtainedavalueof 10.5%for year1983).
- The analysisof airlines"efficiencyis performedusing the residualsfrom the
estimatedcostfunction.Averagevaluesovertheperiodfor eachcompanyareused,
to eliminaterandomfactorsasmuchas possible.Usingtheseaverages,potential
costsavingsarecomputedfor airlines,with respecto theestimatedfrontier.Forthe
groupof Europeanfirms,BritishAirwaysandKLM appearasthemoreefficient,
with costsbelowtheaverageefficientvalues.Strangeresultsareobtainedfor the
casesof AlitaliaandOlympic,whichshowasefficient firms,but webelievetheir
observedoutcomesmaybeaffectedbycurrencyfluctuations.Thistypeof exchange
rates'effecthasbeenpreviouslydetectedby OumandYu (1997),speciallyfor rife
caseof Luffhansa.tbr whichwealsoreporta non-expectedinefficientprofile.The
moreinefficientfirmsin theEuropeangroupareSAS,[beriaandTAP.
For theNorthAraericangroup,the moreefficientUS airlinesare in our sample
Continental,Delta,Northwestand TWA. Both Canadianfirms includedin our
sampleshowupasrelativelyinefficient,with a poorerperformancefor thecaseof
Air Canada.
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Appendix1: Estimationof Economies of Scale from aggregate cost functions.
Defining product in air transport generate problems. What must be considered as
production, the number of passenger carried between Madrid and London?. It can be
considcred a different product, passenger carried in business class and tourist class? Or
even the different fares tbr tourist class that force to passengers to carry, out specific
condhions? Neither can be considered the same product, a direct flight between Madrid
and London, that an indirect flight through Paris or Barcelona. In general transport
industry and in particular air transport can be defined as an industry characterised by
mukiproduction.
A precise definition of product in air transport would require at least an n dimension
vector to recover each origin-destination (see Jara-Diaz, 1996). This make very difficult
to estimate cost functions because is necessary to have available the cost components
for each journey type. The use of aggregate cost functions tries to solve this
intbrmation problem.
So a vector of aggregate products (9) , tonnes-kilometres or passenger-kilometres, and
a vector of qualities (q), load factor, number of points seved or average stage lenght, try
to represent the true output of the company (see Jara and Cort6s, 1996).
So we have a real cost function since we would have to estimate the economies ofscale.
c(w.nx)
And we have an aggregated estimated cost function to obtain them.
So ma?' estimation of (2(9, q) can be considered as an implicit representation of the true
cost function C(Y).
Either 9(Y) as q(Y) depends on the true desegregated output Y.
Marginal Cost respect to components Yj of Y can be obtained as:
ad a_ at a_ aq_
at, or,j=l k_l
So the estimated cost elasticity respect to Y,:
tlt p
j-| k-I
where:
Ej, = aggregated output _'_elasticity respect to Y_.
EkP = quality output % elasticity respect to Y_.
Iqj= cost elasticity respect to aggregated output = traslog coefficient
2o
rlL'1= costelasticityrespecttoquality= traslog coefficient.
Then estimated index of economies of scale can be obtained as:
nt P
L.u k " h h
k=l
where:
_j = Zgi_
12'q_ = Z _'qL_
Therefore, products and qualities elasticities are compensated by weights to obtain the
level of economies of scale from the aggregated cost function.
The most important question is that to obtain tile level of economies of scale all
aggregated output variables and all qualities must be included.
For aggregated output measures, Tonn-kilometres and Passenger-kilometres, C_,, have
value 1 (see Jara and Cortes, 1996), so it's not necessary to weigh the elasticities
obtained directly from the cost equation estimated.
For quality measure, average stage length, the weight to compensate elasticity of this
quality have value 0, so this quality must not be included in the calculation of
economies of scale (Jara and Cortes, 1996). For the quality measure, average load
factor, a sensitivity analysis must be done between 0 and I (Jara and Cortes, 1996). In
the first case that would mean that additional increments in demand is compensated by
an increase in the frequency to maintain load factor constant. In the second case an
increase of demand affects directly to load factor because frequency is maintained
constant. As alternative for this variable (Oum and Zhang, 1997) make an estimation of
the elasticity of load factor respect to output directly.
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Appendix 2: estimation results
Method: Full Intbrmation Maximum Likelihood
Equations: Costs ShareL ShareK ShareMEndogenous Variables: LCOST SL SK
SMConvergence Achieved after 8 Iterations Log of Likelihood Function =
929.166
Number of Observations = 105
Standard
Parameter Eslimalc Error t-statistic
_o 8.09162 .034530 234.334_
1.13614% .899812 .071401
.073606 .627194_ -.877938E-02
_L .298475 .787987E-02 37.8782
_E .041686 .065702 .634469
_K .163176 .187522E-02 87.0168
_ .423682 .697966E-02 60.7024
YLL .164447 .023266 7.06825
Y_E .478189 .426951 1.12001
"{_K .100389 .724344E-02 13.8593
y_, .147563 .019613 7.52390
7LE .035056 .029829 1.I7523
"(L_ -.047149 .740266E-02 -6.36915
YLx, -.057877 .019046 -3.03886
YeK -.031717 .665419E-02 -4.76641
y_, -.070314 .028228 -2.49090
YKx, -.054244 .507834E-02 -10.6814
6Lp -.093457 .033024 -2.82999
5Ep -.312558 .175433 -1.78164
6K0 .015013 .738983E-02 2.03161
8_p .073998 .027250 2.71550
6_, .073590 .026576 2.76905
hE, .266696 .160444 1.66223
8_, -.920714E-02 .660879E-02 -1.39317
6_,_ -.073718 .021773 -3.38577
k_ -.587879 .355514 -1.65361
k, -.066608 .072180 -.922806
k,, -.i18364 .363659 -.325479
A,,,, -.681593 .144055 -4.73148
k_,, -.110937 .074551 -1.48807
.074247 .065351
|2.6023=, .046165
.015889 -.552553
Equation Costs
Dependent variable: LCOST
Mean of dependent variable = 8.15123
Std. dev. of dependent vat. = .957915
Sum of squared residuals = .785391
Variance of residuals = .747992E-02
Std. error of regression = .086487
R-squared = .991772
Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.97060
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Equation ShareL
Dependent variable: SL
Mean of dependent variable = .299019
Std. dev. of dependent var. = .075261
Sum of squared residuals =. 188575
Variance of residuals =. 179595E-02
Std. error of regression = .042379
R-squared = .679969
Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.61761
Equation ShareK
Dependent variable: SK
Mean of dependent variable =. 163162
Std. dev. of dependent var. -- .036166
Sum of squared residuals = .014470
Variance of residuals =.137805E-03
Std. error of regression = .011739
R-squared = .893631
Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.25017
Equation ShareM
Dependent variable: SM
Mean of dependent variable = .423124
Std. dev. of dependent var. = .069013
Sum of squared residuals =.140361
Variance of residuals =. 133677E-02
Std. error of regression = .036562
R-squared = .717274
Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.58134
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Tiffs paper identifies major issues facing Asian aixli.nes and governments when they dealwith the
U.S. open sldea initiatives dizected towards Asian countries, and suggests how they might deal.
with those issues strategically and practically. The paHr is orgar.ired as foLlows. Section [ is a
brief history of international air services regulation including the recent US initiatives for olin
sides and creation of European single aviation market. Section 17 identifies some key problems
associated with traditional air services treaty negotiations. Key lessons from the US-Canada Open
Sldes agreement axe described in Section III. Section IV identifies major challenges that the US
open sides initiatives bring to Asian carriers and governments. Section V describes the suggested
strategies for Asian carriers _d governments to deal with the US open sides initiatives. The paHr
ends with a summary and conc',usions.
History of International Air Services Regulation ,
History of Bilateral Systena Prior to World War 17, U.S. airlines negotiated directly with foreign
governments for the fights to serve foreign territories. Although _e State Department sometimes
assisted U.S. airlines, only in 1943 did the U.S. government begin to assume responsibility for air
service, negotiations ( Taneja, I976, p.2fiS), t At the 1944 Chicago Convention on International. Civii
t The basic rule ofinU:mazion_l law regarding commercial aviation was established at the Aeronautical
Commission of the Pea_ Conferenca in 1919 in Paris. The Paris Convention es',ablished the International
Commission for Air Navigation to revolve any technical problems arising be,'w_a c_untries. Although the US did
not ratify this convention, the Pan American Convention signed in I-Iavana in 1928 agreed to most of the principles
• .-. - ........... .....,. .- ..
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Aviation, the United States pressed for an open, multilateral, regime for postwar international air
services) The Convention failed to produce a multilateral agreement on commercial air transport
rights for international air transport services. Since then, all commercial aspects of international air
transport matters have been governed by bilateral air treaties between the countries involved. The
US and UK signed the first bilateral agreement in I946, known as "Bermuda F', wkich has provided
a framework for other bilaterals to follow (Kasper, 1988, p.5).
The C,kicago Convention also set up the L'uernational Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
an inter-governmental agency which provides a forum for discussion of key aviation issues and the
basis for world-wide coordination of technical and operational standards and pra_ices. Acting as a
counterweight to ICAO, I.ATA was established in I945 to represent the interest of airlines, and is
involved in tec,knical and commercial aspects of aviation. IATA served as an effective industry cartel
for a long tisne.
Bermuda f was a fairly liberal agreement in that it included no capacity, iL-nit on 3rd./4th
freedoms, multiple carrier designations, and substantial 5a freedom fights. However, thirv¢ years later
in 1976, the UK gave notice of termination of Bermuda I, claiming that under the terms of the treaty,
the US carriers had a disproportionate share of traffic. The US was forced to sign Bermuda rI
agreement in 1977 which accommodates British demands to virtually e!imina_e muItiple carrier
desi_ations, Emit capacity supplied, and give up some of US carriers' "beyond rights" to carry
tra._c be_'een Britain and other countries. It was a devastating policy setback for the US (Toil,
1997).
Bilateral agreements typically regulate carrier and route designations, capacity and frequency
of se,'-dces, pricing, and other commercial as aspects o_'doing business. Bilateral agreements are
based on the principle of reciprocity, an equal and fair exchange of rig,hts between countries very
different in size and with airlines of varied strength. Bilateral agreements vary in forrr_ but they
generally specify services and routes to be operated between the two countries, designate airlines and
of_e Paris Convantiom
: This U.S_intent was consistent with its national inte,,'_'t_ ARer WW- Ig the U.S. _'merged as just about
the only nation in the world who could su_y launch commercial scale internanonal airi.i.ucservice_. The
U.S. had aircr_ technology, trained personnel and fixm.uc_alability whiie the waxhad de',_oa-ta_ the European
countries and Japan
capacityto beprovidedbyeachairline,stipulatefaresettingmechanisms,andspecifyconditions
underwhichpassengersmaybetakenorpickedupineachcountryandflownto thirdcountries(fifth
freedomrights). Thereis, at present,anextensivenetwork,of bilateralagreements.Each
internationalirlinefacesacomplexwebofbilateralairservicesagreementssignedbyitshomestate.
The e.-dstenceof thesebilateralagreementshasgreatlyconstrainedthefreedomof indb,'iduaI
scheduledairlines,andlimitedcompetitionin theinternationalairtransportindustry(OumandYu,
1997,ch.3).
Towards Competitive System - US Initiatives. The deregulation of the U.S. domestic air transport
markets in 1978 has demonstrated the advantages of competitive airline system. On international air
se.wices, Carter Administration launched the pro-competitive policy by signing the Presidentia[
Statement on International Air Transport Negotiations in August 1978. The underlying philosophy
of the policy (which became the main trust of the International Air Transport Competition Act of
19793, L_.TCA) was that "maximum consumer benefits can best be achieved through the preservation
and extension of competition between airlines in a fair market place". This broad aim was to be
achieved through renegotiation ofbiIateral air services agreements (Dresner and Tretheway, t987).
A series of crucial bilateral negotiations were thus conducted over the period 1977-82, resulting in
the liberal bilateral agreements signed between the United States and 23 countries including the
Netherland s, Germany, B etgium, Israet, S ingapo re, Thailand 4, Ko re.z, and the P ki.Iippines (Haan ap pel,
1983). The effect of these liberal bilaterals was dramatic expansion of the number of airlines
operating, the total scheduled capacity offered in th"ose markets, and the number of US gateway
points with direct services to European or Asian destinations.
_'le new US aviation policy also directly affected IATA's price-se_ing activities. In June
I978, the US Civii Aeronautics Board (C._B) issued an order requiring IATA and associated parties
to show cause why CAB should not withdraw its approval ot_,and consequently anti-tru_ exemption
3 United. States, PubLicLaw 96-192, 1980, 94 STAT; 34.
Tl_und renou_ace.A,its air servioe agr_ment (ASA) with. the U.S. in 1990, claiming the agreement
favored US airline.s: A new agreement was sig_ext in May 1996 to open their aviation markets to each other's
_'rie."s.
for, IATA's Trai_cConferencesandotherrelatedagreements_.Withoutexemptionfromanti-trust
[egislation,alriinesparticipatinginpricingagreementswouldriskbeingtakento U.S. courtwhen
flyingto theUnitedStates.Theimmediateshort-termeffectof the ShowCauseOrderwasthe
withdrawalof all.USairlinesfi-omLATA membership. Over 40 percent of LATA member airlines'
international trafthc was to and from the United States, so the potential threat to IATA was
considerable. Althougah the Show Cause Order was subsequently abandoned amidst protests from
governments worldwide, it undoubtedly seriously undermined LATA's :m_fluence in the industry.
Ln March i992, the United States offered to negotiate transborder "open sides" agreement:
with all European countries. The first US "open skies" deal was simned in September 1992 bem'ee:
the U.S. and the Netherlands. In February 1995, US and Canada signed an open skies agreemer
with a three year phase-in provision. In May 1995, open skies agreements were signed between tb
United States and 9 European countries including Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Luxembour ,
Iceland, Finland, Denmark, Belgium, and Austria _. One year later, an open skies agreement ws
signed be_'een the U.S. and Germany (Kayal, 1997). The U.S. also signed a phased open sk_ :s
agreemen_ with the Czech Republic L_December 1995, the first such Fact with a former Eastern b? c
country r. Talks between the US and U-K over an "open s'Ides" accord are underway as a prerequi :e
for approval of the proposed BA-AA alliance z. In all, about 40% of Europe-US traffic flies un _.r
open skies (Hill, 1997).
Following the successes in Europe, the U.S. started to shiP[ the focus of its knternatic ai
aviation policy to Asia. T'ne U.S. Open Skies initiative in Asia was announced in summer 1996, :',d
by April, 1997, Singapore became the first country in'Asia to sign an open skies agreement. Dt "k=g
the 1997, Bmnei, Malaysia, Taiwan and New Zealand have also agreed on open sides accords dth
the United S t.ates (U'S DOT News 91-97).
5 United State_, Civil Aeromaudes Board, Order 78_-78,'ltme/.2, 1978.
s According to Air Transport Ass_ation of America (1995), the Unite_ States signed, new h-oer_
agreements or amendments _th 16 coua_triesin 1995.
It offered a s_mi_aragreement to Poland too, but sN1 needs to work Jt out.
s The Uuiw.d.States has made open skies a condition for agorot'mr c.odes_.re a//iance.s.
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Towards Compe,_dve System - European Initiatives. The European Union has been active ha
deregulating its hternai market through :he adoption of the three packages for Iiberalizz_ion
(Tretheway, 1991, and Matin't, 1995). From April, 1997, the EU created a single aviation market
similar to the US domestic market. Any EU-registered carrier has the right to run domestic se_'ices
within any of the EU'_ 15 member countries, as ,,veil as in Norway and Icetand. The single European
aviation market th_:s became the world's largest single aviation market with more than 370 million
potential passenger.'. National ownership rules have been replaced by EU ownership criteria• Air_es
have been given freedom to set fares, with sffeguards against predatory pricing through competition
rules.
So far, these changes do not apply to extra-EU a_eements. Negotiation on foreign carriers'
access to EU mem_.r states presently remains with individual members of the community. Many
of its Member.Staten have been pursuing liberal bilateral air services agreements with non-EU states,
including 'Open S:.ies' agreements with the US ('Button, 1997). However, the European
Commission oppose_ independent negotiation by individual states, and is making efforts to negotiate
ah treaties on beha:-" of member states as a bloc. The EU transport ministers recently decided to
authorize the Corm'Tfission to negotiate a multilateral aviation agreement with the United States
OBarnard, 1996). The Commission is promoting a deal with the United States as a model for EU-
wide accords with tYlrd countries.
Bilateral and 5iultHateral Approaches for Liberal_,ation
Flaws in Current Bilateral Process and Proposed Solutions. In many countries, flag carriers are
allowed to influence bihteraJ negotiation process. Tais is especially true when a country has only one
airline. Carrier interests are bound to dominate the bilateral negotiation process while consumer
interests tend to take a back seat. In this environment, although con_miners gala, governments would
not agree to inc',ease competition unless their flag carriers can also win. This definitely is one of the
reasons why the countries with competitive carriers are pro-h'beralization while other c.,ztmtries
oppose liber_llr_tion. Tais bilateral process is, therefore, unworkable unless liberalization offers win-
win situationto thecarriersof bothcountriesinvolved.It is inherentlyflawed because increased
compet;,dorl usually makes some players to win and some to lose.
In order to make the bilateral process to work, aviation should be kncludeA in _he negotiations
for the broader goods and services trade. This would off'or a better chance for striking a compromise
bern'con countries. This would allow the .theory of comparative advantage takes its course in
detem'_ning winning industries of each counm/. It is arguable that the European countries were able
to form a single European ak- services market because the aviation was included as a part of the whole
economic integration among the EU member states. It was possible to agree on a singie aviation
market despite the fact, that some countries will eventually lose their a_A.nes and much of the
associated employment base.
There are two additional ways to improve the bilateral ak negotiation process. First, as
countries deregulate their domestic markets, new entrants will emerge. Sooner or later, some of
these new entrants will be allowed to enter international markets. This wi,il tend to reduce the
influence of flag carriers in the bilateral negotiation process as the governments need to deal with
con_ctkng interests between the competing carriers, and it needs to be seen to play fak to the multiple
carriers. There is alto a strong emph-ical evidence that countries with mukiple carriers make efforts
to increase competition via multipte designation of carriers. In addition, deregulation of domestic
airline markets has positive effects for increazing competition in international m_kets. Secondly,
economic advancement tends to enhance consumer power and encourage consumer movement. This
will likely add to the weight for consumer benefits of increasing competition relative to the weight
#yen to the carf.er interests.
Multilateral Approach. There is no obvious reason why international aviation matters should be
handled any diK'erently from other international trade matters. EspeciaLly, telecommunications
services have been included in the General Ageement on Trade in Services (GATS) fi-amework.
Muiti.iateral fora _ve better chances for Liberalization on a regional or _obal scale. Eventually,
international, ak transport matters should move towards multilateral fora which can strike package
deals among panidpating countries. It is nearly impossible for counu-ies to agree on a mukilateral
liberaiizatioa package on ak transport without the opportunities to tradecff" with other sectors of"
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economy. Therefore, ICAO would not be an effectdve forum to discuss liberalization of air transpor_
because liberalization of air transport will always create winners and losers. WTO, APEC and/or
ASEAN stand a better chance ofh'beralizing air services along with other goods and services because
most countries wii1 be able to find some winning industries.
. . "
Lessons from the Success of theUS-Canada Open Skies Agreement
Until W"fO and/or APEC becomes an effective multilateral fora to negotiate air services liberalization,
the aviation industry is stuck with bilateral air treaty process. Liberalization between Iike-mLaded
countries are probably the only option in the short run. In this case, US-Canada open sNes
agreement signed in February, 1995, serves as a successful example with some useful lessons.
Prior to February, 1995, the US and Canada had one of the most restrictive bilateral air
services agreements although they share the largest bilateral air services market in the world. Expe,'-ts
agreed that, in the event of an open skies agreement, Canadian carriers would be strucmrai1y
disadvantaged as compared to the major US carriers. Canada's fear was based on the following
reasons. First, US carriers have well developed continental services network supported by large
populati.oa and strong and defensible hubs. Second, since the majority of transborder travelers
originate from or destined to eight major cities in Canada, the US carriers would be able to reach over
80% of Canadian transborder market cost effectively by e:('tending their spokes to these Canadian
cities from their US hubs. Third, Canadian carriers may not be able to access landing slots, gates and
counters at some congested U.S. a2uports, so they may not.be able to initiate new services or provide
high frequency services.
Although there were disagreements on the extent of these problems, both sides agreed that
these problems existed. In order to remedy the situation and create a level playing field, the two
countries agreed on the following measures. First, US c_-'riers entry into major Canadian markets
Croton:o, Montreal and Vancouver) are to be relaxed gradually over a three-year phase-in pe,,,iod 9
9 In fact, a two-year phase-in period was _opted to Moatrml and Vnncou'ver while We NIl ttu'_e-year
period was usext far T_mam.
whileallowingCanadiancarriersintotheUSmarket_omday1withoutanylimitation.Second,the
U.S.guaranteedthat Canadiancarriersgetsomeadditionalairportslots andgatespacesat the
congestedUSairportssuchasChicagoandLaGuardia in New York) °
In addition to these efforts to create the Ievei playing field, there were several important
factors which helped conclude the open skies agreement. First, both of the _v¢o major Canadian
carriers (Air Canada and Canadian A.irlines International) had alliance relationship with at least one
major US carriers. Air Canada had the alliance with United while Canadian had an equity alliance
with American Airiines (Oum and Park, 1.997). u These alliance relationships reduced some fear of
Canadian carriers. Second, shortly before the open skies a_eement with the U.S., Canada transferred
the operating rights of four major airports (Vancouver, Montreal, Edmontorr, Caigao') to the locai
.airport authorities. These airport authorities representing the local business interests played an
important role in lobbying vigorously for the open skies agreement. Third, the negotiation on the
open skies air seduces was conducted taking into account the overall economic and political
relationships between the two countries. These other relationships were taken into account indirectly
because President Clinton and Prime ,Minister Ci'u-etien appointed their respective special negotiators.
At this high level of negotiation, other economic and political factors couid play an important role at
least indirectly.
Tb.e most important lesson learnt from the US-Canada open skies agreement is that it is
possibie to create level playing field even if the flag carriers of the two countries are not equally
competitive. For example, if airlines in China fee! insecure about liberalization of bilateral agreement
with, say, Korea. Koreans may be able to offer significant concessions such as doing codesharing
alliance with the Chinese flag carriers via which they can pool tra._c and/or revenue. Even though
these measures may be construed as an anti-competitive behavior in western industrial/red, countries,
the opening up of Chinese aviation market itself increases competition and thus benefit air travelers.
l0 i"_c tl_-yea.r anniversary report publisheti by the US DOT (1998) indimtes that Air Canada has done
outstandingly well and Canadian _ done very wetl dunng the last three years. Tile total US-Canada transborder
passenger tra_c l:msin--by 37.2% (12.1 miiliota to I6.6 million).
u Air Canada also had alliance with Continental which it had 28.5% ownersNp. American
owns _33.3% equity shares of Canadian.
ChallengesPosedby theU.S.OpenSkiesInitiatives on Asian Carriers and Governments
The US Open Skies Initiatives. The U.S. goverrwnent announced its Open Skies initiative in Asia in
summer 1996. In January 1997, Singapore became the first country in Asia to sign an open skies
agreement with the United States u. Since then the U.S. government has accomplished open skies
air service agreements (ASAs) with Bmnei (Janua_', 1997), Taiwan (February, 1997), Malaysia
(June, I997), and New Zealand 's. Most of these agreements allow airlines from both countries fly
between any point in the U.S. and any point in that country with no restrictions on capacity or
frequency. The agreements also provide unlimited beyond traffic (Sth freedom) fights to both
countries' carriers. In addition, at least the agreements between the U.S. and Singapore and Bmnei
includes Seventh Freedom traffic rights on cargo (hubbing rights in foreign territory). The latter
provision is intended to help Federal Express and UPS to set up mini-hubs in Asia.
The U.S. government has started to work on other countries including (South) Korea and
Thailand. In particular, the U.S. is seeking change of gauge rights (change of aircra_ff size) as a very
important element for doing Open Skies agreement with Korea. The main reason is that the U.S.
carriers who already have extensive 5th freedom rights in Korea wish to operate smaU aircraft: on their
intra-Asia routes to/from Seou! while taking advantage of economies of larger aircraft size in
transpac_c markets. On the other hand, the Korean side is concerned about "past imbalance" in the
US-Korea ASA and is very reluctant to allow the changeof gauge. :4 Korea witl also need to worry
about potential retaliation by Japan if Korea allows US carriers the change-of-gauge rights. This is
because U.S. carriers would be abIe to take away a significant poction of the lapan's international
travellers from the struggling Japanese carriers, and route them via Seout.
o,°,
12The U.S. also reached agreements on open skies with Taiwan and Brunei in early 1997
(US DOT News 48-97).
Sknilar agreements were signed with six Central American Countries during the same
month (US DOT News 82-97).
,4 A U.S. official is reported as saying that the U.S. has "change of gauge" fights with. the
twelve European nations with which it si_ed open skies agreements (Ballantyne, 1997).
l0
Despitethedenialbyasenior U.S. government official, _5 the progress in Asia paraLiels the
U.S. approach in Europe, where a series of open skies treaties with "soft targets" evenmaJly led
Germany into signing a deal. The U.S. is now working on the U.K. and France. In Asia, it appears
that Washingtoa's strategy includes forcing Japan to liberalize) s Of'course, in this approach Korea
holds a key to the U.S. policy given its proximity to Japan and somewhat liberal attitude on
international air transportation matters. The new US policy toward Asia has shifted away fi-om
focussing directly on Japan to working with the rest of Asian countries because successes with other
Asian countries will later pressure Japan to sign a truly open skies bilateral.
Undoubtedly, the U.S. government will have open skies or hearty open skies treaties with a
number of A.sian countries within a few years. Since many of these open skies agreements may
include ex_ensive fi_%hfreedom and some seventh freedom rights (hubbing or change of gauge rqghts),
U.S. carriers may be in a position to set up intra-Asian services more freely than most Asian carriers
can. This can happen because bilateral agreements ber,,veen Asian countries have quite restrictive
3rd/4th freedom traffic rights. For example, most of intra-Asian ASAs apply the "equal benefits"
principte for determining capacity and fi-equency of services whiie the U.S. carriers coutd have
complete freedom to set their flight frequency and prices in the same markets. Because the potential
negative consequences of such an anomaly has caused enough worry to some countries, the ASEAN
transport ministers have established a group to study this problem and to develop a competitive air
services policy as a prelude to an eventuat open skies regime in ASEAN.
_ M.r. Mark Gerchick, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Transportation, has said in
his inte_ziew published in Orient Aviation (June/July, 1997 issue) that the U.S. government
approach to Asia does not include a strategy of"divide and conquer", designed to pressure the
toughest target of all, Japan, into U.S. liberalization demands.
_6Although Japan signed a fairly liberalized agreement with the U.S. in January1998, it has
not changed Japan's basic stands of regarding the bi]ateral with the LT.S. as being "unfair'and
'"unbaianced". In the new four-year deal, Japan recognizes the unlimited beyond fights to the three
U'.S. carriers (United, Northwest and Federal Express). It also aliows All Nippon Airways
incre..ased access to a number of U.S. cities in exchange for increasing opportunities for the U.S.
MOU (Memorandum of Lrnderstanding) carriers on 3rd/4th _eedorn markets between the two
countries.
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Dismantling .Restrictive Intra-Asian Bilateral Agreements.
Although zhe US has open skies agreements with many European countries, the EU countries can
deal with the situation without much difficulty because they formed a single unified aviation market
from Apt:,1, 1997. In other words, European carriers would enjoy more fi-eedom in the intra-
European markets than any US carriers. However, the situation couid get serious in Asia if US
carriers szarz to take full advantage of the open skies agreements in Asia, and set up eflbcient intra-
Asian nenvork. The Asian carriers would not be able to compete effectively with the US carriers in
their own continent because what they can do is limited by the restrictive bilateral agreements with
their Asian neighbors. They will need to persuade their governments to dismantle those restrictive
bilaterais.. Therefore, if enough number of Asiart counties sign open skies agreement with the US,
this would lead to a situation where the restrictive bilaterals between Asian countries will need to be
dismantled wholesale.
Strategies for Asian Carriers and Governments
/°
Intra-Asian Open SMes Firs_
Ideally, open s',des should occur first among the Asian countries, and then, with countries outside of
Asia. Creation of the open skies continental air transport market is in the interest of Asian carriers
and consumers. Sucha pro-competitive policy will help Asian carriers in several ways. t7 First, it will "
allow the Asian caniers to compete effecive!y with the US carriers in their back yard. Second, it
wii1 allow major Asian carriers to set up an efficient mukiple hub network covering the entire Asian
continent effec, ively. This will help put Asian carriers in equal status as the US and European mega
carriers in forming global alliance service networks (Oum, 1997). t' Third, Asian carriers based in
•7 La fact,open competitior, ma Z lead to failure of some carriers and changes in the industry st.ructu.re a,ud
carrier ze_'works.
t, Sia_ none of the Asian aixlin_ has eff._"/ve coverage of entire Asian markets, a U.S. or European
carrier s_king partners in Asia aligns with more than one competing Asian carriers. Therefore, they will be able
to pray ane Asian carrier against another in ord_ to ¢x=act better alliance conditioo.s, in January. 1998, Singapore
Aixlines (50J announced its allian_ with Lug.hmasa, and most l_ly seek a membership in STAR atlian_. This
would put 5Q at odds with Thai rntet'aatioaal who is already a member of STAR a/lian_.
12
e; """_":" :":"'; ..... -" .... :'"" ":2 .'_". "."'-,:. ;" ..... _-...--.-.._ ..:....-z; .,.-,-- . .. ..... _..,_..,,_,
the_untries whereinputcostsarerisingfastwouldbe ableto shift theirsignificantcostbases
includingemploymentto thecountrieswhichenjoyslow inputcosts.Thiswill lengthentheperiod
inwhichtheAsiancarrierscanenjoyunitcostadvantagevis-a-visUSandEuropeancarriers.
Pr_ricad Measures.
Since it is impossible to achieve consensus among all Asian carriers and governments, liberalization
among like-minded countries shouId be negotiated first. This would demonstrate benefits of
liberalized air transport regime as weU as illuminate the threat of traifi.c diversion fi-om the protective
countries. From the earlier discussions, the following measures may be fi-uitfuUy applied for
iiberaiization within Asia.
(1) Linking air bilateral with the negotiation on goods and services trade issues: As discussed
previously, this increases opportune/for compromise becat/se eack country may find some winning
industries. This may require a significant change in institutional structure of governments involved.
Currendy, in most countries the ,Ministry of Transport personnel are the main people who control
negotiation process for air bilaterais. This should be changed accordinNy if trade-offs between air
transport and other goods and services trade matters are to be made.
(2) Compez_satingfor differential competitiveness of carriers: If carriers in a certain country are
less e._dent or structurally disadvantaged than other countries' carriers, it may be desirable to devise
a method of compensating those carriers. This is important especially when dealing with China and
India because their flag carriers are not competitive. For example, Chinese carriers are less
competitive than other major Asian carriers such as Singapore or Korean Air. It is possible for
Singapore or Korea Air to compensate the Chinese carriers in such a way that the benefits from the
liberalized markets be shared nearly equally with Chinese carriers. Another way of compensating
the disadvantaged carriers is to adopt some safeguard measures to protect those carriers for some
time. For example, when the US-Canada Open Skies ageement was si_,ed, the U.S. carriers were
aiIcwed in the three major Canadian cities only on a gradual basis (3-year phase-m) while Canadian
carriers were allowed in the US market unlimited from Day 1.
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(3)Sert,ing a time table for achieving open skies: It is helpful to set a specific time schedule for
iiberatJzatien and evenmaily acNeving open skies even though the dates may be far into the future.
This helps prepare beth the carriers and governments for the eventual open skies.
(4) L!beralize easier itemsfirs_: It is easier to liberalize the following items first.
- Relaxing foreign ownership Iimit oa the second level flag carriers
- Relaxing charter and fi-eight services.
- Relaxing scheduled services to and from secondary and local airports
- Relaxing third and fourth freedom schedule services rights
- Move towards multipie designation of carriers
.,'."
.2" "
V'£ Summary and Conclusions
The U.S. open skies initiatives targeted towards Asian countries appear to have two clear objectives.
First, it recognizes direct, behests for the U.S. carriers of having open skies agreements with Asian
economies whose aviation markets are expected to grow very rapidly in the future. Second, despite
the U.S. denial, the U.S. strateg)' appears to include a 'divide and conquer' strategy for forcing Japan
to the open skies re zime. Despite Japan's repeated threat to repeal its 'unbalance' 1952 Air Services
A_eement with the U.S., it is not possible for Japan to take that course of action because of its fear
of U.S. retaliation in the areas of general goods and services trade. Given the fact that Japanese
international carriers are net cost competitive relative to the U.S. or other Asian carriers, the rational
policy for Japan is to postpone the US-led open skies initiatives as long as possible. Japan may be-
counting on the fag that Korean carriers enjoy enormous market shares in the markets to and from
Japan, and thus, it may be possible for Japan to discourage Korea from singing art open skies
agreement with. the U.S. Japan also knows that Korea-is retu_ant to give away change of gauge
ri_s to the U.S. carriers. Korea plays a pivotal role concerning the U.S.-Japan air bilateral matters
because Seou! can be used to siphon away traffic to and from Japan. The U.S. initiatives are not yet
Likeiy to succeed in the North_st A.sian market because of these fa_ors. Tnaddkion, it is premature
for ekher the C,hinese gove,,7_ent or Chinese carriers to even consider open skies with the U.S. "fSis
..
'7.;
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leaves some breathing room for Japan to fend offthe threat of the U.S. open skies initiatives in the
region it_Eorea does not sign an open skies with the U.S.
Unlike the U.S. or European carriers, none of the ,_ian carriers has efficient tra._c col1_cfion
and distribution network covering the entire Asian continent effectively. Essentially, each Asian
airline has a fairly extensive network to and from its own capital city, but does not have any hubs in
other parts of Asia. Therefore, major US or European ca_n-iers looking for Asian alliance partners
have an incentive to align with more than one Asian carrier. Since these Asian carriers are mutual
competitors in Asian market, they are at disadvantage in joining a _obal alliance network such as
STAR Alliance. When two or more Asian carriers join a global alliance network, other senior
partners in the global alliance network may be in a position to play one against another Asian carriers
and thereby extraa better conditions for alliance.
The recent U.S. open skies initiatives directed to Asian countries pose a major threat to Asian
carriers. The U.S. wishes to negotiate for unlimited _'eedom for setting up hubs (star-burst
operations) in Asian countries so that the U.S. carriers can provide high frequency services using
smaUer aircrat_ in the intra-Asian markets while enjoying economies of larger aircra_ff in the trans-
Pacer routes. Since most Asian countries already have far more iibera[ bilateral agreements with. the
U.S. than among themsdves, if one or two countries situated in strategic locations in Asia (such as
Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong) agrees to give unlimited seventh freedom rights or change of gauge
rights to the U.S. then this will lead to dismantLing of the system of restrictive bilateral agreements
among Asian countries. This would happen because Asian carriers would be far more constrained
in their own intra-Asian markets than the U.S. carriersl Most bilaterals between Asian countries have
restrictions on seat capacity and/or frequency and pridmg even on the third/fourth freedom tra._c.
Therefore, it is better for Asian countries to create open sides bloc (or substantially more
liberalized air transport region) before allowing the U.S. carriers to do hub (or sr.ar burxt) operations
in Asia. This will induce the major Asian carriers to set up an efficient multiple hub airline network
covering the entire continent. This wi.ll also e_ance their status in _obal allianc_ networks. In
addition, this would allow the Asian carriers based in the countries where input costs are rising fa..,-'I:
to shi_r2their significant cost bases to the countries w_,ich, enjoy low input costs. This wili help
prolong the period in which Asian carriers ,,rill have uak cost advantage vis-a-vis the U.S. or
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Europeancarriers.
Sinceit is impossibleto ac,hieveconsensusamongall Asiancarriersandgovernments,
liberalization among like-minded countries should be negotiated first. The following measures may.
be fruiffuity applied for liberalization within Asia.
• Linking air bilateral with the negotiation on goods and services trade issues.
• Attempt to compensate the losses to the carriers' in developing countries who are
expected to be disadvantaged in an open skies environment and/or to build in
temporary safeguards for protecting those carriers.
• Setting future time table for achieving open skies to get carriers and governments
prepare for the eventual open skies.
• Liberalize easier items first such as freight, charter, services to/from secondary
airports, foreign ownership of secondary carriers, etc.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, booming economies within South East Asia and in adjacent regions,
especially North East Asia, have provided a foundation for strong growth in airline travel.
Despite the potential for expansion, Thai International, Philippines Airlines and Garuda
International have faced financial constraints and their competitive positions have weakened.
They have lacked sufficient finance to grow and to upgrade their fleets, they have accumulated
sub-optimal mixes of equipment, and they have been expected to provide uneconomic services
that governments deem necessary. To a large extent, these same problems have beset Malaysian
Airlines while Singapore's has, by necessity, remained focused on its international markets.
Faced with these challenges, government policies in South East Asia that protected flag carriers
have given way to privatisation and a more liberal approach to competition. Increasing reliance
has been placed on private sector airlines to supplement capacity as competition in domestic
airline industries has been liberalised. A step that has followed soon after has been multiple
designation in international markets (Hooper, 1997). In the process, aggressive new entrants
have been accommodated in dynamic markets. However, aviation policy in Asia continues to be
characterised by a close relationship between the flag carrier, dominant business groups and the
government (Bowen, 1997). The underlying approach to policy change can best be described as
"pragmatic" (Bowen and Leinbach, 1995) and it is not evidence that governments in the region
have committed themselves unequivocally to an ideology of flee and open airline markets.
Nevertheless, policies continue to be challenged. The expansion of airlines from source or
destination markets outside the region is one of the key ones, particularly since these carriers
attempt to align themselves with airlines based in the region. Singapore Airlines, for example,
has been linked to Delta Air Lines and Swissair in the Global Excellence alliance. United
Airlines and Lufthansa have been associated with Thai International, but as Singapore Airlines
shifts its allegiance to the Star Alliance involving these two airlines along with Air New Zealand
and Ansett Airlines, the role of Singapore as a regional hub has been strengthened at the
expense of Bangkok. Governments in South East Asia have to deal with ever more complex
alliance arrangements and a concentration in market power. When the alliances involve airlines
from the USA, an additional consideration is the pressure that is exerted to enter into an "open
skies" bilateral agreement.
These open skies agreements, with generous provisions for fifth freedom traffic, give the
airlines from the USA a competitive advantage through their more advantageous access to
intra-regional traffic (Findlay et al., 1997). Bilateral agreements between ASEAN economies _
have tended to remain restrictive on the issue of fifth freedom rights. AS a result, it has been
difficult for the airlines to use their equipment to maximum advantage within the region let
alone to consolidate hub-and-spoke networks. Alliances among airlines are being used to
circumvent the regulations, but the focus has been on agreements with carriers based in Europe
and North America. The hubs based in ASEAN play their parts within global networks but their
capacity to distribute traffic efficiently within the region is liiIfited. At the same time, there have
J ASEAN's current members are Brunci Darussalam, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia,
Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
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beenimpedimentso thedevelopmentof newroutesprovidingdirectlinksbetweencontiguous
growthareas.
Progressonreformof airlineregulationonamultilaterallevelhasprovento beaslowprocess,
but broaderinitiativesto liberalise trade accelerated the process in Europe and in North
America (Button, 1997). Various regional trade agreements in South East Asia have been
developed, including the ASEAN Free Trade Area, the Northern Growth Triangle (IMT-GT),
the East ASEAN Polygon (BIMP-EAGA), the Southern Growth Triangle (IMS-GT), the
Greater Mekong and Golden Quadrangle Growth Areas. The geography of South East Asia,
however, places considerable reliance on efficient air and maritime transport to promote
regional integration. The need for more flexible aviation arrangements has become clear and
this prompted the ASEAN transport ministers to commit themselves to an "open skies" policy.
The policy requests member countries to remove many of the current restrictions on market
entry to international aviation with their markets and to support free competition between the
airlines. Within APEC there is even broader commitment to free trade and an agreement to
review ways to achieve a more competitive environment for air services.
The current economic situation in Asia will force the airlines to consolidate their positions for
at least the short-term. All of the region's carriers are facing gloomy economic prospects and it
is possible governments will adopt a more protectionist stance. However, the IMF bail-out
packages require governments to commit themselves to free trade. The economies of the region
have prospered by broadening markets and it is likely that the drive to expand intra-regional
trade will remain a strong force. In addition, the major airlh_es in South East Asia are
participating in "global" alliances that demand better systems of feeder services. Also, the USA
already has concluded several open skies agreements and it will continue to exert pressure on
other countries to follow suit.
There is sufficient momentum behind the formation of aUiances and the creation of regional
markets that airline competition in South East Asia will become more and more competitive
over time. This paper describes these forces and makes observations about the impact they will
have on the development of intra-regional airline service. In particular, we raise the question
what South East Asia can learn from experiences with single aviation markets elsewhere,
particularly Europe. Inter-related questions concern the benefits that can be expected to flow
from a single market, whether the regional airline market is a step towards a more liberal,
multilateral framework, whether a particular group of economies is optimal for the airlines and
whether new members will be permitted to join. Finally, we examine the global forces of
alliance formation and open skies agreements with the USA and ask whether regionalism will
combine with these forces to create a more competitive international airline sector.
2 AVIATION POLICIES IN ASEAN
Airline services in South East Asia developed initially as a set of links in a network radiating
from European countries to their satellites. This network was strengthened in the two decades
following World War II, but it was the introduction of long-haul, wide-bodied jets and the
emergenceof aggressiveairlinesinSouthEastAsiathattransformedthemarket.Singaporeand
Bangkok,in particular,werelocatedstrategicallyasstopoversandinterchangepointson the
rapidlygrowinglong-haulservicesbetweenEuropeandAustralasia(Rimmer,1996).
The emergingcarriersin SouthEastAsiapossessedcompetitiveadvantagein termsof the
locationof theirhomebaseandtheirlowerinputcostsandtheywereableto establishastrong
presencein thelonghaulmarkets(Findlay,1985).Furthermore,therapideconomicgrowthin
Asia over the past fdteenyearshaspresentedamplescopefor theseairlinesto pursue
expansionisttrategies.As a result, airline services between ASEAN and North-East Asia have
undergone considerable development (Rimmer, 1996). Economic growth and broadening intra-
regional markets did have an impact and the network of airline services within South East Asia
was beginning to improve. For example, the network in 1979 included Hanoi, Vientiane,
Yangon, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Jakarta, Manila and Bandar Seri Begawan
(Brunei) and 11 other cities. By 1996, Phnom Penh and an another 17 non-capital city airports
had been added to the network (Bowen, 1997). Most of the new airports were in Malaysia and
Indonesia, but all of the South East Asian nations were opening up secondary ports for cross-
border traffic.
The key airports in South East Asia now have the potential to be used by the airlines as hubs to
consolidate regional traffic from feeder routes. An additional feature at Singapore is the use of
these hubs by carriers based in the United States and Australia to transfer on-line passengers
between various points in their home continents and countries other than Singapore. These
arrangements allowed the carriers to make more efficient use of their wide-bodied aircraft and
have permitted increases in frequencies into the hub. Singapore took a lead when it agreed to
the UK's request for break of gauge rights within their air services agreement, increasing the
potential for traffic consolidation and feeder services. The strategic placement and use of these
hubs have mitigated some of the weakness in the region's route network development.
The aviation policies adopted by the ASEAN economies have adapted to their changing
circumstances. All promoted a single, government-owned flag carrier that was expected to take
on unprofitable services to assist in nation-building. This was particularly important for
Malaysia to link the Peninsula with East Malaysia and for the Philippines and Indonesia, both
archipelagos. Each of the ASEAN carriers faced the challenge of establishing their presence in
a market very much under the control of the metropolitan powers generating the bulk of the
traffic. During the 1970's, though, a more liberal environment began to emerge. Competition
among the carriers made it progressively more difficult for governments to control fares.
Promotional fares proliferated as scheduled airlines learned to cope with floating currency
exchange rates and competition from charter airlines (Lyle, 1995). Progressively, there was less
attention to pricing regulation inthe bilateral agreements and the major objectives for the
ASEAN carriers were to gain access to markets and to get approval to increase their capacity.
However, the pace of change varied from country to country.
Thailand maintains tight regulatory control over all aspects of international aviation. In its
bilateral regulations it has sought "order in the air" through the balancing of economic benefits
in the exchange of traffic rights, a careful monitoring of controls over capacity, the multilateral
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establishmentof tariffsthroughIATA andageneralacceptanceof airlinecooperativepractices
suchaspooling.Thailandalsoisreluctanto deregulateits domesticmarketbecauseits minor
domesticairlinesarenot strongenoughto withstandopencompetition.However,Thailand
recentlyendedits policyof designatingonlyoneinternationalcarrierandThai Internationalis
beingprivatisedto enhanceitscapacityto managemorecommerciallyandefficiently.
In contrast,Singaporehaspursuedexpansionof itsinternationalair transportfinkswith avery
openapproachto settingcapacity.Singaporehassignednumerousbilateralair agreementshat
do not requirereciprocalcapacityentitlementsfor SingaporeAirlines.Whereverpossible,
Singaporexchangesrightsbasedonopportunitiesratherthanonabsolutereciprocityin traffÉc
or operationalterms.Nevertheless,Singaporehashadto bereadyto reacha compromiseand
in manyof its agreementsit hasacceptedsomerestrictionson routeaccess,traffic rights,
capacityandtariffs.WhentheUSAturneditsinterestin concludingopenskiesagreementso
Asia,Singaporewasthefirstto move.FromApril 1997, US carriers have been permitted to fly
beyond Singapore while Singapore Airlines enjoys similar benefits in the USA. The privatised
Singapore Airlines has been free of community service obligations and it is noted for its
commercial success.
The Philippines has ended Philippine Airlines' monopoly in the domestic market and five new
carriers have been free to compete on domestic routes. One of these new entrants (two more
had applied) was given the second official flag carrier status for regional routes. Indonesia has
opened 23 gateways for international tourism and air traffic rights have both Indonesia and the
Philippines have liberal air services agreements with Singapore.
Partners in bilateral agreements have been under similar pressures and multiple designation and
capacity increases have been negotiable in many situations. However, cross-border links in
ASEAN are under-developed as a result of the bilateral system. Bowen (1997) has argued that
there is over-servicing of the routes between Malaysia and East Malaysia and under-servicing
on routes from Malaysia to adjacent Sumatra and that the "...pace of change is slow and
distorted by the inherent biases in the bilateral system" (Bowen, 1997, page 136). We now
examine how alliances can alleviate this problem.
3 ALLIANCES AND AIRLINE SERVICES IN SOUTH EAST ASIA
International airlines have used alliances to circumvent restrictive regulations that prevent them
from pursuing network strategies within which a hierarchy between feeder and trunk services
would emerge. These alliances are organised around code-sharing, joint frequent flyer
programmes and marketing, shared computer reservations systems, joint use of resources,
combined purchasing and co-ordinated schedules. Thus far, the airlines based in South East
Asia have been more interested in forming alliances with major carriers from the USA and from
Europe. This gives credence to the argument that alliance formation among international
airlines is an attempt globalise within the regulatory constraints (Gialloreto, 1988; Tretheway,
1991; Doganis, 1994).
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Accordingto onelineof argument,themajorairlineswill determinethelocationof keyhub
airportsandthelesserairlineswill berelegatedto feederoles(Shenton,1995).WhenUnited
Airlines and Lufthansa formed their alliance in September 1993, United had to choose whether
to use London/Heathrow as its mini-hub in Europe, but chose to use its code-share flights with
Lufthansa for intra-European services. Similar effects are emerging as Singapore Airlines is
admitted to this alliance. Lufthansa's link to Thai International is weakening and a consequence
is that Lufthansa will concentrate its services to South East Asia through Singapore. As this
Star Alliance adds new partners such as Air New Zealand and Ansett International, Singapore's
role as a regional hub is enhanced.
However, there are concerns that the smaller carriers within these alliances will be relegated to
the role of feeder airlines. The proposal for British Airways and Qantas Airways to extend their
code-share agreement on routes between Australia, Singapore and Europe raised the concerns
of Australia's International Air Services Commission (IASC) for this reason (Findlay et al.,
1997). The IASC refused to approve the proposal when it was first raised in 1997 on the
grounds that the Australian carrier would play too small a role within the alliance. From
Australia's point of view, the emerging alliance between American Airlines and British Airways
ensures Qantas is part of a powerful airline group. However, if this comes at the price of
Qantas being relegated over time to being a feeder airline there are important implications for
Australia (Bureau of Transport and Communications Economics, 1994).
Policy makers in South East Asia will have to balance their concerns about increasing market
power of the major alliances (Burton and Hanion, 1994), the possibility that the region's
airlines will be relegated to the status of feeder airlines and the benefits of concentrating traffic
through hub airports. The USA has the clearest policy regarding these types of alliances - they
are acceptable provided they operate within an 'open skies' regime and if dominant positions
on less competitive routes are weakened. Interest among the world's airlines to enter into
alliances with their counterparts in the USA has given the latter country the leverage to
negotiate very liberal air services agreements. Ten European nations have acquiesced (Jennings,
1996; Odell, 1997) and the USA is pursuing a similar approach in Asia (Bal.lantyne, 1997;
Jennings, 1996). The protectionist approach taken by some of the key nations in Asia has
discouraged alliances with airlines from within the region, but even Japan has not been able to
sustain its opposition to alliances under the pressures of competition from the European and
North American airlines.
In April 1997_ Singapore entered into an open skies agreement with USA and similar
agreements have been concluded between the USA and Brunei, New Zealand and Taipei with
discussions in place with Malaysia and South Korea. The Singapore - USA agreement allows
for access to all gateways in the USA and beyond, greater flexibility in code-_sharing and the
freedom to create a wide variety of commercial relationships with US and third party carriers.
Key points of the agreement are (Chin, 1997):
• Termination of restrictions on pricing, capacity, type of airlines, and number of flights
and routes
• Liberal charters
• Right to fly between any point in the US and any point in the other nation and beyond
to third nations
• Open code-sharing
• Prompt conversion and remission of hard currency
• Self-handling provisions for carriers to perform or control airport activities that support
their operations
• Non-discriminatory operation and access to computer reservations systems
• Fair competition in commercial activities such as airport charges
• Membership of international conventions on safety and security
The USA is attempting to draw a critical mass of Asian countries into these liberal agreements.
It is realistic to assume that countries in South East Asia will be unable to stand in the way of
alliances involving the mega carriers and it will be very difficult to resist the pressure to enter
into open skies agreements. This poses difficult questions about how to promote effective
competition while positioning regional airlines in such a way that they can exercise influence
within the alliance (Oum and Taylor, 1995). At the same time, the open skies agreements that
have been negotiated with the USA put the regional carriers at a disadvantage - their access to
intra-regional traffic is less favourable than is becoming the case for the US airlines (Findlay et
al., 1997). In addition, if the hub airports are to live up to their potential, the South East Asian
airlines will have to develop strong regional, feeder services. It is not so much a question of
whether a more liberal regime will emerge in Asia as it is a question of timing and form. It is
possible that more liberal access to markets and more competitive conditions will be granted on
a bilateral basis, but another path is within regional airline markets.
4 TOWARDS A COMPETITIVE, REGIONAL AIRLINE MARKET
WITHIN SOUTH EAST ASIA
Although the matter will be raised again by the World Trade Organisation (WTO), air traffic
(landing) rights or services directly related to the exercise of traffic rights remain outside the
framework of GATS. The principles of bilateralism and reciprocity dominate negotiations
concerning international trade in airline services. As a general proposition, though, multilateral
initiatives to promote free trade tend to become bogged down in complex sectoral issues. More
substantive progress has been achieved in recent years through regional trade agreements.
Associations of states agree to reduce barriers to trade within their region in order to allow
industry access to larger markets and to reap economies of scale and to improve efficiency.
Alternatively, a regional trade agreement can be formed to give the member states greater
negotiating power in external markets. The regional trade agreement also can be an agent of
change designed to promote regional political co-operation and possible integration.
It is more likely that regional trade agreements will be formed by economies that are located in
the samegeographic area, but it is helpful if the participating states share a common history and
that they have reached similar levels of economic development and have compatible trade
policies. Regional integration generally is the result of a combination of market and policy
factors, but it can proceed in a variety of ways. For example, the European Union (EU) is an
attemptto achievebroadregionalintegrationbasedarounda singlemarket.The North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has progressed along the lines of a traditional
approach to free trade among member countries based on tariff reductions. The EU has been
able to set up supranational institutions whereas the NAFTA approach relies upon enforcement
by national authorities.
In January 1992, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) announced its intention
to form the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) by 2008. In September 1994, ASEAN Member
Countries agreed to accelerate progress with AFTA by reducing the initial time frame from 15
to 10 years. The primary objective of AFTA is to enhance ASEAN's position as a competitive
production-based economic region geared towards servicing the global market. This is to be
achieved by expanding trade relations, making it possible to increase specialisation and exploit
economies of scale. ASEAN members also participate in Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) and share in the commitment to remove trade barriers by 2020.
These regional trading agreements have provided a foundation upon which more liberal airline
regulations can be introduced for a group of countries. Since April 1997, for example, there has
been a single aviation market in the European Union and airlines from member economies are
able to operate anywhere within the region. Canada has signed an open skies air services
agreement with the USA, but this is separate from NAFTA (Tretheway, 1997). Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Paraguay recently signed a regional agreement (Mercosur group) and
this has been mooted as a step towards a pan-American "civil aviation network governed by a
single multilateral regional air transport agreement" (Pereira, 1996). The single aviation market
between Australia and New Zealand is another example of a regional approach within the
context of a broader trade agreement. ICAO has identified 50 such groupings of states that are,
or could become, involved in the regulation of aviation. Clearly the potential exists to form a
similar arrangement in Asia particularly to cater for the new airlines.
In 1994, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand signed a joint Memorandum of Understanding under
which regional flights would be encouraged within the 'Northern Growth Triangle'. Each of the
signatories was free to designate two airlines that would be permitted to operate whatever
capacity they wish between secondary airports on a scheduled or charter basis, carrying
passengers and/or cargo. In situations where this arrangement was at variance with air services
agreements, the latter were to take precedence.
Since then, the Philippines and Brunei have joined and the group is known as BIMP-EAGA
(Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines - East Asia Growth Area) and it covers a market with
a potential of 250 million air travellers (Ballantyne, 1996). Discussions between Thailand,
Myanmar, Vietnam, . Cambodia,. Laos and Yunnan Province of China have mooted another
aviation bloc. The EAGA group has been working together to improve transport links that have
been neglected. Indonesia has declared Kalimantan and Sulawesi unrestricted to foreign carriers
from other Southeast Asian countries. EAGA governments have agreed to set up a new
regional airline, Saeaga, a joint venture between a Malaysian company and the State
governments of Sabah and Sarawak. Saega has been designated as Malaysia's second airline for
points in EAGA.
AlthoughJapanhasa moreprotectionistapproachto aviationpolicy,it attemptedin 1995 to
create an Asian aviation forum to achieve regional cooperation on aviation policies (Ballantyne,
1995). APEC, through its Transport Working Group, also is examining ways to promote a
more competitive air services regime. More tangible progress, though, was made in ASEAN in
February 1997 when the transport ministers reiterated the importance of the development of a
Competitive Air Services Policy as a gradual step towards open skies in ASEAN. The first step
is to introduce air services liberalisation within or between sub-regional groups such as BIMP-
EAGA, IMT-GT, IMS-GT. The second step is to develop the ASEAN Open Sky Policy. The
final step is to implement the ASEAN Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights on Non-
Scheduled Services among ASEAN countries.
The intention in AFFA is to accelerate the growth in business and foreign investments, tourism
and trade. Deregulation within individual economies is an additional force. ASEAN transport
ministers have stated that "The competitive environment in international air transport within
ASEAN shall be developed and promoted, with no restrictions in frequency, capacity and
aircraft type for point to po'mt access". However, the proviso was added that tiffs competitive
regime must be based on the progressive, order!y and safeguarded change in international air
transport regulations on the basis of fair and equal opportunity for all member countries."
5 A REGIONAL AVIATION MARKET IN SOUTH EAST ASIA: SOME
ISSUES
Attempts to create a competitive, regional airline market in South East Asia have been
motivated by the desire to strengthen ties between economies in the region through an
improved network of airline services. Given the experience with aviation in the European
Union, it is worth examining what is similar in South East Asia and what can be learned from
Europe. For that matter, what can be learned from other attempts to create single aviation
markets within Mercosur and Closer Economic Relations (CER) between Australia and New
Zealand? Several inter-related questions arise. One is what benefits can be expected to flow
from a single market, particularly in terms of new routes and strengthening of feeder services
and hubs? Is the regional airline market a step towards a more liberal, multilateral framework?
These questions cannot be answered without also considering whether any particular group of
economies is optimal for the airlines and whether the defined group remains the optimal set in a
dynamic industry. On what terms are new members permitted to join? Finally, to what extent
are the global forces of alliance formation and open skies agreements with the USA
complementary to the formation of regional markets? Will the two sets of forces combine to
create a more competitive international airline sector or will one be set against the other?
Button (1997) has commented on the lessons that Asia can draw from the European
experience. He pointed out that the formation of the single aviation market lagged behind trade
liberalisation and built upon experiences of deregulated domestic markets. The European Union
had developed prior experience in the transport sector through the road transport sector.
Europe presents the airlines mostly with short-haul markets that were relatively mature. In
somerespectsSouthEastAsiasharesomeof thesecharacteristics.Key among these is that
liberalisation of aviation competition is dealt with as a part of a much broader programme of
trade and cultural integration. However, it is notable that progress on aviation reform was slow
in Europe. Despite Europe's ability to agree on supra-national organisations to manage
competition policies, it has been difficult to establish a level playing field in the competitive
airline industry. Arguments about state subsidies to airlines, unfair competition, consumer
protection, safety and environmental issues continue to arise. The comprehensive framework
within the European Union, though, has allowed it to deal with issues such as a code of
conduct for computer reservation systems and to examine the pricing of packaged travel
products.
The pace of economic growth has been a major factor motivating liberalisation of airline
markets in South East Asia. The recent economic difficulties might ease the pressure on
regulatory reform, though it is possible it will give even more reason why airlines should be set
free to adjust to prevailing conditions. There are good reasons to believe that the time frame for
liberalising airline markets will be shorter in South East Asia. One of the interesting
developments to come out of the currency crises of 1997-98 has been that the Asian
Development Bank will take on a central role in setting standards for financial management and
reporting. This is a long way from the European model that created supra-national regulatory
mechanisms, but it is an important step nevertheless.
The formation of a single aviation market in Europe has resulted in the formation of new
airlines, the expansion of services on secondary routes, altered relationships among the carriers
and increasing competition among hub airports. The charter airline sector has been highly
influential in Europe, carrying at least as many passengers as the scheduled airlines. Charter
airlines provide strong price competition in leisure markets, but they also have played a key role
in the development of new routes. In South East Asia, the charter market is not such a strong
force and this could prove to be a constraint on the expansion of cross-border routes between
growing sub-regions.
To some extent, South East Asia has more to learn from Latin America's attempts to improve
intra-regional services. Through the 1990's, the airlines in Latin America realised that their
costs were higher than those incurred by their large US rivals. Government policies prevented
the region's airlines from working together within cross-border alliances (Cameron, 1996) At
the same time there were few impediments to the Latin American airlines entering into alliances
with the USA's carriers. This has allowed some of the region's carriers to improve their
financial position, but they have had to play a secondary role. When the Mercosur trade group
was formed, though, there was immediate interest in the development of new north-south
routes to connect growing sub-regions. Within the group of member countries, a liberal
approach appeared conducive to the estabLishment of new services, but an added attraction is
that these would operate free of direct competition from the powerful carriers from the USA.
Thorough studies of the Latin American experiment with a regional airline market would be
likely to provide valuable insights for policy makers in South East Asia.
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Thereis a distinctpossibilitythat theformationof regionalaviationmarketscouldresultin
greatercompetitionwithin,but the barrierscouldrise for airlinesfrom outsidethe region
(Ballantyne,1996).ICAO hasaddressedthismatter,but thereis insufficientexperiencewith
tradeblocsto makeanyfkm predictions.Protectionistblocswith largeinternalmarketscould
usetheirpowerto thedisadvantageof smallerparties.Spurredonby competitionfromwithin
the bloc,efficientairlinesdrawingupona largemarketcouldbecomedominantcarrierson
inter-blocroutes(Nuutinen,1992).Indeed,the DirectorGeneralof the InternationalAir
Transport Association was reported to have urged African nations to pursue a strategy of
liberalising competition within a bloc to promote efficiency and development, but to use the
bloc as a countervailing force to deal with powerful external interests (Vandyk, 1995).
So far, regional integration agreements have proved to be compatible with multilateral free
trade. Possibly there has been a "honeymoon effect" within which liberal attitudes are
reinforced and as awareness and commitment to international rules governing trade relations
grows (Chichilnisky, 1995). However, this could give way to more protectionist approaches as
vested interests realise the potential to divert trade and to extract rents. Since free trade
agreements emphasise rules of origin, it is likely they will face resistance to open membership
rules that would allow them to become a genuine step towards multilateral free trade (Krueger,
1995). Regional trade agreements are more likely to foster global free trade when they are
formed in order to reap external economies of scale and to eliminate inefficiency (eg. optimising
cross-border airline services). Bowen (1997) argues that the strong links between governments
in South East Asia and the airlines and the politicisation of the industry has resulted in powerful
vested interests in maintaining the status quo and he has raised the possibility that AFTA will be
undermined by exclusions. Furthermore, he regards the consensus approach within ASEAN as
an obstacle to progress.
APEC is committed to non-discriminatory liberalisation but there are practical issues to
consider such as the problems airlines have in gaining access to congested airports. The terms
upon which new members can join the free market are important, but this begs the question
whether there is an optimal set of members. It is not difficult to appreciate that an airline
market based on ASEAN member countries focuses attention on Singapore and Bangkok as
hub airports, but some of the busiest routes in the region are concentrated on Hong Kong
(Rimmer, 1996; Bowen, 1997). Airlines plan their services based upon groups of countries that
make up natural markets and the networks they have been able to develop. The conflicts that
emerged between Australia and Hong Kong during 1996, for example, highlight the problems
that can occur. Disputes arose because Qantas Airways was carrying passengers originating in
Hong Kong to Bangkok and Singapore. A region defined as ASEAN or some sub-regional
grouping might make sense from the point of view of economic and cultural integration, but it
might not make good sense from the point of view of the economics of amine operations. The
bilateral approach to negotiation of air services agreements constrains the way regulators and
airlines consider markets (Findlay and Round, 1994; Alamdari and Morrell, 1997), but
regionalisation is likely to encounter similar problems.
Generally, airlines do not derive a cost advantage by extending their networks, but there is an
argument these are more important in international market (Findlay et al., 1995). We have
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pointedout that allianceformationis focusedon relationshipswithcarriersfromoutsidethe
regionratherthanfrom withinSouthEastAsia.However,thegreatestpotentialto increase
trafficexistsbyencouragingalliancepartnersto co-ordinatebeyond-gatewaysis to (Parkand
Cho,1997).Someof thenewentrantsin SouthEastAsia have provided feed traffic to their
country's flag carrier with equipment suited to lower density routes. In Europe, though, the
major carriers have consolidated their positions by acquiring regional airlines or at least
entering into appropriate, vertical alliances. KLM, for example, has a small home market and it
has been dependent upon concentrating European traffic through Amsterdam. Its investments
in regional carriers have been designed to protect this position. At the same time, British
Airways and Lufthansa have expanded their influence across Europe via their relationships with
regional carriers.
Singapore Airlines had expressed interest in taking equity in Indonesia's Sempati Airlines, but
generally there has been little evidence thus far that the South East Asian carriers will be
permitted to invest in each other. The experience in Australia has been that liberal policies,
coupled with financial constraints on airlines makes it necessary to have an open attitude to
foreign investment. Air New Zealand has become a 50% owner of Ansett Airlines. Singapore
Airlines is forging an alliance with both of these carriers and is evaluating an investment in
Ansett. Possibly Singapore is responding in the same manner as KLM, but it emphasises again
that the optimal market might not be bounded by ASEAN.
6 CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Regionalism is not a force that acts alone. It has been pointed out that the Latin American
airlines see the Mercosur regional airline market as an opportunity to develop markets as they
cope with the pressure of competition from the major US carriers under liberal bilateral
agreements. In Asia, the USA has concluded several open skies agreements and its carriers now
enjoy opportunities to carry intra-regional traffic on more advantageous terms than the airlines
based in the region (Findlay et al., 1997). One way to counter this is to enter into liberal
bilateral agreements with each other. New Zealand and Singapore already have done this. The
formation of regional aviation markets takes this a step further. However, the USA becomes a
de facto member of the groups where it has signed its open skies bilaterals with the significant
partners. This is a factor that could lead to a more open approach to membership of the
regional groups. Bowen (1997) argues that the US open skies agreements are a progressive
step in an opening salvo to liberalise the transpacific market in the same way the Atlantic was
liberalised in the mid-1990's. Much will depend, though, on the way the governments in South
East Asia respond to the open skies agreements and in the way the cope with their current
economic problems and the pressure that these are placing on their airlines.
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ABSTRACT
There are two types of international routes in and out of Korea.
One is single-tracked route where only one Korean carrier operates,
and the other is double-tracked route where both of Korean carriers
operate simultaneously. In this paper, we analyze whether there is a
price competition between the two Korean carriers and thus whether
single and double tracked routes show difference in price
performance. On the basis of the analysis, we calculate how much
passengers are benefited due to price competition.
1. Introduction
Effective competition among international airlines is not expected under restrictive
bilateral ageements. These restrain tariffs, routes, flight frequency, aircrafts and so on.
The routes connected to and from the US territory are an main exception. The US has
pursued an open-sky regime. Most of the countries has signed liberal bilaterals with
the US since 1980.
Korea also maintains restrictive bilaterals with one exception of that with the US.
However, the entry of the second carrier, ASIANA into international airline industry in
I989 has changed the conventional pattern of competition on routes in and out of Korea.
Conventional pattern of competition is to have a market preserved for each international
airline by restricting the types of traffic rights exercised by each airline. This
restrictive pattern is also reinforced through means such as restriction on ticket-buying
places. For instance, a traveller from Korea to Japan cannot buy the ticket in Japan.
Thus pricing practice of each national carrier at its home base is to be respected.
The entry of ASIANA changes this market protecting behavior. Because KAL and
ASIANA have the same home base, the two carriers without cooperative measures are
to compete at least for national traffic which originates from Korea.
There are several dimensions of competition other than price : the number of flight
frequence, the quality of in-cabin services, route network and etc.. However,
restrictive bilaterals do not allow for competition in some important dimensions such as
flight frequencies and route network. The latter dimension is only subject to long run
competition because the internal guideline of Korea _ which prescribes which route is to
be served by which airline does not allow free entry into any international city-pair
markets. The guideline stipulates the criterion for double-tracking, meaning that there
is some critical number of passengers beyond which, the second carrier can enter the
market.
One cannot find the presence of the two national carriers in every route. Also even
after the density of passengers is such that the second carrier can enter, the number of
flight frequencies given to the new entrant is doubly restricted through the bilateral
agreements and the internal guideline. The former defines the total number of
frequencies and the latter, the number given to the second cartier. What this means is
that duopoly competition is conducted only on the dimension of pricing.
*)Since the entry of ASIANA, Korean government has set the rules stipulation which route is to be cerved
by which airline by how much. The rules are contained in the internal guideline. See Kim(1996) for
details
The TranspacificroutesconnectingKoreaandthe US havebeenliberalized since
1980. When the two countries signed a bilateral which allows for liberal pricing
(double disapproval system), free determination of flight frequency and routes. The
full effect of the liberal bilateral was being realized after 1988, when the new set of the
US international carriers turned their eyes to booming Asian markets, especially Korea
and Taipei '_. ASIANA launched its 1st transpacific flight in 1990 on the route
between Seoul and LA. On the routes between Korea and the US, the addition of a
new player needs not intensify competition, since it was already there.
The economic shakeout in early 1990s, however, has made the US carriers lean
towards cooperative flight with foreign carriers. Codesharing and blockseat sales
agreements among international carriers became a norm. This means that fierce
competition to capture significant market share between Korean and the US carriers is
lessened to such an extent that both sides become cooperative partners. For instance
KAL codeshares with Delta, and ASIANA with Northwest. Other US carriers
including UA and Continental restructured its operation and reduced flight frequencies
to and from Korea. After this incidence, the only competition on the routs is virtually
between the two Korean airlines. The internal regulation still does not allow free
determination of flight frequency, and the two should compete on price.
On the basis of above aromaments, we can classify two types of international routes,
depending on competition between the two Korean airlines:
single tracked routes where only one Korean carrier operates
double tracked routes where both of the Korean carriers operate.
In this paper, we analyze whether there is a price competition between the two
Korean carriers and thus whether single and double tracked routes show difference in
price performance. On the basis of the analysis, we calculate how much passengers
are benefited due to price competition
2. The Model
Competition on the single tacked routs is patterned after the joint profit maximization
of a national carrier and a foreign carrier. The joint profit maximization may be a
reasonable hypothesis in view of the IATA tariff setting mechanism. The unamity rule
2)To operate over Korea and Taiwan has a purpose of surrounding Japanese market. Also, congestion at
Narita contributed to the diversion.
isusedand each participating airline can secure reasonable level of profits.
Let i, k denote the national carrier and the foreign counterpart respectively. Then on
single-tracked route r, the airlines set the prices P_', P) in such a way that they will
k
' is the profits of carrier i on route r and r_•maximize joint profits rc_,+ z_rk, where rr,
is that of carrier k. Profit is composed of _vo components of revenue and cost. Let
dr', d, _ denote the numbers of passengers carried on route r by carriers i and k
respectively, then P) • d', P_. d_ represent revenues of carrier i and k respectively.
Also let C_, C,* denote cost functions of carriers i and k on route r, respectively, and
each function has arguments of number of passengers d, and flight distance O_. That is
c::c:(o,, a;) & c; ---c; (e , a;)
Then the prices are set to solve the following problem:
(I) max(zt _,+ rc_)
P;,?:
From the first order condition, we obtain
aa ea(2) c3_ _ cMi p_ + di_ MC .-.-=_di + . pi, + MC e ._= 0
8Px OP OP' 8P' OF"
From
O)
(2), we can have
p_ MC _-_ d _. OP..__i c_P_Od' _(pk _ MC_ ) 3d_OPi Oat;
For modelling competition on double-tracked routes, we assume that the Korean
carriers compete on prices for maximizing each airline's individual profit. That is, the
Bertrand hypothesis is adopted.
Let i and j denote Korean carriers and k denote a foreign carrier which operates on
router. Then the profit zc_ of carrier i on rout r is
(4) zd = P el (P', P/, 1:*, m, m _)
Where/_, P, P_ are prices of carriers i, j, k on mute r respectively and d is the
number of passengers carried by airline i. m and ra_ denote purchasing power of Korea
and foreign country concerned on route r. The cost function Ci has a same meaning as
before.
Thengivenpi,/_,, airline i set its price P' to solve
(5) max rc i
From the fn-st order condition assuming the existence of interior solution, we will get
aC, &l,(6) /_i=d, 4
o_ ed, 0P,
Rearranging (6), we have
=0
_---_=o::>P,=MC,- 4" ad,(7) ag
Regression Equations
The airlines aiming at joint profit maximization solve equation (3) simultaneously.
The solution prices must satisfy.
(8) aF-iP'-Mc')°d''" 0P'
•_d----7 0d i _d _
(9) pk=MC __d k OP_
ad _ (p,_MC,) _d'_ c3P'Od,
From (9) and at solution,
(10) P_ = MC k-d k'_-
_pk Opk
_d _ (P_ - MC_) Od_
Thus to put (10) into (8), we obtain
(11) P(-MC _ =
-d i gpi Opt, ¢.MI, Opi
"_ + --_k " ad"--7
_d' OPk
1
Od* aP* OF
If we denote the denominator of the R.H.S by K. the coefficient of d_in numerator by
A, and the coefficient old k by B, we have
(12) ÷-Ba'
K K
Because the marginal cost function MC _ of airline i is a function of the number of
passengers and flight distance, it can be estimated with
(13) MC _ =c_ +130 +?td'
Where ct, !3, 7 are unknown parameters to be estimated. Thus price equation P' is
estimated through the linear equation.
(14) P_=c_ +130+_-K)d' +Bd_K
If we replace the coefficients ofd _and dk of equation (14) by 13:and t33 , 13t for 13and
add an error term, our final estimation equation is
(15) P_=ct+13tO+J3,d'+J33d_+a,
In equation (15), 13_measures change in the marginal cost that an incremental change
in flight distance will generate. 13_ and 133 include not only direct effects of price
change on numbers of passengers but also indirect effects &the change in the latter on
costs of involved airlines.
On the double tracked routs, the regression equation is obtained from each national
airline's profit maximization problem, the equation (6). Therefore, the regression
equation is
(16) pt __ +1310 +[32d,
Where cq 131,132have the same meaning as in equation (15).
We combine equations (15) and (16) into one equation in order to clearly see the
difference of prices between the single-tracked routes and the double-tracked routes.
The following equation will do the job:
(17) P,_ =0: +131O r +(132 +5,133)d¢ +5,134 .d_
Where P,_ denotes price set by a national carrier i on route r, Or is the distance of
route r, _ is the number of passengers carried by airline i, and finally d_ denote the
numberof passengerscarriedbyall theforeigncarriersoperatingonrouter. 8, is a
dummyvariablewhosevalueis 1onsingle-trackedrouteand0otherwise.
Results
For estimation purpose, we gather data on routes where national carriers operate for
the year 1995. The numbers of passengers carried by each carrier (foreign as well as
national) over the year were used.
We obtain price data of each airline at one point during the year. Normal fares are
used. The data on flight distances is compiled from the real flight distance data
reported by national carriers.
Estimation is conducted for three cases: KAL alone, ASIANA alone, and consolidated.
KAL alone estimation shows difference in pricing behavior between when it is
confronted with ASIANA and when it is the sole national carrier flying on a particular
route. ASIANA alone estimation has the same meaning. And consolidated
estimation examines whether there exists aggregate change in pricing behavior.
In the consolidated estimation, it is shown that the estimate 133has a statistically
significant positive value. This means that, ceteris paribus, price is higher on single
tracked route than on double tracked mutes. It also indicates that overall there exists
price competition between KAL and ASIANA.
31(Z
Estimated value 189 0.07 -010001
Sta_ndm-d error 0.0001 0.0001 0.3004
R., 0.89
13: 93
0'.0028
34
0.0006
0.0013 0.0419
An airline alone estimation produces a similar result. KAL levies higher price on
single tracked routes. However it turns out that ASIANA alone shows little difference
in pricing behavior irrespective of the existence of KAL on routes ASIANA flies.
However, ASIANA result may not be a useful conclusion because the number of
samples applied for estimation of ASIANA-alone case is as many as 19 out of which the
number of single tracking routes is only 3. This means that the latter number may not
be helpful in discriminating the two cases of single-tracked and double-tracked mutes.
7
ASIANA
197
(0.0.022)
244
(o.ooo3)
0.073
(0.0001)
0.069
(O.O001)
-0.0001
(0.3955)
-0.0008
(0.0630)
0.0027
(0.0012)
-0.0006
.(0.8555)
O. 0008
(0.1194)
-0.000724
(0.0750)
Numbers m parenthesis refer to standard errors of the corresponding estimates.
0.92
In consolidated estimation, the estimates for 13's except for 132have poskive values.
The estimate for _32, however, is not significant. This means that the effect of cost
reduction due to passenger increase is offset by the positive effect &passenger increase.
The same result takes place for KAL-alone estimation. ASIANA-alone case shows
many insingnificant result due to deficiency of data on single tracking routes.
3. The Economic Effect due to Double Tracking
In this section, we estimate the net benefit of passengers generated through lowered
price due to double tracking.
Changes in consumer surpluses are the basis forthe calculation &the net benefit due
to double tracking. Consumer surpluses are calculated as a difference between what
the passengers would pay if the presently double-tracked routes were operated by KAL
alone and what they actually pay. If a route r is operated by KAL alone, KAL will set
the price Pf according to what is estimated in the previous section. That is,
Where i denoted the estimated value of parameter • and df is the number of
passengers carried by foreign airlines, d_ is that of KAL.
If the route r were double tracked, the price P_ would be expressed as,
So the price differential zXP, is
^ k
=P?- P?=r ,d,+ ,dr
The following table shows the changes in consumer surplus due to mukiple tracking for
the year 1995.
Route single tracked fare Double tracked fare Net consumer surplus
Seoul-Guam 766.38 429.40 81530594
Seoul-Nagoya 840.16 243.60 228048600
Seoul-New York 1753.06 1051.00 306538831
Seoul-Tokyo 2213.15 178.90 2180145061
Seoul-Manilla 633.69 384.20 55669259
Seoul-Bankok 1213.46 434.30 383861036
Seoul-San Franscico 1176.76 1017.10 45941104
Seoul-Sydney 1039.16 838.10 25084652
Seoul-Singapore 710.74 487.70 48928144
Seoul-Okinawa 278.54 290.90 12509
Seoul-Honolulu 1397.90 736.10 247269982
Seoul-Hong Kong 1070.46 341.80 392734966
Seoul-Hukuoka 713.68 217.00 168851413
Seoul-Hiroshima 234.92 259.60 -765817
Seoul-LA 2046.92 1036.60 664648018
Total Benefit 4828498357
,_, Units are USD for the 2nd, 3nd column and 1,000won for the last column.
In 1995, 1 USD was about 800won.
The table shows some unreasonable results. The route of Seoul-Tokyo exhibits
price differential of 10 times as high as (the double tracking price is ten times as low as)
that of s'mgle tracking. This result seems to be produced due t6 excessive difference in
number of passengers carried on the route relative to the sample mean. The case of
Seoul-Hiroshima route tells that double tracked price is higher than single-tracked one.
This takes place due to the excessive differences in the size of explanatory variables
relative to other routes. In these particular cases, it seems that time series data on each
of these will produce better estimate in setting down the hypothesis whether the double
tracking and single tracking show significant difference in pricing behavior.
4. Concluding Remarks
Entry of a new carrier, ASIANA turns out to be successful in promoting passenger
welfare. Frice differential between single tracked and double tracked routes are
significant. Korean Air seems to feel competitive pressure from ASIANA, which was
never felt when the former was the monopolist. It also means that restrictive
bilateralism is not successful in enhancing competition between a national carrier and a
foreign carrier. If also implies that to have more than a national carrier and make them
compete is a welfare improving measure if market can sustain it.
In this paper, duopoly competition is analyzed using Bertrand hypothesis that one
airline competes on the price dimension with fixed conjecture on the pricing behavior of
the other airline. This may be extended to include more general conjectural variation.
Also the model adopted here is short-run in nature in the sense that flight freguency and
network of airlines air given. However, this restriction may be relieved to capture long
run effect of network and flight frequency competition even under the restrictive
bilateral framework. The extension of our model will facilitate comparison between
restrictive bilateral regime and open-sky rigime in terms of the network comfiguration.
I0
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I.INTRODUCTION
The importance of corporate involvement in the decision making process for business
related air travel is being increasingly recognised the literature. Business travellers consume
air services (i.e. they take airline flights), however, they may not be the principal decision
maker in the purchase. Also it is the organisation that employs the traveller that incurs the
cost for air travel. Consequently this research addresses the relationship between the
traveller and his/her employing organisation in the purchase of air travel.
In this paper traveller opinions on his/her corporate travel policy are evaluated using a
Likert summated rating scale. The benefits sought, by the traveller, from the air service are
also investigated and these benefits are used to segment the short haul business air travel
market in the EU. Changes in the market for short haul business travel since the full
liberalisation of the aviation market in the EU are evaluated by comparing the data to an
earlier study of similar travellers in 1992.
The common notion of business travellers is that they tend to travel more frequently then
leisure travellers and they tend to pay higher prices for these services. The business travel
sector of the market is prepared to pay higher fares as it is the company and not the
individual traveller that bears the cost of the travel. This cost is then subsumed within the
costs of the business. Airlines, not surprisingly, value this segment of the market very
highly. Airlines can practice price discrimination in fare structures as business travellers
have been prepared to pay higher fares to ensure travelling flexibility (i.e. to be able to
change their flight bookings freely should, say, a business meeting run-over). In the
domestic US market about 50% of passengers are travelling for business purposes,
however, this market represents two-thirds of passenger revenues (Stephenson, and Bender,
1996). In the EU the passenger number figure may be as high as two-thirds (Doganis,
1991), indicating the revenue figure would be even higher. The business travel market is,
therefore, very important to the EU airlines.
The airline industry in the EU until recently has been one in which operators face very little
competition. Bilateral agreements between national governments within the EU had
ensured that most routes were only served by two airlines. Duopolistic arrangements
ensured that consumers were given little choice of airlines, schedules, and prices. The
market for short haul air services in the European Union has experienced a period of major
change since 1990 when the first effective initiatives to liberalise the market were
introduced. The final elements of a single market for airline services, completed in April
1997, has created an regulatory regime where any airline can offer any route within the EU
at any price. Evidence suggests that increasing competition can have a significant effect on
the market. Studies indicate that when more than two airlines operate on a particular route,
tariffs and yields fall significantly, although there tends to be an increase in passenger
numbers stimulated by the falling prices (Barrett, 1991, Doganis, 1994). The number of
routes where more than two airlines operate has been small (only 2% of European routes in
1992) but changes in the industry can be observed. A number of marketing agreements and
alliances have been created between short haul operators and larger transcontinental
operators in a bid to gain from potential economies of scale and scope, and marketing
benefits (e.g. increased interline business through code-sharing agreements, and shared
frequentflier programmes)(Williams,1993,Doganis,1994).Opportunitiesto usethetariff
asacompetitivetoolhasbeentakenbyanumberof start-upairlines.Fourteennewcarriers
of thisnaturebegunoperationsbetweenMarch1995andSeptember1996 (Jones,1996).
Theseno-frills,lowcostoperatorswhoofferlowerpricesasthey:-
• sell directly to passengers, thereby avoiding travel agency commissions.
• tend not offer flights through a computer reservation system (CRS) thereby avoiding
these costs.
• tend not offer in-flight food, seat assignments, and interlining.
• outsource as many services as possible
• operate from uncongested airports with low charges (Whittiker, 1998).
The concept has proved to be sufficiently popular in the US that major operators have
introduced their own low-cost subsidiaries to halt declining market-share. In what can be
seen as a similar move, British Airways has also announced its plan for a low-cost
subsidiary operating in Europe.
As the supply side of the airline industry with the EU changes, airlines need to assess
whether the factors of demand for their services will also change. If the principal concerns
of business travellers are having fully flexible tickets, free in-flight food and beverages, and
the opportunity to earn points on frequent flier programmes, then increased choice, and
reduced tariffs in the traditional market and the introduction of low-cost operations will not
greatly affect the business travel sector of the short haul market. If, however, the lack of
airline and schedule choice and the non-availability of heavily discounted fares has meant
that the market has been required to pay higher fares then a re-assessment of the attitudes
and likely future behaviour of the market is appropriate. This paper, therefore, is
concerned with investigating the business travel market.
2. THE BUSINESS TRAVEL MARKET
The behaviour and attitudes of the business travel market has been the focus of a number of
recent studies. The most substantive and comprehensive of these studies is the Stephenson
and Bender's analysis of the US business travel market (1996). From a noted reduction in
the proportion of business related travel in the market from 55% in 1979 to 48% in 1993,
the authors dismiss this reduced proportion as the result of an increase in non-business
related travel and investigate the reasons for the reduction in business travel, attempt to
determine the effect of air travel substitution by other modes of travel and increased use of
telecommunications such as videoconferencing and the internet. The paper is based on two
studies; one of 421 corporate travel managers and one of 701 business travellers as part of
the 3,061 people surveyed as part of a national travel study. They found that the demand
for business related air travel was reducing. This finding was supported by both travel
managers and the travellers. They conclude that the primary reason for reduction in
business travel is both companies and travellers frustration with high airline prices, and
internal corporate pressure to reduce travel expenditure. Evidence was also given for
significant substitution by other modes and also alternative communications methods.
Thecostof travelin demandfor businesstravelhasbeentraditionallyviewedasbeingnot
importantastheemployingcompanybearthecost. In StephensonandBender'sstudyit is
not surprisingthat cost is identifiedasbeingimportantasthey surveycorporatetravel
managers.Corporateinvolvementinthebusinesstravelmarkethasbeensomewhatlimited
in theacademicliteraturebutmoreacknowledgedincommercialstudiesof theindustry.
QuotingfiguresfromtheAmericanExpressTravel& ExpenditureExpenseSurvey,Bourne
(1991) notes the growth of large companiesemployingtravel managers. For UK
companies,this figurehadgrownfrom 11%in 1986to 42%In 1991. Skapinker(1992)
notespressuresbycompaniesonboththeirtravellingemployeesandon theirtravelagents
to reducethe cost of travelby down-grading(forcingbusinesstravellersto travelon
economytickets)andalsoto evaluatein a moresystematicway thepurposeandvalueof
travel.
Althoughliberalisationis leadingto morecompetition,someevidenceindicatesthat its
overall effecton cost is not downward. In 1996,spendingon travel via the Guild of
BusinessTravelAgentswhohandleabout75%of UK corporatetravelincreasedby 17%,
whilethenumberof flight increasedby 8.5%(Cohen,1997).Theauthorthenarguesthat
stronginvolvementin the managementof travelexpenditureis vital by corporationsthat
havelargetravelcosts.
AnotherUK basedstudyof corporatetravel (Cook, et al, 1994), undertaken by the
University of Westminster, indicates the some of the ways that corporations are involved in
the business travel market. A s rvey of 128 companies revealed that 77% had a written
travel policy, but that 70% of these policies granted travel choice discretions to travelling
executives. However 20% were looking to reduce this choice in future. Indeed IATAs
1997 Corporate Air Travel Survey showed that 70% if business travellers were willing to
try "no-frills" airlines (IATA, 1997).
Corporate involvement in the purchase of business air travel can be in seen in a number of
activities. Firstly, travel policies either written or unwritten may be used to influence choice
of airline, and fare type thus reducing cost. Travel managers or travel departments may be
involved in the selection, and purchase process of airline tickets. Travel management may
include bulk purchasing deals from preferred airlines thereby influencing future travel
choices. Travel managers may use their travel agent to find the airline ticket which gives
them the greater perceived value for money.
Individual travellers may be adverse to corporate influence in their travelling behaviour.
Corporate choices may be contrary to the preferred choice of the traveller if the traveller is
a member of a frequent flier programme (FFP), or if the choice of airline is perceived to
reduce the travelling, comfort, flexibility, status, or convenience. A number of studies have
tried to assess the effectiveness of FFPs to influence airline choice. One empirical study of
the US market concluded that FFPs have a significant effect on airline choice (Nako, 1992).
This view is partially supported by a study of Australian business travellers. Browne, et al,
(1995) found that membership of a FFP was a factor considered by travellers in the
purchase decision but not one as important as on-time performance, schedule convenience
or low fares. Gilbert (1996) concludes that the proliferation of FFPs and the build up of
unredeemed rewards have affected the effectiveness of these schemes.
Mason & Gray (1995) argue that corporate involvement in the business travel purchase
decision is sufficiently important that the market should be treated for marketing purposes
as a hybrid market, displaying characteristics of both consumer and industrial markets. A
stakeholder model of the purchase decision process is used to analyse the market. They
identify three stakeholders in the purchase of air travel; the traveller, the travel organiser
and the employing organisation, and argue that each stakeholder will have a set of purchase
benefits. The actual purchase benefits sought will be based on the competition between the
stakeholders. A sample of 824 business travellers is segmented into three distinct market
groupings based on the key purchase benefits and demonstrate that these groupings are
affected by corporate involvement in the purchase decision.
This brief consideration of the demand side of the business travel market has shown that the
validity of the high consumption, high yield airline passenger is questionable, and that
traveller choice may well be influenced by corporate involvement in the purchase. This
combined with the changing supply side of the industry, further investigation of the business
travel market is required so that marketing strategies may be based on a sound
understanding of the factors that affect the market.
3. METHODOLOGY
To investigate corporate influence in the EU short haul business travel market a quantitative
survey was undertaken. The survey was administered in Stansted in the UK over two
separate periods. Agreement to survey passengers was gained from Air UK Ltd. which
operates the largest number of flights from this airport. The survey was carried out over
three days in April 1997 and five days in November 1997. A scale of traveller attitudes
towards corporate travel policies was included. Behavioural data regarding the traveller,
the travel organiser and the employing organisation were collected. An attitude scale of
business traveller purchase benefits previously developed by the author (Mason, 1995) and
was included to evaluate the importance to travellers of various product elements. An
earlier survey of business travellers was undertaken at the same airport on the same target
sample in 1992. Thus the new survey provided data to enable an examination of the
reliability of this scale, and will allow the investigation of changes in the market over a five
year period. 1,000 self-completion survey forms were distributed to short haul international
and domestic travellers of which 450 useable survey forms were collected. This represents
a 45% response rate for distributed survey forms, which is a similar to the response rate
achieved by Stephenson and Bender (1996) in their Corporate Travel Manager study.
Analysis of the passenger figures during the survey period indicates that the sample
represents about 5% of all Air UK travellers (both leisure and business) from this airport
during the survey periods. The sample size allows an estimate of average number of trips to
be calculated with 95% confidence within a 1.5 trip interval. Although this does not meet a
preferred I trip confidence interval as achieved in the earlier survey (Mason and Gray,
1995) this sample is deemed to be acceptable.
Demographic data about the respondent and higher company were collected. Also data
about the respondent's travelling behaviour including the number of trips taken in the
twelve months, how the flight was selected, and booked, whether the respondent's
employing company had a corporate travel policy (CTP) or a travel manager or department.
Fifteenattitudestatementsaboutcorporate travel policies were developed through the
views about travel policies comments reported in various trade journals and also from
asking a number of business travellers their views about such policies. The most extreme
and some fairly neutral comments were kept for inclusion in the survey. These comments
were both positive and negative, and are included in Appendix I. Attitude statements
regarding 25 product attributes were also included in the survey. This list (see Appendix II)
is similar to the list included in the earlier survey and reported in Mason and Gray (1995).
The authors indicated that repeated survey administration and comparison would provide
data to evaluate the validity of the results of the first study and this study will allow this.
4. RESULTS
A demographic profile of the respondents did not reveal any surprises. The sample was
predominately male (90.3%), with the vast majority working in senior roles in their
respective organisations. 19.3% of the respondents indicated that they were company
directors, a further 34.0% worked as senior managers, while another 26.4% worked in
"other management" positions. Together this means that 86.9% of the respondents fell into
the A or B social stratifications. An age profile of the respondents shows business travellers
tend to be in middle age. 36.3% were aged between 35 and 44, with a further 40.8% aged
between 45 and 64.
The respondents worked in many different industries and from very small to very large
companies. The majority (64.1%) of respondents worked in services industries of various
types. 27.9% of the sample were employed in the manufacturing sector while extractive
industries accounted for 19.7% of business travellers in the sample. The author believes
that the large extractive industries sector is partially influenced by the routes offered by Air
UK at Stansted. The east Scottish coast and Stavanger in Norway, both which have
significant oil sectors, are both important destinations for Air UK at Stansted. However the
large services sector is surprising. 19.8% of respondents worked for small companies with
less than 100 employees. 23.2% of the sample worked in medium size companies (up to
1000) employees with the remaining 57.0% of the sample working for companies with more
than 1000 employees.
The respondents on average made 19.75 business trips per annum. This may be compared
to the figure found in the earlier survey which was 16.61 (Mason, 1995). Assuming the
sample to be normally distributed (although it is slightly skewed), the amount of trips made
by business travellers in 1997 is significantly higher than in 1992. This results provides
some evidence to the on-going importance of the business travel market in the EU and
distinguishes this market from the US market were Stephenson and Bender (1996) provide
evidence that the market seems to be travelling less. EU short haul business travellers make
fairly short business trips. 30. I% of the sample were making a day return, with a further
28.1% staying just one night. 91.3% of all respondents made trips of no more than 2 nights
away. Respondents, on average were members of 1.99 frequent flier schemes. Free flights
were the main benefit claimed from membership of such schemes with on average, each
respondent redeeming 1.03 free flights during the preceding twelve months. This benefit
seems about three times more popular than free upgrades, of which 0.34 were claimed by
respondents during the year on average.
Businesstravellerscollect informationaboutavailable flights from three key sources.
40.1% of respondents made travel agency enquiries, while 19.0% used in-house travel
managers or departments to find out about available flights. 27.7% of travellers planned
their flights using airline printed schedules. The large amount of flights taken by the sample
would infer that travellers become familiar with the available airlines operating from a
particular airport and may collect printed schedules directly from the airline. The majority
of flights (71.0%) are booked through specialist business travel agents, with a further 10.9%
of flights booked directly with the airline.
The majority of short haul business travellers still select their own flight. 64.0% of the
sample indicated they selected their own flights. This figure, however, is significantly lower
than the figure in the 1992 survey where 69.8% or travellers selected their own flights.
Business travellers it would seem are becoming less involved in the purchase decision for air
services. This reduced involvement may be explained by greater corporate involvement in
the market.
42.7% of respondents worked for companies that either employed a travel manager or who
had a travel department (this figure has risen from 36.3% in 1992), and 70.7% worked for
companies that had a corporate travel policy (60.3% in 1992).
The survey does provide some evidence that fewer companies provide their travelling
executives with full-fare fully flexible travel. 14.4% of the sample were travelling on full-
fare tickets while this figure was 25% in 1992. This figure cannot be fully off-set by a rise
in the proportion of travellers that do not know the fare type they are travelling on (29.3°,/0,
as opposed to 25% in 1992), but the fact that such a large proportion of travellers do not
know what type of ticket they hold indicates low involvement in the purchase.
This brief analysis shows that business travellers seems to becoming less involved in the
selection and booking of airline services, while travel managers and travel department have
an increasingly important roles to play in this area. The effect of corporate involvement is
having some identifiable effect on the selected airline service, and that this effect is tending
toward cost reduction rather than increased traveller flexibility.
4.1. An attitude scale for corporate travel policies
A Likert summated rating scale was used to assess business traveller attitude towards
corporate travel policies (CTPs). Fit_een attitude statements, some positive and some
negative in nature, were developed for use on the scale. Respondents were asked to
indicate their level of agreement with each of the statements on a five point scale, from
"strongly agree" to "strongly disagree". Statements that were positive about CTPs were
scaled from five for "strongly agree" to one for "strongly disagree", and vice versa for
negative statements. A total attitude score for each respondent was calculated by totalling
the individual item scores. Therefore the range of potential scores on the total scale was
between 15 to 75. The mean score was 50.06 with a standard deviation of 6.21. The
lowest score, i.e. most opposed to CTPs, was 27 and the highest 72. The scores were
normally distributed, and to assist in the analysis of the scale respondents were divided into
three equal groups; respondents against CTPs, respondents with neutral attitudes towards
CTPs, and those with positive attitudes towards CTPs. A correlation of the summated
scores with the scores given for each individual item shows the statements in the scale that
most discriminated between respondents attitudes. These were:-
"CTPs are a good idea" (r 2 = 0.6036)
"CTPs are a constraint which serve no great purpose" (r 2 = 0.6395)
"CTPs are a hindrance when planning a business trip" (r: = 0.6399)
"CTPs tend to infringe of employment travel benefits" (r 2 = 0.6588)
A chi-square test of independence was used to identify which demographic and behavioural
variables influenced respondent's attitudes towards CTPs. Table 1 below provides a
tabulation of variables that were shown, at the 95% level, to influence respondent attitude
to CTPs.
Table 1: Business traveller attitudes towards corporate travel policies.
Anti-CTPs Neutral to CTPs Pro-CTPs
(%) (*/,) (%)
33% of sample 33% of sample 33% of sample
Company size
1-99 employees 35.0 13.4 11.8
100-999 employees 17.9 28.6 17.6
> 1000 employees 47.0 58.0 70.6
Company has a CTP
Yes 55.2 84.7 93.2
No 44.8 15.3 6.8
Company has travel manger or dept.
Yes 33. I 49.6 57.1
No 66.9 50.4 42.9
CTP type
Written rules to be adhered to 20.0 25.7 35.7
Written guidelines 46.3 50.5 46.4
Written rules open to interpretation 13.8 5.7 7.1
Unwritten rules 20.1 18.1 10.8
Respondent selected own flight 70.9 65.2 63.1
Source of flight information
ABC, OAG etc. 9.6 9.2 12.5
Airline produced schedule 28.9 36.8 16.1
Travel agent enquiry 51.8 25.0 44.6
Travel Manager/Dept. enquiry 9.6 28.9 26.8
Flight booked by:
Traveller 30.0 16.2 14.4
Traveller's department 29.1 39.6 32.4
Travel Manager/Dept. 25.5 34.2 36.9
No of trips in last year
1-5 trips 48.1 53.2 30.9
6-10 26.9 25.2 32.7
more than 10 25.0 21.6 36.4
The table shows that business traveller attitudes towards CTPs are influenced by the size of
company that he/she works for. 70,6% of respondents who had positive attitudes towards
CTPs worked for companies with more than 1000 employees. This figure can be compared
to the proportion of the respondents with negative attitudes towards CTPs, where 47%
worked for companies with more than 1000 employees. A larger proportion of the group
with negative attitudes towards CTPs worked for small companies with less than 100
employees compared to the positive group (35.0% compared to 11.8%). It would seem
therefore that business travellers who work for larger companies are more likely to have
positive attitudes towards CTPs.
Business traveller attitudes towards CTPs may be partially explained by knowledge of CTPs
based on their experience of working with them. 93.2% of the group with positive feeling
towards CTPs worked for companies with CTPs, whereas only 55.2% of the group with
negative attitudes did. Those that were anti-CTPs were more likely to select their own
flight (70.9%), while those with a positive attitude towards CTPs were more likely to allow
others for select their flight (36.9% did not select their flight). This behaviour may be
explained by the frequency with which each group travel. The results show that the
negative group had made fewer trips in the last year compared to the positive group.
The presence of a travel manager or department within a company seems to have some
effect on business travellers opinions regarding CTPs. 57.1% of the positive group worked
for companies that employed travel managers, while this figure was only 33.1% of the
negative group.
It is surprising that, when questioned about the nature of the CTP employed in their
company, a larger proportion of the group positive about CTPs indicated that their CTPs
was quite rigid with written rules to be adhered to. About half of all respondents, however,
indicated that the CTP under which they make business trip are written guidelines. This
may be compared to the results in table 2 below which shows a cross-tabulation of
respondent attitudes towards CTPs and the class of travel accorded to those at different
corporate levels within the employing company. It would seem that, while the proportion
of traveller allowed to fly on business class increases with corporate status in all groups, the
hierarchical bias is most obvious in the group of travellers that hold negative feeling towards
CTPs. Business traveller attitudes towards CTPs may be most affected by companies that
create travel policies that favour those at the top of the corporate hierarchy.
Table 2: Hierarchical corporate travel policies and business travel attitudes.
Anti-CTPs Neutral to CTPs Pro-CTPs
Flight allowance for various
hierarchical levels in respondents
company
Company directors
-Business Class
-Economy Class
Senior Management
-Business Class
-Economy Class
Other Management
-Business Class
-Economy Class
(%)
52.9 67.9 64.3
47.1 32.1 35.7
36.7 46.4 44.8
63.3 53.6 55.2
15.5 18.7 30.1
84.5 81.3 69.9
Table 1 above also shows differences between the groups in terms of the way in which they
find out flight information, and also book their flights. The negative group were most likely
to sourceflight information from travel agents, while the neutral and positive groups were
more likely to make enquiries on in house travel managers or departments or airline
produced schedules. The positive group were also much less likely to book the flight
themselves, relying more heavily on others in their departments or in-house travel
departments.
The analysis of the scale of traveller attitudes towards CTPs shows that company size
obviously will affect the likelihood of a company employing a travel manager or having a
CTPs and thus it would seem that marketing approaches for different size of company may
be appropriate. The evidence provided here shows that corporate involvement in the air
service purchase is greater in larger companies, and it would seem that these travellers on
the whole are positive or at least neutral about this involvement.
4.2. Business travel market purchase benefits
Each respondents rated the importance of each of 25 product elements on a 5-point ranked
continuum scale. Principal component analysis of the 25 purchase benefit elements was
performed to identify any underlying purchase benefits. The data performed well under test
of sampling adequacy (KMO = .82848) and sphericity (Bartlett = 3046.8, significance =
.0000) indicating the suitability of the data for principal component analysis (PCA). Six
principal factors identified by PCA accounted for 59.6% of the variation in the data set.
Tests of the internal consistency of the data (Cronbach's alpha) provided evidence of the
reliability of the attitude scale. In the earlier study six factors were also identified with a
very similar amount of variation (60.6%). Table 3 below shows the variables that are
closely associated with each factor.
Factors 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 each have a bundle of product attributes associated with them
which are very similar to those discovered in the earlier study. This provides further
evidence of the reliability of the attitude scale, and indicates that there are the following
purchase factors in the EU short haul business travel market; Business class value, in-flight
comfort and experience, price, schedule, and local airport. Factor 3 in this survey includes
duty free shopping and free newspapers, and beverages. In the earlier study this factor
included ease of reservation, seat allocation, quality of ground service, and was called "air
service user-friendliness". Further testing of the attitude scale is needed to investigate the
reliability of this area of purchase benefits.
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Table 3: Factor analysis of business travel purchase benefits.
Variable Factor I Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6
Cronbach Alpha .7678 .7883 .7202 .7619 .6957 na
Business Class value
No ticket restrictions _:i!:ii:iiiii_!_i!iiiiiiiii:i.23780 .02897 .15668 .08844 -.19996
Seat allocation ii!ii::i:!i!_!i!i!_ii6_iii_i!_i!ii_!ii!ii.31436 .03391 .19398 -.04366 .02103
Return Boarding Card !i!i!!iiii_!iiiiil;_ .07233 .09119 .19720 .12523 .35450
Business lounge iiii!ili!iiiii!i__iiiiiiiiii!iiiiii.16340 .32410 -.04926 -.05598 .21021
Business Class Check-in ii::!_i:ii_ii:i_:ii_:_i!_iiiiiiii_.17992 .19039 -.14428 .00784 .09457
In-flight comfort &
experience
In-flight service .08924 :_;_:"_:"__:_:_
_i_i_i i_! ! ..$.:ii_i_i;_? .49488 .00936 .00112 .02188
Seat comfort .07395 :::;"::_:. : ::':_:_:
.............._7_9..:L::::,,.... ... 20197 .03497 .00881 .07153
Airline punctuality .30155 ii!iiiiiiii!_i_iiiiiii_iiiii!.02857 .00530 .18568 .14435
Past experience of airline .23953 iiiiiiiiiii_iiiiiiiii!iii_!::: .03287 .11572 .16232 .14435
Airline safety record .14483 iiz_i_iiii!_iii_i_!_i_;i_!i!iii_!.06982 .13651 .04056 -.03888
in-flight user benefits
Duty Free available .12644 -.01874 ii!iiiiiii!ii_i_ii !iiiiili .30118 -.00777 -.14626
Free newspapers .16246 .19153 :::::::::::::::8::::::::::::: .03470 .10578 .09102
Free beverages .03503 .20303 iijiiiii_ii!_i if!! .05237 -.05495 .06001
Price
Ticket price .03640 .09447 .08475 iiiii_iiii_i_i_7_211_i_i_i_i_i_i_i-.05149 .10873
Ticket discount .02671 .10934 .17720 i!iiiiiiiiiiii_i_i_l.iiiiiiiii-.06530 .13262
Schedule
Timing of outward flight -.06644 .08326 -.02686 -.09181 i_ii_::i:_!_!_!_i_iii_:_i_:_!_i_:.09406
Timing of return flight .08124 .12469 .02307 .03476 !jii!i!!iiiii_iiiiiiiiiiiii .05213
Airport
Local airport .00479 .12538 -.04223 .13195 .05995
Following the principal component analysis, factor scores for each respondent were
calculated and saved to be used in a cluster analysis to identify segments within the business
travel market.
4.3. Business travel segmentation analysis
An iterative clustering algorithm was used, and a robust three cluster solution was reached
after only four iterations. To evaluate the validity of the segments, a cross-validation
procedure was applied to the solution. The cluster analysis was re-applied to the top half of
the sample and each respondent's cluster membership in the validation process stored. The
final cluster centres of this process were then used as the initial cluster centres in the
application of the cluster analysis in the bottom half of the sample. Again the validation
cluster memberships were stored. The validation cluster membership data were correlated
with the original cluster membership data, the correlation coefficient was 0.8799 for the top
of the sample, and 0.7701 for the bottom. The result of the cross-validation procedure was
deemed satisfactory.
The chi-squared test of independence was used to identify the variables which differ
significantly between the clusters. The variables that influenced segment membership were;
management level/social classification, size of employing company, age (at the 90% level),
the number of trips taken during the past twelve months, whether the company had a CTP,
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and the Likert score on the CTP attitude scale. Details of the differences are shown in table
4 below.
Table 4: Business travel segmentation profile
Segment 1 Segment 2 Segment 3
(%) (%) (%)
20.5% of sample 34.8% of sample 44.7% of sample
Management level
Company director 18.2 17.4 32.9
Senior management 66.2 67.4 57.8
Other management 15.6 15.2 9.2
Age
(significance 0.09982)
25-43 27.3 30.5 17.6
35-44 37.7 34.4 38.2
45-64 35.1 35.1 44.1
Number of trips in last 12 months
1-5 trips 48.1 56.5 36.9
6-10 19.5 24.4 33.3
more than 10 32.5 19.1 29.8
Company Size
1-99 employees 15.6 15.3 26.2
100-999 23.4 26.7 19.2
more than 1000 61.0 58.0 54.7
Company has CTP
yes 75.0 77.9 65.1
no 25.0 22.1 34.9
Views of CTP
Anti-CTPs 11.7 39.6 34.5
neutral to CTPs 35.0 30.2 35.2
Pro-CTPs 53.3 30.2 30.3
Analysis of variance was used to examine the difference importance placed by each segment
on product elements 1 to 25. This process revealed significant differences for product
elements 1 to 22. These differences are significant at the 95% level. In the attitude scale,
scores can range from 1 (highly important) to 5 (low importance). Table 5 below shows the
mean attitude score for a number of purchase element for each segment and is organised to
show the most important factors first. The segment that rates each product element the
highest is highlighted.
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Table 5: Purchase benefits sought by business travel set[ments
Segment 1 Segment 2
mean attitude score mean attitude score
Segment 3
mean attitude score
Most important purchase factors
Timing of outwardflight 1.0519 1.9015 i::::_ii!_:ii!:ii]_0058 iii!il ili::!
Timing of return flight 1.3247 2.1818 iii:: ::_iii!iiii_0_i::_i:_ii:ii::!ii
Local airport i :::i:i i::iliiii:_tli_ii_:::i::ili_:i::i_:i_iil i_:ii 1.7803 1.5202
Punctuality 1.8939 1.6127
Seat comfort _ii::i_ il! :iii!ii:iiii_ii_ili!i_,iiiiiiii_i_:iii_i!iiii1.8106 1.7341
Fast-track check-in iiiiiiililiiiiiiii!i!!iiiiiliiii_i_iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii!iiiii1.9615 1.6716
In-flight service i.iiiiiiil:..i.:i!.i!i.l.i._!i._i!iiiiii!!.i.i!i!ii!.ill! ll 2.1818 2.1445
Lack of ticket restrictions 2.7532 2.2803
Frequent flier programme 2.6134 2.4987 i!!ii:_!ii!!!i _!iiiii_iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii!!ii;i
Ease of reservation 3.1169 2.3712 iiii:_i!ii ::iiiiiiiii_!_ii_;iiiii!iiiiiii::ill
Business lounge available 2.7662 2.5758 ilili_:_i:_:i:-ii_iiiiiii::ii_:ii_:i::_iiiiiiii_ii!iiiii!iiiiiiilii
Price 3.4675 2.5227 iiiiiii!iiiili !iiiiiiiiii_i_ii!!_i!i!!iiiiiiiiiiiiii_:iiiiiii::
Duty free available 4.0260 _:i!_i!_:!i!iii_:ii:::i!i_.ii!iii_._:ii_!_i_::!:i ii : i:_ :_ii!_:iil.... 3.,_162
These tables are used as a basis to develop a profile of each segment.
4.3.1. Profile of segment 1
The first segment is made up of 20.5% of the respondents of the survey. A large proportion
of members are employed in senior management positions. The age profile of this group is
fairly even across the spectrum, however, the largest proportion of the segment (37.7%) are
aged between 35-44. This is consistent with the management positions they hold.
With regard to business travel consumption, the largest proportion of the segment (48.1%)
have made five trips or less in the last twelve months. However, when compared with the
other segments, this segment has the largest proportion of the members who have made
more than ten trips in the last year (32.5%). Members of this segment are most likely to
work for large companies, with 61% of the group working for companies with more than
1000 employees. 75.0% of members of this segment work for companies that have a CTP,
with 53.3% of the group holding positive attitudes towards these policies.
By identifying the product attributes that most closely associate with the purchase factors
identified in the factor analysis above, we can see that segment one seems to rate factors 2
(in-flight comfort and experience) and 6 (local airport) most highly. Local airport is the
most important purchase item to members of this segment. Members of this segment are
keen to ensure that their time is not wasted, and thus airline punctuality and fast-track
check-in are important purchase considerations. It is interesting to note that it is this group
that rates airport business lounges least highly of the three segments, but this may reflect the
groups propensity not to waste time. Once on board it is members of this segment that rate
seat comfort and in-flight service more highly than members of the other segments, but is
the group that places least importance on the price of the airline service.
This segments, therefore, works for large companies, is not interested in the price of the
product but wants a smooth and pleasant product delivery during the consumption of the
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service.As longas these items are met, members of this segment would be least bothered
by corporate involvement in their travel arrangements.
4.3.2. Profile of Segment 2
Representing 34.8% of the sample, a similar proportion of this segment are employed in
senior management positions (67.4). The age distribution of this segment is similar to that
found in segment 1, however this group tends to travel the least of all the groups. 56.5% of
this segment have made five or less trips in the last twelve months. Although a smaller
proportion of this group work for very large companies (58.0%), 77.9% of this group work
for companies that have CTPs. The effect of corporate size on attitudes towards CTPs may
explain the high proportion of the group with negative attitudes towards CTPs.
As can be seen by the table 5, members of this segment on average do not rate any product
attributes more highly than members of other segments with the exception of duty free
shopping. Consequently to investigate this segment we will look at the product attributes
they rated most highly and also look at those product attributes where this group recorded a
similar score to segment that scored the product highest. The most important factor to this
group is local airport, which is rated higher than the timing of the outward flight, as is
punctuality and seat comfort. The availability of a business lounge is relatively important as
is the ease in which tickets may be reserved.
The profile indicates that members of this segment tend to travel less than the other
segments. As they travel less the evidence suggest they get more involved in the purchase
of their flights, and have negative feelings towards CTPs. To market to this segment,
airlines should concentrate on the traveller not the corporation, given the travellers negative
feelings towards CTPs, promote ease of access to the local airport, the connections
available from the airport and quality of the duty free shopping and the business lounge
facilities.
4.3.3. Profile of Segment 3
Representing 44.7% of the sample, this segment is the largest group of business travellers.
32.9% of the segment indicated that they work as company directors, with a further 57.8%
working in senior management. This segment has the largest proportion of members who
work for small companies (26.2%), although over half (54.7%) work for companies with
more than 1000 employees. Members of this group are fairly evenly distributed in the
frequency of business trips made. 29.8% of the group have made ore than 10 trips in the
last year but 36.9% have made five or less. The age distribution is more distinctive,
however, with 44.1% of the group being aged 44 or over.
With regard to CTPs members of this group were the least likely to work for a company
that had a CTP. However this figure was still 65.1% demonstrating the reach CTP have in
the business travel market. Attitudes towards CTPs were fairly evenly distributed between
members of this segment, the largest proportion holding neutral opinions (35.2*/0).
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The identifiable characteristics of this segment however are the purchase factors that they
rate highly. Table 5 shows the large amount of product elements that members of this
segment rated more highly than members of other segments. The scheduling factors were
most important but members of this segment also rated purchase factors 1 (Business class
value), and 4 (price), more highly than other segments.
This segment represents a large section of the short haul business travel market that want
good schedules at low prices but also want to have the ability to change their flight
bookings without restriction, and want to use well equipped business class lounges.
These factors combined with the slight tendency of this segment towards smaller companies
possibly indicates that travellers in this segment have a greater involvement in the purchase
decision than, particularly segment 1 where there seems to be more evidence of corporate
involvement. Airlines or travel agents may wish to develop products aimed at this market
segment that reduces the need for traveller involvement and makes the purchase easier.
Travel agency management of smaller companies travel expenditure accounts may be
mutually beneficial for the companies and agents.
This research has identified and profiled three market segment within the EU short haul
market that are not obviously comparable with the market segments identified in the earlier
study. The most striking difference between the earlier study and this research is that
company size can be used to distinguish between segments in this study, whereas this was
not possible in the earlier study. Company size is obviously a useful segmentation basis and
when combined with the findings regarding corporate travel policies and corporate
involvement in the purchase decision and procedures, the findings in this survey are very
useful.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper has provided additional information regarding the business traveller and his/her
employing organisation in the purchase of air travel. The scale for traveller attitudes
towards CTPs cart be evaluated by its application in other markets. Other attitude
statements could be developed that might gain greater insight into business traveller attitude
constructs. The scale for purchase attributes which was previously developed has been
assessed and surprisingly similar results were found in terms of the key purchase attributes
in the short haul business travel market which provides strong evidence of the key purchase
benefits sought by the business travel market. A new market segmentation based on these
product elements reaped further in-sight into the market and how it has changed in the last
five years.
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APPENDIX I
1. CTPs
2. CTPs
3. CTPs
4. CTPs
5. CTPs
6. CTPs
7. CTPs
8. CTPs
are a good idea
make the whole process of travel more easy
are a constraint which serve no great purpose
benefit those at the top of the hierarchy
take transport decisions away from the individual traveller
allow the company to save money on travel
are a sensible business decision
are a hindrance when planning a business trip
9. CTPs force travellers onto other transport modes for short distance travel (up to 300
miles)
10. CTPs tend to infringe of employment travel benefits
1I.CTPs require advance planning of business trips
12.CTPs downgrade the class of travel allowed
13.CTPs have resulted in companies having preferred airlines
14.Frequent flier points should be awarded to the company rather than the traveUer
15. CTPs increase the use of video conferencing and e-mail while reducing air travel
APPENDIX H
1. Timing of the outward flight
2. Timing of the return flight
3. Flight frequency
4. Ticket price
5. Ticket discount
6. Ease of reservation
7. Lack of ticket restrictions
8. Direct route
9. Seat allocation at reservation
10. Fast-track check-in
11. Quality of ground service
12. Flight from local airport
13. Return boarding card on departure
14. Business lounge available at airport
15. Automated check-in
16. Exclusive Business Class check-in
17. In-flight service
18. Seat comfort
19. Duty Free available
20. Free daily newspapers
21. Free beverages
22. Frequent flier programme
23. Airline punctuality record
24. Past experience of an airline
25. Airline safety record
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1 GENERAL REVIEW OF THE AIRLINE DEMAND FORECAST MODELS
This research is purposed to review current airlift demand forecast models and to refine in
accordance with the analysis methods of econometrics.
Kanafani(1983) categorized current models into two ways of macroanalysis and
microanalysis models in reference to the dichotomous analysis methods of the economics as
macroeconomics and microeconomics respectively. Macroanalysis methods includes both
of the time series models and variable elasticity models as shown <Figure I and 2>.
< Figure 1 > Macro analysis models
I Macro Analysis Model I
I
Time Series
t
VariableElasticity
1974 Kanafani
1978 Frankena
1992 Oum
1992 Goodwin
I
Simple ]Time Series
1972 Lave
1980 Behbehani
1988 Teodorovic
1990 Bennett
1992 Bishop
1992 Oum
1992 Goodwia
1992 Dresner
1992 Fujii
1993 Jansson
1995 Maillebiau
I
PartialAdjustment
1972 Young
1983 Kanafani
I
Income
1972 Young
1980 Aureille
Gerneral
Time Series
1980 Kanafani
1995 Dargay
SimpletimeseriesmodeldevelopedbyMaillebiau(1995)isasfollows.
log(PAX)= ct - 0.868log(YLD)+ 0.618Iog(USENP)+ 0.170Iog(ACC)
- 0.044log(TRD)+ 0.062log(DOL)-0.217D86....................... (1)
( PAX:annualpassenger
YLD:averagefarepermile
USENP:annualdomesticenplanements
ACC:accessibilityof service
TRD:annualtrades
D86:dummy)
Invariableelasticitymodel,Oum(1992)estimatedairfareelasticitiesof air passengertravel
demandas<Table1>.
<Table 1> Demand Elasticities of Air Passenger Travel
Time Series
Leisure travel 0.40-1.98, 1.92
Business travel 0.65
Mixed or unknown 0.82,0.91,0.36-1.81
1.12-1.28,1.48
Cross-section Other
1.52 1.40-3.30,2.20-4.60
1.15 0.90
0.76-0.84,1.39,1.63 0.53-1.00,1.80-1.90
1.85,2.83-4.51
In consideration of time, the statistical observation usually takes as one year, because it is
essential that the economic datas are available on an annual basis.
Current demands would be the results of the foregone years as Dargay(1995) model for the
U.S. domestic passenger.
In Dt = a + bin Pt + cln Yt + din Dr-1 ................................................. (2)
( Dt : travel demand in period t, Yt : Personal income in period t
Pt air fare in period t, Dt-i • travel demand of the previous year )
< Figure 2 > Micro analysis models
I Micro Analysis Model I
I I
Air Travel
Choice Model
I I
Pair Model Model I Airport SpecificDemand Model
1977 Kanafani 1972 Verleger 1972 Young 1975 Haney
1990 Sergio 1986 Oum 1993 Williams 1991 Kaemmerle
1992 Hong 1993 Oum
1992 Chou
2 ECONOMETRIC MODEL BUILDING
Airlift passenger demands are divided into business and nonbusiness by trip purposes. And
nonbusiness demands are subdivided into tourism and visitor (of relatives and friends.)
Kanafani(1983) said that, from the unavailability of trip purpose information, trip purpose
analyses are often not taken into consideration in air travel. But Korea authorities
concerned immigrations/emmigrations have been gathering informations about the trip
purposes of official, business, tourism, and visitors (relatives/friends) strictly in view of
national securities.
The objective period of this research is between 1976 and 1990, before ASIANA airline
was inaugurated into the transpacific routes. Econometric models will be built for these 3
categories with time series analysis.
Independent variables are final consumption expenditures per capita (Table A-3),
Transaction between Korea and U.S.A.(Table A-6), air fare (Table A-5), and GDP per
capita (Table A-4) of appendix. And the standard year to change the current value to real
values is 1985.
From the decreasing effect air fare and increasing of income, American travelers to Korea
were increased 14.2% in average annually.
In due to the absence of intermodal competition between airlift and others on the route of
transpacific, these analyses do not include any cross elasticity of demand.
Since the specification test becoming an intergral part of econometric demand model, all
modelsarepassedthrough one of the statistical inference tests, Kolmogorov-Smirnov
evaluation.
In Korea, Since government managed the exchange rate of foreign currency, this research
omits any effects from this.
2.1 American Tourists to Korea
In Tt= 1.321156 In dr- 1.028466 In fi-l+ 0.536099 In Tt-i ........... (3)
(2.403056) (-1.243644) (3.159584)
( ) t statistical value of 95% significance level.
R2 = 0.97, R2 = 0.96, D.W. = 1.94
(Tt : American tourists, dt : final expenditure per capita, fi-_ : fare of the previous year)
<Table 2> Kolmogorov-Smirnov Evaluation
Range Number of Accumulated Expected Accumulated Difference
Observation Frequency Frequency Frequency (d=CiCi-CiEi)
(Oi) (C Oi) (Ei) (C Ei)
-oo ~-1.0 0 0 2.6976 0.1587 -0.1587
-1.0 ~ -0.5 0 0 2.5463 0.3085 -0.3085
-0.5 ~ 0 7 0.41 3.2558 0.5 -0.09
0 ~ 0.5 10 1.0 3.2558 0.6915 0.3085
0.5 ~ 1.0 0 1.0 2.5463 0.8413 0.1587
1.0 ~ oo 0 1.0 2.6979 1.0 0
total 17 17
max [d I= 0.3085 < 0.318, therefore, null hypothsis is adopted.
There are three findings from this study being different from conventional studies.
American tourists demand is elastic to air fare of the previous year of their departures
rather than the current year. And this is different from <Table 1>. The reason is that almost
of Americans participates in tours organized by travel agencies who begin to promote their
sales several years prior to.
American tourists swarm into the trip corridors that the American tourists have been
experienced. They prefer of those routes security ascertained to the undeveloped routes.
And they are sensitive to their income of the year of their departure.
2.2 American Visitors to Korea
In Bt = 0.420802 In gt + 0.764301 In mt ................................................. (4)
(3.004489) (5.491212)
R2 = 0.9442, R 2 = 0.9330, D.W. = 1.97, 9 = 0.597 (Cochran- Orcutt)
(Bt: business purpose visitors, gt : real GDP per capita in America
mt " transactions between two countries in the period of "t")
<Table 3> Koimogorov-Smirnov Evaluation
Range Number of Accumulated Expected Accumulated Difference
Observation Frequency Frequency Frequency (d=CiCi-CiEi)
(Oi) (COi) (Ei) (C El)
- :_ ~ -1.0 0 0 2.2218 O. 1587 -0.1587
-1.0 ~ -0.5 2 O.1428 2.0958 0.3085 -0.1657
-0.5 ~ 0 2 0.2857 2.681 0.5 -0.0228
0 ~ 0.5 6 0.7142 2.681 0.6915 0.0227
0.5 ~ 1.0 2 0.8571 2.0958 0.8413 0.0158
1.0 ~ m 2 1.0 2.2218 1.0 0
total 14 13.9972
max [d [= 0.1657 < 0.349, therefore, null hypothesis is adopted.
Doganis(1991) identified factors as generally affectiong passenger demand for airline
services across all markets, i.e., the level of personal diposable income and the level of
economic activity.
But the results is that American visitors for the purpose of business and official are sensitive
to GDP per capita rather than personal disposable income. The reason is that visitors'
organization pays trip expenses for the visitors.
2.3 Korean Ethnics (of America) Visitors
lnVt
= 0.560291 + 0.516563 lndt - 4.168766 lnfi-i - 3.461288 lrtfi-2 ................. (5)
(0.802) (7.584) (-3.180) (-2.917)
mR 2= 0.8787, R2=0.8374, D.W. = 1.26, 9= 1.17.
The reason why statistical values are not so good is that, when Korean ethnics (of America)
travel their motherland to visit relatives, they are used to buy any diluted tickets from the
normal tare.
3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Americans' behavior of travel is rational in view of economy referring statistical values of
three models. In tourism purpose travel model, demand elasticities both of income and fare
are near unitary (1.32 and -1.03 respectively) mean that they consume travel as an usual
goods rather than luxury.
They respond to the fares of the previous year not the current year and also to the tour
fashions of the previous year. It means that Americans begin to plan several years prior to
their departures and pay tour fees to the organizers two years prior to at least.
American visitors for the purpose of business respond to the real GDP per capita rather
than final consumption expenditures per capita, and also to the real transactions between
two countries.
Korean ethnics of America desire to visit their relatives in motherland regardless of their
level of income (demand elasticity of income, 0.56.). But whether they could materialize
their desire depends upon highly to the level of fares.
And they begin to plan several years earlier than American tourists.
Upon these conclusions, policy implications are drawn as follows.
First, to promote foreign tourists to travel to Korea, authorities focus their activities on to
the tour organizers of America rather than the individual traveler.
The target is to the middle level income or above group. Public relations activities including
advertise should be maintained with the long-term programs.
And, because Americans refer to the tourism pattern that tourists have swarmed into,
authorities keep the bondages with the persons who already visited Korea.
Second, to help the Korean ethincs of America to materialize their desire, authorities
prepare package program of home-coming tour several years prior to their trips.
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APPENDIX A
<Table A-l> Americans to Korea(Tourism Purpose)
Year
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
198I
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
Person
32013
37465
42420
55937
53295
58475
67089
80776
89893
82388
112069
136412
1226O4
108454
104756
Tourists
Occupancy(%)
31.32
32.95
35.94
43.92
43.90
44.84
44.36
45.77
45.21
34.41
39.38
41.80
35.30
34.20
32.19
Rate(%)
11.40
17.03
13.23
31.87
-4.72
9.72
14.73
20.40
11.29
-8.35
36.03
21.72
-10.12
-11.54
-3.41
Other
Person
70186
76245
75619
71418
68109
71927
84160
95712
123092
157035
175502
189918
224677
208679
220632
Rate(%)
2.19
8.63
-0.82
-5.56
-4.63
5.61
17.01
13.73
28.61
27.58
9.85
8.21
18.30
-7.12
5.73
Total
102199
123710
118039
127355
121404
130402
151249
176488
212986
239423
284571
326330
347281
3171_
325388
<Source : Korea Tourism Promotion Association, Foreigners to Korea (Monthly Report)>
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<Table A-2> American Travelers to Korea (Visiting Relatives)
Year
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
Visiting
Relatives
1682
1262
2698
Business
Commercial
11785
20860
19158
Official
42303
33269
33450
Other
14416
20854
20313
5575
6779
7538
7895
11762
20385
33517
39112
43877
43714
48707
46429
17505
17262
20761
22913
27750
35390
51376
61721
69975
39830
36400
35593
44401
45593
50373
58060
59849
61185
73149
75304
74408
63911
19194
17033
8508
7668
8035
8951
10607
16944
14082
11820
14881
43903
65474
82762
Total
70186
76245
75619
71418
68109
71927
84160
95712
123092
157035
172502
189918
224677
208679
220632
<Source ' Korea Tourism Promotion Association, Foreigners to Korea (Monthly Report)>
I1
<Table A-3> Final Consumption Expenditure Per Capita of U. S. A
Year
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
Current
Expense
($billion)
1129.4
1257.2
1403.5
1566.7
1732.6
1915.1
2050.7
2234.5
2426.4
2629.0
2807.5
3012.1
3235.1
3471.1
Real Expense
Amount
($billion)
2135.0
2233.0
2316.0
2321.0
2264.8
2266.4
2286.2
2413.1
2511.8
2629.0
2755.2
2849.7
2943.7
3013.1
per
capita
9791
10138
10404
10312
9943
9847
9832
10277
10598
10987
11403
11682
11950
12080
Rate(%)
4.39
3.54
2.62
-0.88
-3.52
-0.97
-0.15
4.53
3.12
3.67
3.79
2.45
2.29
1.09
C.P.I.(%)
52.9
56.2
60.6
67.5
76.5
84.5
89.7
92.6
96.6
100.0
101.9
105.7
109.9
115.2
< Source : IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook (1990)>
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<Table A-4> G.D.P. of U.S.A.
Year
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
Current
GDP
($billion)
1761.7
1965.1
2219.2
2464.4
2684.4
3005.5
3114.8
3355.9
3724.8
3974.2
4205.4
4497.2
4847.3
5198.4
Real GDP
Amount
($billion)
3101.6
3247.7
3408.9
3480.8
3472.7
3548.4
3457.0
3585.4
3828.2
3974.2
4094.8
4238.9
4434.9
4568.0
(Real GDP)
per capita
14225
14746
15315
15466
15247
15418
14868
15270
16153
16609
16947
17367
18004
18315
Rate(%)
3.93
3.66
3.86
0.99
-1.41
0.10
-3.57
2.70
5.78
2.82
2.04
2.53
3.61
1.73
GDP
Deflator
56.8
60.6
65.1
70.8
77.3
84.7
90.1
93.6
97.3
100.0
102.7
106.1
109.3
113.8
<Source IMF, ibid.>
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<Table A-5> Air Fare (between L.A. and Seoui)
(unit • $)
Year
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
Normal One Way
Economy Fare
('Nominal)
581
581
581
581
710
756
794
842
842
842
842
884
884
884
884
Real Fare
Amount Rate(%)
1098
1033
958
860
928
894
885
909
871
842
826
875
842
804
767
-8.19
-5.92
-7.26
-10,23
7.91
-3.66
-1.01
2,71
-4.18
-3,33
-1.90
5.93
-3,77
-4.51
-4.60
<Source " IATA, Tariff>
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<Table A-6> Transactions between Korea and U.S.A
Year
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
Import
from
Korea
4297
4973
5994
5466
4547
5206
5821
8063
10213
10754
14368
17674
19709
17285
Export
tO
Korea
Total Amount
Amount
3150
3794
4410
5863
5488
6217
6052
6312
6820
6489
6480
8528
11608
14105
7447
8767
10404
11329
10035
11423
11873
14375
17033
17243
20848
26202
31317
31390
Rate(%)
27.26
17.73
18.67
8.89
-11.42
13.83
3.94
21.07
18.49
1.23
20.91
25.68
19.52
0.23
<Source • Korea Trade Association, Foreign Trade (Monthly Report) and
IMF, International Finance Statistics>
\
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Abstract:
In this study, we present a theoretical model for passenger air transport demands in Spain.
Quarterly data has been used for the 1980.I-1992.IV period.
We have used cointegration techniques, which are subject to a wide range of tests, to obtain
short- and long-run equations. Moreover, we have obtained the product, price and cross
elasticities of each mode of transport. These estimations may be used to analyze the effects of
transport fares on income changes, as well as to predict short- and long-run traffics.
1. INTRODUCTION
The initial models of passenger transport demand were the aggregate "modal split models". In
these models, there has been an attempt to determine the number of journeys in a given set of
modes of transport for two towns, taking into account the characteristics of the passengers.
Studies on modal split, such as Quandt and Baumol (1966), Boyer (1977), and Levin (1978),
have been criticized by Oum (1979) and Winston (1985), among others, for the few variables
used to account for the motivation in the user's behavior, and for using very simple linear
patterns in their estimations.
Several models of aggregate passenger transport demand based on the user's behavior have
been carried out in order to improve the previous ones. The user's utility is optimized in these
models in line with the classic theory of consumer's behavior and demand. The work by Oum
and Guillen (1979) based on the user's behavior is a typical example in which the passenger
demand in Canada is analyzed.
Some disaggregate research based on the user's behavior has also been done on passenger
transport demand. The most significant work on these models is McFadden (1973, 1974). In
these works, the user takes a discrete choice of some of the different modes of transport
(railway, air, road transport, etc.) and it is assumed that the mode chosen optimizes the utility
for the user.
Spanish interurban passenger transport was first studied in the "Elasticidad de la Demanda del
Transporte Ptiblico de Viajeros" (Elasticity of the Passenger Public Transport Demand) by the
Instituto de Estudios de Transportes y Comunicaciones (Institute of Transport and
Communication Studies) (1978). This was analyzed by V_quez (1985) in a work carried out
by the Secretarfa General del Ministerio de Transportes (General Secretariat of the Ministry of
Transport). In addition, other studies such as that by Inglada (1991), Coto-Mill_in and Sarabia
(1994); and Coto Bafios and Inglada (1995) have been carried out on this issue. The elasticities
of the modes of transport in the main regions were studied in IETC (1978) and V_quez
(1985). Price elasticities have been studied in Inglada (1992) for monthly data between
1980.01 and 1988.12, with time series in which the residues have been modeled with the Box-
Jenkins techniques. Uniequational models have been carried out in Coto-Mill_in and Sarabia
(1994) in order to estimate income elasticities, using the Industrial Production Index (IPI) and
the Electric Power Consumption (CENER), for the 1980.0 l-1988.12 period, and monthly data
have been used in the estimations. In these works, the series is also modeled by the Box-
Jenkins methodology.
An original model is offered in this paper in order to estimate price income and cross
elasticities for the 1980.I-1992.IV period, applying cointegration techniques and using monthly
data. Such techniques allow the estimation of short-run elasticities, which add immediate
responses to price and income changing, and the estimation of long-run elasticities which
allow to see the effects of the price and/or income changing produced later on.
This researchoffersa modelaccordingto thesecondproposalabove,beingbasedon a
microeconomicanalysis,whichcanbeconsideredasclassic.Itsstructureisverysimple.Point
numbertwopresentsthetheoreticalmodelfor Spanishpassengertransportdemand.In thenext
point,thedatausedaredescribed.Pointnumberfourpresentstheestimationsof thedifferent
demands.Finally,themainconclusionsareofferedinpointnumberfive.
2. THE MODEL
Assumea typicaluserwhosepreferredgoodsverify theweakseparabilitycondition.Thus,
modelingof theof passengertransportservicedemandconstitutesthesecondstageof a two-
stagebudgetprocess.Therefore,the user'sincomefirstly falls into two big spending
categories:passengertransportservicesandtherestof thegoodsandservices;secondly,the
user'sincomeis assignedtothegoodsandservicescontainedin eachof thesetwocategories.
Thatis tosay,theutility functionof therepresentativeuserisasfollows:
U=U(X 1,X2....Xk;Xk+ I..... X n)
where vector Xi= (X 1, X 2 .... Xk); with i= I, 2..... k represents passenger transport services;
vector Xj= (Xk+ 1..... Xn); j= k+l .... n represents goods and services except for those
corresponding to passenger transport and U represents a utility function which is continuous
and differentiable, monotone, increasing, and strictly quasi-concave.
The consumer balance is reduced to:
max U (Xi, Xj)
subjectto:Pi" Xi + Pj"Xj = Y
where the prices Pi = (PI, P2, ..., Pk) and Pj= (Pk+l, ..-, Pn), and where Y represents the user's
level of income.
First order conditions allow to obtain the following typical user's Marshallian demands:
Xi= Xi (Pi, Pj, Y) [1]
Xj= Xj (Pi, Pj, Y) t2]
Of these individual demand functions, function [1] is interesting for us since it corresponds
with passenger transport services.
Equation [I] still presents some problems. Firstly, functions such as [ 1] should be valid for any
income distribution among the different economic agents. If this were not the case, function
[1] would provide as many values as income Y distributions among the user were possible
and, therefore, such a function would not exist. Another assumption would be that income is
dist.ributed under a specific rule. Once this rule has been established, the integrability
conditionsarecheckedandtheexistenceof theaggregateMarshalliandemandfunctionsis
guaranteed,Varian(1992).However,therearenodatato goalongtheselines.In orderto solve
thisproblemin thisstudywecanassumethatall theusershavethesamelevelof income.
Function[1] is generalenoughtoanalyzethepassengert ansportservicedemands-Talgoand
long-distancerailway,air androadtransport-identifyingthe differentsubindexesfor the
amountsdemandedineachservice.
From 1980.Ito 1992.IV,passengert ansportservicesin Spainhavebeenprovidedunder
different regulationconditions.The governmentcompanyRENFEand Iberia have the
monopolyof railwayandair nationaltransportin Spainrespectively,androadtransportis
providedbyprivatecompanieswhichweregivenaregularlineaftera systemcalled"rightof
testing".It canbesaidthattrumproadpassengert ansport,whichhasa low incidencein
quantitativeterms,is theonlymodeof transportwhichhasnotyetbeenregulated.However,
giventheimpossibilityto obtainquarterlystatisticaldataonpassengerroadtransport,andwith
the aim of addinginter-regionaltransporton the user'sown vehicles,we haveusedthe
premiumpetrol consumptionvariable.The premiumpetrol consumptionhas also been
regulatedbythegovernmentduringtheperiodof thisstudy.Undersuchregulationconditions
and with the aim to preventthe problemswhich may arise from the supply-demand
simultaneity, we have assumed that supply is exogenous in relation with prices and income
and is determined by the decisions of the government.
3. SPANISH DATA
The data on the series of long distance passenger railway transport (VKF), passenger Talgo
railway (VKT), and passenger departures and arrivals in Spanish airports (AERV), have been
obtained from the series provided by the Informes de Coyuntura del Ministerio de Transportes,
Turismo y Comunicaciones. No data on road transport passengers are available and a "proxy"
such as premium petrol consumption has been used in order to approximate the transport on
the user's own vehicles. The variable (QGAS) has been obtained from the Direcci6n General
de Previsi6n y Coyuntura del Ministerio de Econom/a y Hacienda. The gas-oil consumption
variable (QGLEO) has also been used with the aim of approximating the behavior of regular
and trump passenger transport on public services. However, the results obtained are
significantly anomalous and the reason for this may be that this variable shows the behavior of
road transport of goods (much more important in terms of consumption), rather than of
passengers.
The data on the series of long distance railway prices (PF) and air transport tariffs (PA) have
been obtained from the monthly series worked out from the tariffs of the Boletines Oficiales
del Estado (Official State Reports), evaluated within the period in which each tariff is in force.
The data on the prices of premium petrol (PGAS) have been obtained from the Direcci6n
General de Previsi6n y Coyuntura del Ministerio de Economia y Hacienda as monthly data,
also evaluated within the period in which each tariff is in force.
The data on the prices of gas oil (PGLEO) have been obtained from CAMPSA until 1992.
From then onwards, the data from the Compafifa Logfstica de Hidrocarburos (Hydrocarbon
Logistic Company) have been recorded for further studies.
The data on the income variable have been obtained considering the Spanish quarterly GDP as
"proxy". The series used for the 1980.I-I989.IV period is that used by Maule6n (1989) and it
was extended until 1992.IV from the series of the Contabilidad Nacional Espafiola (Spanish
National Accounting).
4. MARSHALLIAN OR NON COMPENSATED DEMANDS OF INTERURBAN
PASSENGER TRANSPORT: AIR AND ROAD TRANSPORT
We have estimated some equations from the specifications in model [I] by adjusting the
variables to each mode of transport. All variables headed by letter L are in natural logs and
those headed by letter D are in differences, except for the dummy variables D89.I, DS90.I,
D81.I, and D89.II, which will be properly defined tater on in this paper. The statistical "t" is
presented within brackets under each coefficient.
We have applied a cointegration approach, which has provided the most satisfactory results of
the various approaches previously attempted (Inglada (1992), Coto-Millfin and Sarabia (1994)
to obtain the estimations. For more information about the matter, see Engle and Granger
(1987), Johansen and Juselius (1990), and Osterwald-Lenum (1992).
4.1 Air transport demand
4.1.1 Long-run
The estimated equation of long-run balance cointegration has provided the following results:
LAERVt = - 1.88 - 1.48 LPAt + 1.48 LPFRt
(-2.13) (- 6.43) (21.14)
R 2 adjusted = 0.91 ;S.E. = 0.04 ;
DF=-4.14; DW= 1.79.
DW = 1.25 ;
Inaddition,if JohansenmethodologyisappliedtoaVARalongwiththreelagsandarestricted
constant,it is concludedthatthereis onlyonecointegrationvector.Thetestof thenumberof
cointegrationvectorsresultsinto:
Number of cointe_ration vectors
Under Ho Under HI Trace test Critic values 5%
r=0 r> 1 41.14 34.91
r < I r > 2 19.60 19.96
r < 2 r = 3 6.83 9.24
(a)
(a) Osterwald- Lenum critic values (1992)
r being the number of cointegration vectors.
After normalization, the following cointegration relationship is obtained:
LAERVt = - 1.76 1.41 LPAt + 1.17 LPIBt
In both estimated equations, the long-run elasticity of air transport demand with respect to the
GDP is close, somewhat higher than the unit and takes 1.16 and 1.47 values as it would
correspond to normal goods and particularly to "luxury" goods. The estimated long-run own-
price elasticity of goods is negative with values ranging from 1.38 to 1.40, which reflects a
significant response of the demand to price changing.
4.1.2 Short-run
The short-run non-linear and joint equation presents the following results:
DLAERVt = - 0.51 (LAERVt.I + 2.24 + 1.24 LPAt.l - 1.47 LPIBt.t)
(- 3.92) (1.96) (2.06) (- 9.8)
- 0.43 DLPAERVt.4 + 0.45 DLPGASt - 0.78 DLPAt
(-3.07) (2.14) (-2.36)
R 2 adjusted = 0.95 ; S.E. = 0.048 ;
F= 147.13 ; DW=2.10 ;
Serial Correlation : Ljung-Box : Q(1)= 0.30
Q(2)= 0.19
Q(3) = 1.36
Q(4) = 2.44
Residual Normality : Bera-Jarque: N(2) = 1.08
Heterocedasticity: ARCH (I-4) = 1.27
D91.I is a dummy variable which accounts for the effects of an Iberia workers' strike
in the first term of 1991, and its value is i for the first term of this year and 0 for the rest of the
year.
The long-run elasticities obtained for this and the previous model do not differ from each other
significantly. Then, long-run income elasticity is now 0.80 in comparison with the former
values 1.16 and 1.47, as it corresponds to normal goods or services with an average elasticity
of l. 143, next to the unit. Air transport is turning into a normal goods of unitary elasticity
rather than a luxury goods, as it was stated in Coto-Mill_in and Sarabia (1994) -with an
estimated value of an income elasticity of 1.61 from 1980.01 to 1988.12-.
The negative value of the own-price elasticity of goods is 0.775 in comparison with the former
1.38 and 1.40 values, the variation here is more significant, although the average elasticity is
t.185.
Short and long-run elasticities are once more slightly different. Short-run elasticities clearly
present the inelastic feature of the demand, and a substitution effect of road transport, which
has never been revealed before, is detected. Gross and net substitution relationships between
air and road transport result once more from these estimations.
4.2 Road transport demand
4.2.1. Long-run
In the inter-city passenger road transport demand equation, the dependent variable is the
amount of premium petrol, in logs, LQGAS:
LQGAS t = - 3.80 0.13 LPGASt + 1.11 LPIBt
(-3.21) (- 1.94) (8.29)
Rz adjusted = 0.94 ;S.E. = 0.03;
DF = - 5.52 ; DW = 2.0 i.
DW= 1.51 ;
Applying the Johansen methodology to a VAIl. with a lag and a restricted constant, it is also
concluded that there is only one cointegration vector. The results obtained from the test of
cointegration vectors are as follows:
Number of cointe,_ration vectors
Under 1-1o Under H_ Trace test Critic values 5% (a)
r=0 r> 1 41.87 53.12
r< 1 r>2 19.19 34.91 I
r < 2 r = 3 7.90 19.96 t
(a) Osterwald - Lenum critic values (1992)
r being the number of cointegration vectors.
After normalization, the following cointegration relationship is obtained:
LQGASt = 2.85 - 0.47 LPGASt + 0.3611 LPIBt
The results obtained from the long-run estimations provide elasticities of 0.361 and 1.11 with
respect to the GDP, relationships which characterize these services as basic goods rather than
as luxury goods, always within the context of normal goods. The own-price elasticities of the
goods take the negative values 0.13 and 0.47, once more referring to essential goods with
inelastic demand and slight demand variations as a response to tariff changes (if we consider
such changes as proportional to premium petrol price changing).
The gas-oil demand equation QGLEO presents very similar values with respect to its price and
to the GDP variable.
4.2.2 Short-run
The non-linear estimation in only one stage of road demand, provided the following results:
DLQGAS_= -0.69(LQGASt.I + 3.88 +0.15LPGASt.I - 1.11 DLPIBt.j)
(- 4.85) (2.20) (1.68) (- 6.19)
- 0.36 DLPGASt + 0.34 DLPAt
(-2.73) (2.23)
R 2 adjusted = 0.95 ; S.E. = 0.036 ;
F=212.45 ; DW=2.13 ;
Serial Correlation : Ljung-Box : Q(1)= 0.28
Q(2)= 1.91
Q(3) = 4.81
Q(4) = 4.82
Residual Normality : Bera-Jarque: N(2) = 4.16
Heterocedasticity:ARCH(1-4)= 1.17
The valueof the GDP long-rundemandelasticitynow obtainedof 0.765confirmsthe
inelasticityof the income"proxy",the servicesbeingconsideredas essential.The same
happenswith the QGLEOdemand,whichconsidersthe regularline inter-citypassenger
transportdemandas"proxy".Thenegativevalueof thelong-runown-priceelasticityof goods
for thismodelis0.10,whiletheformervalueswere0.13and0.47.
Theestimatedshort-runown-priceelasticitiesof goodshavethenegativevalue0.36anda
crosselasticityof 0.34with respecto air transportprice.In theshort-run,it is possibleto
speakaboutgrosssubstitutionrelationshipsbetweenroadandair transport.However,it isnot
possibleto meetany conclusionwith respecto the net substitutionor complementary
relationshipsof thesetransportserviceswithoutanyfurtherassumption.
5, CONCLUSIONS
In thispaper,wehavepresentedatheoreticalmodelof air passengertransportdemand.With
quarterlyaggregatedSpanishdata,equationsof inter-citypassengerair androadtransport
demandhavebeenspecifiedfor 1980.Iand1992.IV.
Moreover,we havecarriedout differentdemandfunctionestimationsusingcointegration
techniques,andhavebeensubjectoawideevaluationwhichallowsusto checktheadequacy
of thismethodwith respectto othersusedinearlierworksby Inglada(1992),andCoto-Mill_in
andSarabia(1994).
Eachspecificdemandmayrequiremoredetailedstudies,especiallyroadtransport.However,
havingcarriedout theestimations,it is possibleto meetconclusionsasregardsincome,the
own-priceelasticityof goodsandcrosspriceelasticitiesuchasthefollowing:
- Long-runincomeelasticitiesareall positiveandall theservicesarenormalgoods.Income
elasticitiesareverycloseto theunit for air transport,andslightlybelowtheunit for road
transport.
- Theown-priceelasticitiesof goodsincreaseparallelto thequalityof theservice,sincethey
increasewith tariffs, andpresentvaluescloseto theunit for air transport.Theyareclearly
inelasticfor roadtransport.
- All crosselasticitiespresentpositivevaluesandtheyarebelowtheunit.Grossandnetlong-
run substitutionrelationshipsbetweenair and road transportand gross substitution
relationshipsbetweenroad and air transportcan be guaranteed,but net substitution
relationshipsbetweenthesecannot.
Theseestimationscan be usefulfor the analysisand predictionsof the effectsof tariff
changing,aswellasfor trafficandshortandlong-runincomepredictions.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Hub and spoke networks have become a critical part of air transport operations since
deregulation in the United States. This is principally because they enable a carrier to
maximise the number of markets served with a given volume of flights. For example, 100
points linked to a common hub enables service to be provided in more than 5000 different
city pair markets. In Europe, hub and spoke networks have existed tbr many years as a
consequence of international boundaries and the restrictions they imposed on traffic rights.
Nevertheless, many of these were merely a collection of uncoordinated services that
happened to share a common terminus. It is only in the last few years that most European
airlines have started to operate and market their networks effectively to carry connecting
passengers with both origin and destination outside their home country.
Whereas passengers making a direct flight often have little choice as to the airport used and
typically only one or two carriers flying on the route, the situation is somewhat different for
transfer traffic. The passenger flying from Berlin to Los Angeles, for example, can choose
between eight different hubs in Europe and the Umted States that provide a one-stop
connecting service and a multiplicity of possible airlines. Even where direct flights exist,
indirect routings can often still provide a worthwhile alternative in terms of fares or schedules
and are hence capturing an increasing share of traffic.
For airport operators, connecting traffic offers the only real oppommity to grow beyond the
traffic potential of their own local catchment area. In mm this supports a much wider range of
services than would otherwise be possible with accompanying economic benefits as shown
by Small (1995). Amsterdam Schiphol for example sees it as vital to the Dutch economy to
become a 'mainport' (one of Europe's leading hubs) in the 21st century (Butterworth-Hayes,
1993). The 'footloose' nature of this traffic means that it is one of the few areas in which
competition between airports can take place.
Whereas traditionally it has been straightforward to forecast air traffic on a route by route
basis, transfer passenger demand is very much more difficult to predict. This is because it is
driven by the supply of air services and will shift between alternative hubs and airlines
dependent on the relative quality of service and price. Data on connecting flows is scarce
outside the US hence various models and estimates become necessary to analyse this traffic.
This paper considers the extent to which hub airports in Europe compete for transfer traffic
and the performance of the major airlines. The relationship with scheduling issues, airport
facilities and geographical constraints is addressed. A method for estimating changes in'
transfer traffic under changes in service or infrastructure provision is suggested. Some
possible future developments of hubbing in Europe are considered, with particular reference
to the shortage of runway capacity at many of Europe's major airports.
2 MARKETS SERVED
International boundaries have played a major part in shaping the present European air
networks. Most passengers from regional airports have historically had to change planes at
the national gateway (ie UK traffic would travel via London, German via Frankfurt etc).
Long-haul services have also tended to reflect linguistic and colonial links. For example,
manyLatinAmericanservicesareavailablefromMadridbut little in thewayof routesto
Asia;Montrealis well servedfromParisbutCanadianflights fromotherEuropeancities
focusonToronto.DeregulationwithinEuropehasmeanthatmostairportsof anysizeare
now linkedwith severalhubsin differentEuropeancountriesandfor mostjourneysthe
passengerhastheoptionof takingconnectingflightsthroughavarietyof hubsaswellasany
directservices.
Despitetheadventof tong-rangetwinjets, thecoverageof intercontinentalservicesfrom
Europeremainsfairly thin.Forexample,Parisdoesnothavea dailyserviceto Delhiwhile
Londonis lackingoneto Rio;Brusselshasnoserviceto HongKongandAthensnoneto
Chicago.OnlyNewYork is linkedwithall themajorEuropeancapitalsonaregularbasis.
Thismakestheuseof hubsnecessaryeveninsomerelativelylargemarkets.Furthermore,the
timetakento changeplanesis lesssignificantin thecontextof a 7000kmjourneythantbr
oneof 700km.
TableI examinesthepotentialrangeof servicesfromEuropeto eachof theworldregionsvia
thealternativehubs.It is numberof flightsratherthancapacitythatis thecriticalfactoras
passengerchoiceis not increasedby merelyusinga largeraircraft.Theproductof the
frequenciesavailableviaeachhubhasbeenusedasthebasisforcomparison.
For example,consideringall Europeancountriesto North America,althoughLondon
Gatwickhasmoretransatlanticfli_ts thanParisCharlesDeGaulle,becauseCDGhastwice
asmanyEuropeanflightsitshubpotentialintheEurope-NorthAmericamarketisgreater:
European x North = Hub
frequency American potential
(incdomestic) frequency
LondonGatwick 1099 x 166 = 182434
ParisCDG 2457 x 146 = 358722
Thehubpotentialof eachairportoutof thetotalsumacrossall 18hubsis thekeyvariable
usedfor comparison(atypeof theoreticalmarketshare).Thismeasuretakesnoaccountof
waitingtimes,distancetravelledorairlinesused.Thesewill bediscussedsubsequently.
Table1showsthatHeathrowenjoysadominantmarketpositionin itslong-standingroleasa
hubfor servicesbetweenEuropeandNorthAmericawith40%of thepotentialconnections;
Frankfurtis secondwith 18%.At theotherendof thescale1%of theseconnectionsarevia
Dusseldorf and less than 0.5% via Barcelona. Heathrow also dominates in the Asia and
Middle East markets. To Africa the service is more evenly spread with Paris narrowly behind
Heathrow and Rome a significant option. To Latin America, Paris moves into first place
closely followed by Madrid, while Heathrow slumps to fifth. The ranking of Heathrow in the
African and Latin American markets will have deteriorated further since this time with the
recent move of most BA services to Gatwick.
IO
Table 1: Hub service from all European countries
(ill are column
EU Rest of North Latin Africa Middle Asia
Europe America America East
Total
intercon-
tinental
via
Amsterdam 9 9 I0 14 10 l 0 10 l 0
Athens 2 2 1 3 3 1 1
Barcelona 3 1 - 2
Brussels 6 5 2 2 9 1 3
C openhagen 7 12 2 - 2 4 2
Dusseldorf 3 2 1 2 1 - 1
Fr "ank_fiart 9 13 18 17 15 14 22 17
Lisbon 1 - 2 1 -
London LGW 3 1 6 3 2 2 - 3
London LHR 20 18 40 13 22 39 38 35
Madrid 6 2 2 18 3 1 3
Manchester 2 I 1
Milan LIN 3 1 -
Munich 4 4 1 1 2 1 I 1
Paris CDG 12 12 11 23 17 13 14 14
Rome 4 4 2 3 10 7 3 4
Vienna 2 5 1 3 i 1
Zurich 4 9 3 2 4 4 5 4
- less than 0.5%
data for week of 19-25 June 1995Source: Derived from OAG
Table 2 considers the level of provision from the five major European markets to long-haul
destinations. In each case it is Heathrow together with the national hub that dominates. Paris
CDG suffers in the French market from a lack of domestic service (most of the domestic
routes being at Orly). Madrid and Rome in contrast have large numbers of domestic flights
but poor coverage otherwise. London Heathrow makes a consistently strong showing due to
its dominance of intercontinental services. Amsterdam is in its strongest position from the
UK (17% of services) but generally falls below 10%. There is a reasonable spread of
provision, with at least 3 hubs exceeding 10_/oof services in each market.
The existence of services is however only part of the equation. To consider how these relate
to a passenger's choice in practice a range of other issues have to be considered. The most
important of these are the flying time - which is essentially a function of distance travelled -
and the transfer time which depends on airport layout, frequencies and the level of schedule
co-ordination.
Table2:Sharebyhubof potentialconnectingservicesfromfivemajorEuropeancountriesto
intercontinentaldestinations
(figuresarecolumnpercentages)
from UK France Germany Italy Spain
via
Amsterdam 17
Athens
Barcelona
Brussels 3
Copenhagen 1
Dusseldorf
Frankfurt 9
Lisbon
London LGW 5
London LHR 43
Madrid 1
Manchester 1
Ivlilan LIN
Munich 1
Paris CDG 15
Rome 1
Vienna
Zurich 2
11
l
6
41
3
1
17
4
1
3
2
1
1
26
1
29
1
3
16
2
2
5
6
3
1
17
3
22
2
I
20
20
1
3
1
21
1
3
26
23
2
- less than 0.5%
Source: Derived from OAG data for week of 19-25 June 1995
3 GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION
Geographical location is critical for a hub airport. A centrally located hub will minimise
travelling distances and hence journey times in a large number of markets.
Table 3 is based on the weighted passenger km required to interlink the 36 busiest airports in
Western Europe. Istanbul, Las Palmas, Lanzarote and Tenerife Sur are not considered part of
the core network and have been excluded._Only one location in Eastern Europe (Moscow)
exceeded this threshold and is also excluded.
This is not simply a distance minimisation exercise; airports are given a 'weight' equivalent to
the number of passengers handled. London Heathrow with over 50 million passengers per
annum therefore exerts more pull on the outcome than Hanover (4 million), for example.
Each airport in turn is considered as the hub and the passenger km required to link all the
airports in the system calculated. It is the relative position of the different hubs that is of
interest.
Table3:Increaseinweightedpassengerkm
viaahubrelativeto
Hub
Brussels
Paris CDG
Paris ORY
Cologne
Dusseldorf
Frank_Atrt
Amsterdam
Stuttgart
LondonLGW
LondonLHR
Zurich
Geneva
Increase in
travel distance
0
+2
+2
+3
+4
+6
+7
+I1
+12
+12
+14
+16
Hub
required to interlink 36 major
the optimal location (%)
Increase in
travel distance
Lyon +21
Hm_over +21
Munich +27
Birmingham +27
Milan +30
Hamburg +30
Manchester +37
Berlin +42
Nice +43
Marseille +43
Copenhagen +60
Vienna +65
Hub
Dublin
Barcelona
European airports
!ncrease in
travel distance
_-67
+7I
Glasgow
Rome
Palma
Madrid
Oslo
Stockholm
Malaga
Lisbon
Helsinki
Athens
+73
+83
*-93
+105
+105
+127
+161
+166
+179
+196
The optimal location is Brussels. Paris is almost equally good (+2%) and benefits from being
a large traffic generator in its own right - these people do not need to take a connecting flight.
Northern Germany is then favoured (Cologne +3%, Dusseldorf +4%, Frankfi_ +6%). The
worst location for a European hub is, not surprisingly, at Athens where travel distances would
be trebled compared to using Brussels. In comparison with a previous study based on the EU
prior to recent enlargement (Dennis, 1994), the centre of gravity has moved eastwards, as
Paris was then the optimal location. This is due mainly to the inclusion of additional airports
and also above average growth rates at a number of central European airports in the last few
years.
It is worth noting that the result is sensitive to deviations away from a north west - south east
axis. Zurich for example represents only a +14% increase in travel distance over Brussels,
whereas Lyon is +21% and Hamburg +30%.
In terms of traffic connecting between long-haul and European flights the result will be
similar. The southern markets of Africa and Latin America account for only about 24% of
intercontinental passengers from Europe as against 41% on the North Atlantic and 35% to
Asia, the Middle East and Pacific (IATA, i{@7).
Due to the dominance of the North Atlantic a location in NW Europe (UKAreland) is
favoured as a long-haul hub. Such an airport is also surprisingly well located in relation to the
great circle routes from the Far East and Latin America. It is only for Africa that a hub in
southern Europe provides a worthwhile advantage. For passengers connecting between
Europe and intercontinental flights therefore, the best hub location moves to the north-west of
Brussels - ie the London area. There is nevertheless a level playing field between many hubs
that extend average travel distance by only 1-2%, not a major problem when travelling
thousands of miles. This would include all locations within the region bordered by
Manchester-Amsterdam-Frankthrt-Paris.
Other airports can still be optimal for serving more localised flows (eg Copenhagen for
Scandinavia-Europe or Madrid for Europe-South America) but to offer a competitive service
in the full range of markets necessitates a central location.
The traditionalong-haulhubsof London,Paris,AmsterdamandFrankfurtwill theretbre
continueto enjoya geographicaldvantagein theyearsahead.Brusselscouldprobably
supportmoreservicethanit doesat present.Demandfor air travelin Europeis likely to
becomemoredispersedover thecomingyearsas the moreperipheralcountriesin the
Mediterranean(egSpain,Italy,Portugal)andEasternEuropearelikely to havethehighest
growthrates(IATA, 1995;AEA, 1995).Thiswill havetheconsequenceof movingthe
optimalhublocationfurthersouthandeast, bringing locations such as Munich and Zurich
more firmly into the picture.
4 TRANSFER TIMES AND SCHEDULE CO-ORDINATION
If the passenger is prepared to wait an indefinite time at the hub, connections can be achieved
between all services operating to and from it. In reality, long delays at the transfer airport are
unattractive especially where the actual flying time is short. If alternative routes are available,
a considerable drain of traffic may be experienced whilst even in a monopoly position,
optional demand will still be suppressed. The typical waiting times incurred differ between
the various hubs. This is a result of the physical design of the airport, the frequencies
available and the schedule operated by the airlines.
The lower bound for the time required to change between two services is measured by the
Minimum Connect Time (MCT). These are co-ordinated through IATA and represent the
minimum time required between an arrival and departure for the two flights to be bookable as
a connection. The MCT takes into account the time required to relocate a passenger and their
baggage between flights. Airports with [ong walking distances will hence have a higYier MCT
than more compact facilities, although different MCTs may apply depending on the terminals
used. Baggage handling systems are often the constraining factor but customs and
immigration or security checks can also pose a bottleneck. At Brussels, tbr example, more
immigration desks have been opened to reduce the MCT on Sabena's connections between
European flights inside and outside the Schengen area from 40 to 30 minutes. The speed of
unloading passengers is a further consideration - this is generally slower for larger aircraft.
Some MCTs are artificially inflated for competitive reasons - to deter passengers from using
them as part of a connection. For example, KLM departures at Heath.row (not a KLM hub)
have an MCT of 4 hours! Finally, there is a decision to be made as to what is the acceptable
level of missed connections. This will be :1 function of punctuality at the hub airport. The
MCT should incorporate a contingency so that a slightly late arrival (eg 10-15 minutes) will
not destroy the connection. Increasing congestion and delays in Europe make this the main
constraint on any further reduction in the MCTs. British Airways has actually increased
certain MCTs at Heath.row and Gatwick in recent years in order to improve reliability.
Table 4 compares a range of examples. At most single terminal locations such as Axnsterdam
and Brussels transfers can be accomplished in 30-50 minutes (and as little as 25 minutes on
Austrian Airlines at Vienna). In contrast, at multi-terminal airports such as Heathrow the
MCT rises to 70-90 minutes when a change of terminals is required. In this difference of
time, the passenger could have flown an extra 500 km or more! The allocation of airlines to
terminals at Heathrow is particularly inefficient as 67% of passengers who change aircraft
also have to change terminals (CAA, 1997). In particular, BA short-haul to long-haul
passengers have to make the cumbersome move from Terminal 1 to Terminal 4. At Paris
CDG in contrast, all of Air France's services are 'under one root'.
Table4: MinimumConnectTimes
Airport Terminals
LondonHeatl-a'ow
ParisCDG
London Gatwick
Rome
Madrid
Amsterdam
Brussels
Frankfurt
Zurich
Vienna
(within T1, within T4)
(within T2, within T3)
(between terminals)
(within T 1)
(within T2)
(between terminals)
(within North term)
(within South term)
(between terminals)
for ten major European airports
MCT (minutes)
45
60
70-90
60
45
75
45
40-60
75
45 -60
45-60
40-50
30-50
45
40
25-30
Source: OAG World Airways Guide, July 1998
Although at face value it is the frequencies with which different routes are operated that will
also be critical to minimising the waiting time when making a transfer connection, one option
that can raise the competitiveness of a hub is to improve the scheduling without actually
changing the number of flights. An essential element of any serious attempt to maximise the
scope of an airport as a hub involves a concentration of activity into a limited number of
peaks or waves during the day. These should see a large number of inbound flights arriving in
a short space of time, then departing again as soon as the MCT has elapsed. The transfer time
between flights in the same wave will be close to the best attainable. The improvement from
grouping flights in this way will be most dramatic at small airports but it can nevertheless
offer important advantages to large airlines and airports also. Although the volume of flights
at a busy airport such as Heathrow ensures that many connection possibilities will exist by
chance, it is only through operating waves of flights that a consistent connecting timetable
can be provided, with services in both directions in each city-pair market and a transfer time
close to the optimal.
Figures 1-4 compare the distribution of flight activity at Heath.row and at Amsterdam (plotted
on the same scales). Heathrow has a flat pattern of activity across the day, the product of the
airport being full to capacity and one runway being used for departures and one for landings.
Furthermore, British Airways has close to 40% of the slots in each time period. In contrast,
Amsterdam's activity is much less smooth with KLM and its partners operating three main
connection waves centred on 0930, 1330 and 1830, together with a developing one at 1600.
An arrival at Schiphol at 1800 will connect to 80 departures within 2 hours whereas one at
1030 would manage only 20. Heathrow would offer about 30 connections within 2 hours
from any given arrival time, which is due also to the high Minimum Connect Times that exist
between terminals. Most of the major airports in Northern Europe with the exception of
Heathrow now operate some form of wave pattern but in Mediterranean Europe this has yet
to be implemented. Even the best European airports compare unfavourably with the
concentration achieved at major US hubs however where the peaks are sharper and virtually
every flight is constrained to fall within them.
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Inevitably it is only the local airline and certain agreeable partners that will contbrm to this
type of schedule. Operators not based at the hub airport have less to gain from the multiplier
effects and will be more strongly motivated by requirements of the point to point traffic or
their own hub system elsewhere. The grouping of flights into waves also means that the
probability of the first outgoing service to any particular destination being by the same amine
as the delivering flight is disproportionately high. One of the most important commercial
benefits to arise from hub and spoke operations is the extent to which individual airline
networks can become self sufficient in meeting demand. Department of Transportation data
in the US shows the proportion of on-line connections (passengers who change planes
between two flights on the same airline) has risen from 52% prior to deregulation to over
90% today. At Heathrow, with its wide variety of operators, Civil Aviation Authority (C,a_)
surveys showed that BA-BA connections accounted for only 27% of transfers in 1984. This
had risen to 43% in 1991 and is estimated to be nearer 60% today. This means that British
Airways' on-line connections at Heath.row generated 4x as many transfer passengers as those
involving any other combination of carriers in 1991 and this is likely to be closer to 6x in
1996. It is individual airline networks theretbre that increasingly provide the focus for
competition between hubs.
A consequence of the move towards on-line feed is the marginalisation of carriers that are not
hubbed at one end of the route or the other. In the US this is readily seen in the dominance of
the major carriers at their 'tbrtress' hubs. In Europe, the traditional 50:50 split between the
two national carriers is being squeezed as the hub airline, with the benefit of the connecting
traffic, can raise frequencies to a level that the other carrier(s) cannot match. This may lead to
withdrawal of the non-core operations, as SAS have done on Gothenburg-Amsterdam and
Alitalia on Turin-Frankfurt (Table 5).
Table 5: Domination of hub to spoke routes
Route 1989
Amsterdam-Gothenburg lxKL, lxSK, lxAY
London-Marseille 1,,d3A, 1xAF
Frankfurt-Turin 1xLH, 1xAZ
(daily frequencies)
1997
4xKL
3xBA
4xLH
A.F-Air France, AY-Finnair, AZ-Alitalia, BA-British Airways, KL-KLM, LH-Lufthansa, SK-
SAS
Source: ABC/OAG World Airways Guide
5 AVAILABILITY OF SERVICES AND IMPACT ON JOURNEY TIMES
To assess how these factors come together in practice to influence a passenger's choice of
route, schedules in 40 sample markets (Europe-long haul) have been ranked by overall
journey time for travel starting on Thursday January 15th 1998. Thursday is the most neutral
day of the week for analysis as it generally has average traffic levels and service patterns. The
markets were chosen to give a good geographical spread around Europe and the World in
relation to the overall patterns of demand (eg more US points were included than African
ones). None of the city pairs selected had direct service on the day chosen for study. The aim
was to ensure that all hub airlines had a comparable opportunity to compete for this traffic.
Several rules were created for this analysis. Only on-line connections (including code-shares)
have been included as these account for the majority of traffic and form the key focus of
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competition.Thereis likelytobeaclosecorrelationbetweentherankingof themajorairlines
andthestatusof theairportasawhole.
Linkagesmustsatist}'thepublishedIATA MinimumConnectTimesbuthavebeencompiled
with referenceto all scheduledflightsoneachsector,notmerelyconnectionspublishedor
listedin theOAG.Onlyconnectionsbetweennon-stopflightsareconsideredasit should
oftenbepossibletousetheintermediatecallasahubto cutoutonestop.It wouldotherwise
alsobecomplicated by US routes where a large number of one-stop through services exist
that really involve an additional comlection at a US hub. Services requiring a wait of more
than 6 hours at the transfer point also have been discarded and this will eliminate any
connections requiring a night stop. Connections via hubs outside Europe are treated on the
same basis as those within - a passenger from Stockholm to Los Angeles may well find the
best connection to be American Airlines via Chicago and it will be identified as such.
A flight cannot be counted more than once in this analysis even it carries multiple codes. If
there is more than one on-line connection possibility, it is the European airline that has been
taken. (There are relatively few cases where this an_biguity arises).
An airline that provides the fastest routing in every sample market would receive a score of
100%. If an airline has no service in a particular market it scores zero. The score could hence
be considered analogous to the position of an airline on the CRS screen.
Table 6 shows the performance of the various airlines at their hub airports and compares the
results from a similar exercise carried out tbr Thursday June 22nd i995.
Table 6: Performance of European hub
Hub airline (airport)
Lul_hansa(Frankfurt)
Air France (Paris CDG)
KLM (Amsterdam)
Swissair (Zurich)
British AW (Heathrow)
Sabena (Brussels)
Alitalia (Rome)
British AW (Gatwick)
airlines: score based on sample of Europe-
intercontinental markets (optimal service = 100%)
Score Score Hub airline (airport)
1998 1995
63 % 70% LuO.hansa(Munich)
60% 42% Austrian (Vienna)
59% 50% Continental (Newark)
50% 29% SAS (Copenhagen)
47% 55% USAirways (Philadelph)
15% 5% American (Chicago)
14% 11% Delta (Atlanta)
13% 10% Others <5% in 1998
Score Score
1998 1995
13% 1%
9%
8%
6% 6%
5%
5%
5% 4%
18 hubs 6 hubs
Lufthansa at Frankfurt comes narrowly ahead of its main rivals, followed by Air France at
Paris CDG and KLM at Amsterdam. Swissair at Zurich and BA at London Heathrow are the
other two major players in the Europe-intercontinental markets. There is then a 'second
division' made up of Sabena, Alitalia, BA at London Gatwick and Lufthansa at Munich. The
other hubs axe only a realistic option in a few specific markets. Although Iberia, for example,
has an attractive Latin American network it scores only 4% overall. This is because Latin
America is a relatively unimportant market from Europe as a whole, Iberia's long-haul
services are poorly scheduled in relation to its European flights and many secondary
European points are not linked directly with Madrid at all.
!1
This demonstratesthe importanceof schedulingand MCTs as Heathrow'stheoretical
superiorityin numberof servicesiserodedwhenoneconsidersthefastestviableroutingsin
practice.Similarly,KLM doesmuchbetterthanAmsterdam'slevel of operationsalone
wouldsuggest.
It is importantonotethatthefiguresin thetableabovearesomewhatsubjectovariationsin
thesampleof marketschosen.Thepositioningof the majorhubsappearsto be robust
howeverandit is only in therangebelowabout10%thattheoutcomemaybeseriously
distorted.A numberof keyprinciplesareneverthelessclear.
Comparedwith 1995,oneof themostnotablechangeshasbeentheimprovementof Air
Francefrom beingtheweakestmajorhub carrierto oneof the strongest.This canbe
attributedto theirconversiontoa fivewavesystemin Summer1996accompaniedbya$22
million investment(in conjunctionwithAeroportdeParis)in airportfacilities(Beechener,
1996).Swissairis theotherdramaticimproverandnowmeritsaplacealongsidethebigtour.
This has been achieved by scrapping the split operation of long-haul services between Zurich
and Geneva, in order to concentrate on developing the Zurich hub and boosting European
feeder flights and frequencies through the use of smaller Crossair equipment. Aggessive
scheduling gives fast connections, especially from the Mediterranean regions - where the
local hubs are ineffective and Zurich has a geographical advantage over the gateways in
Northern Europe.
The competition has sharpened up since 1995, which accounts for the slight fall in the
rankings of Lufthansa at Frankfurt and British Airways at Heathrow. If a faster routing via
another hub is now available the position of eg Lufi.hansa will fall, even though it may be
operating the same schedule as before. This is because the scores are relative to the best
service available in each market. It is likely that Frankfurt and Heathrow will continue to lose
ground as they have little scope for expansion and other hubs ',vill start to catch them up.
BA's Heathrow rating may also have suffered from the transfer of thinner routes to Gatwick,
eliminating its service altogether in certain connecting markets or requiring a change of
airport at London which is not allowed in this analysis.
KLM has improved its score marginally thanks to very competitive European coverage. It is
more wedded to the 747 than its main rivals however and in a number of long-haul markets
(apart from the US) it fails to achieve a dally frequency, which is becoming something of a
handicap.
The secondary hubs have generally also been improving. Lufthansa has now started to
develop Munich as a serious additional hub to its Frankfurt base (Jane's Airport Review,
1997), while Sabena has built on its extensive European network to introduce more long-haul
flights. Austrian, supported by a range of code-share deals, has moved into intercontinental
services and BA has moved more flights to Gatwick - although not in the major markets that
tend to be the focus of this analysis. A much greater number of airlines and airports are also
able to offer service in at least some markets. 18 other hubs scored 1-5% in the 1998 analysis
compared to only 6 in 1995. Newcomers include British Airways at Birmingham where they
now have one transatlantic flight and Eastern European carriers such as LOT at Warsaw who
are modernising and developing rapidly. A trend towards deregulation globally is opening up
additional gateways and services.
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BeyondEurope,it is reallyonly theUShubsthathavesufficientlinksto offera serious
alternativeandthenonlyforpassengerst avellingtotheAmericas.It is interestingto notethe
relativedeclineof JFK asmorelinks to US gatewayswith betterdomesticconnections
becomeavailable.Thecompactscaleof Europecomparedto theothercontinentsmeansthat
aback-trackinEuropecanoftenproveshorterthanusinganoverseashubthatisnotquiteen-
route.Forexanlple,Manchester-Amsterdam-Los,amgelesi 9381kin whereasManchester-
Atlmua-LosAngelesis 9652km.ThusalthoughtheUShubsscorehighlyon fasttransfer
times(exceptperhapsat JFK)andrangeof destinations,thesearecounteractedby'the
increasedflyingtimeinmanycases.
Thereareof courseotherwaysin whichhubscancompetebesidesprovidingattractive
schedules.Leisure passengers can be tempted by heavily discounted fares to consider the
most tortuous of routings (eg consider services from Europe to Australia by Air China or by
Aeroflot from Europe to the Far East). In Europe, an airline such as British Airways benefits
from being based in the UK and can afford to be aggressive on pricing in high cost markets
such as Germany. In contrast, Swissair is more dependent on high yields to balance its costs.
Business passengers are more sensitive to time than price but frequent flier progran_-nes have
added a new dimension. Someone locked in to British Airways' Air Miles or KLM's Flying
Dutchman scheme tbr example is likely to go out of their way to use them tbr long-haul
travel, even if it involves a connection through a hub.
6 INTRA-EUROPEAN CONNECTIONS
The suitability of hubs for intra-European traffic is more difficult to assess at the general
level. This is due to geography ruling out many hubs for particular journeys (eg few people
are likely to travel Manchester-Helsinki via Frankfurt let alone via Athens!). This narrows the
effective competition in each market. Secondly, because most of the larger markets in
northern Europe are of short distance (under I000 km) and have plentiful direct service,
hubbing becomes irrelevant in these cases. However, this position is likely to change over
time. The peripheral markets in Europe are the more underdeveloped and expected to see the
strongest growth in the coming years, which will raise average stage lengths. Also congestion
at some of the capital cities will force greater use of regional airports, which will only be able
to access the whole of Europe via connections through a hub (eg a passenger from
Northampton might travel Birmingham or _uton - Amsterdam - Vienna rather than going to
London to fly Heath.row - Vienna non stop).
The number of hubs able to offer intra-European connections is somewhat wider than for
long-haul. Table 7 shows the potential split of services between the realistic hubs in several
cross-Europe markets. The pattern of services is generally more dispersed than in the long-
haul context although there is still an advantage to the national hubs in most cases. Time of
day is also a key factor in short-haul markets. Services departing before 0800 or between
1600-1900 can be expected to command a premium traffic, reflecting the importance of
minimising lost working hours in this business travel dominated market.
For the reasons outlined above it is difficult to produce a definitive ranking of the hub airlines
but some features can be readily identified. Brussels, which comes nowhere as an
intercontinental hub, is a key competitor within Europe, reflecting Sabena's strategy of
specialising in this market. In contrast, many of the larger hubs are not optimised for short-
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haulconnections(Blacldock,1990).SwissairatZurichbenefitsagainfromitsstrengthin the
southernEuropeanmarkets.BothSabenandSwissairarealsocharacterisedby attractive
timingsmorningandevening.SAShastheScandinavianmarketwell tiedupatCopenhagen
and Olympic the Greek marketat Athens.London Heathrowis ratherperipheral
geographically.Themainmessageseemsto bethatsmallerhubscanfulfil ausefulregional
rolebutthisisstill largelydependentonthebaseairlinetargetingsuchtraffic.
Table7:Sharebyhubof potentialconnectingservicesin fivecontrastingintra-European
markets
(figuresarecolumnpercenta:ies)
Hub
Aansterdam
Athens
Barcelona
Brussels
Copenhagen
Dusseldorf
Frankfurt
Lisbon
LondonLGW
LondonLHR
Madrid
Manchester
MilanLfi',l
Munich
ParisCDG
Rome
Vienna
Zurich
UK-
Italy
II
na
na
11
na
2
6
na
5
i9
na
1
8
2
25
8
na
3
France-
Sweden
13
na
na
9
25
1
5
na
3
26
na
na
1
14
na
na
3
Spain-
Greece
na
36
23
na
na
na
na
na
na
na
17
na
6
na
na
12
na
na
Germany-
Portugal
6
na
4
11
na
6
26
11
na
na
8
na
3
7
14
na
na
5
Norway-
Austria
25
na
na
I0
42
3
5
na
na
na
na
na
na
2
na
na
13
na not applicable
less than 0.5%
Source: Derived from OAG data for week of 19-25 June 1995
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7 TRANSFER PASSENGERS - SCHEDULE AND DEMAND MODELLING
Transfer traffic is one of the most difficult segments of the market to forecast on a
disaggregated basis. Data on the demand side is non existent in much of Europe except for
surveys at specific airports. In contrast, the US has an overall 10% ticket sales sample.
Transfer flows can also be very ephemeral in nature. It is necessary therefore to devise a
model based around knowledge of the supply side to imply patterns of passenger demand.
There are a number of reasons why the distribution of connecting flows may alter over time.
These include:
Changes to airline service provision (eg launch of new routes or frequencies)
Changes to airline schedules (eg creation of a new or different wave system)
Changes to MCTs (eg through provision of a new terminal facility or baggage system)
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Changestoairlinecommercialstrategies(egpricingincentivesoralliances)
Thisis particularlycrucialwhenaimingtoassesstherevenueimplicationsof investmentsin
newinfrastructureorservices.Oneexampleof recentinterestinvolvedestimatingtheimpact
on transferpassengersof possiblechangesin serviceat LondonHeathrowor Gatwick,
relativeto theothermajorEuropeanairports.Thesetall into severaldifferentcategories
(MCTchangesuchasfromapossiblefifth terminalatHeatbaow;creationof someformof
wavesystem;operationofadditionalflightsduetoenhancedrunwaycapacity).
Theprincipleis thatthecompositionof theexistingtransfertrafficoverLondonby carrier
androutegroupis knownfromtheCAA surveys.No comparabledatais availabletbr the
otherEuropeanairportshowever.Wealsoknowtheexistinglevelof servicein thedifferent
hubmarketsatHeathrowandGatwickcomparedto therivalhubs(egFrankfurt,ParisCDG,
Amsterdan_).Thiswasachievedbyinputtingthepublishedschedulesto acomputerdatabase
andthenwritingsomespecialprogramsto interrogatethis in termsof connectingservicesfor
selectedconnectionwindows(egMCT upto 2 hoursshort-haul,MCT up to 4 hourslong-
haul).Someestimatesof airlineyieldsin thedifferentmarketsenableamonetaryvalueto be
putontheresultingtraffic.
The assumption is that the existing London transt_r traffic is a reflection of the existing
availability of connecting services. By improving the level of service at eg Heathrow relative
to the other airports we could then imply a benefit in terms of transfer traffic. This is only at a
snapshot in time but provides a measure of the benefit of the new facilities - in practice
Heathrow may be running to stand-still as other hubs improve taster but the incremental gain
will be similar.
One of the major benefits of the proposed fifth terminal at Heathrow (TS) would be to enable
British Airways to combine all its existing T1 and T4 operations in one building. This would
hence reduce the high 75 minute MCT that currently exists for interchange between T1 and
"1"4to a figure of around 45 minutes. The impact of this on one of the (unidentified) transfer
market _oups in the analysis is outlined below.
The base traffic is 697,000 transfers in the year (each of these passengers makes both an
arrival and departure at Heathrow). This is achieved on 543 connecting pairs of flights on an
average day: 18,1% of the total on-line col_mecting service in this market (BAv KL v AF v
LH etc). The improved MCTs from T5 increase BA's service with an unchanged schedule to
676 connecting flight pairs. This is 21.5% of the new (larger) total on-line connecting service.
We therefore expect BA's traffic to rise by a factor of 21.5/18.1 ie to 831,000 passengers an
increase of 134,000. Further gains come from passengers switching within Heathrow as the
BA-BA connection becomes a better option than their current one (some of these may already
be using BA on one leg of the journey). This brings an extra 74,000 passengers. A 'same
terminal' benefit is also included based on experience of existing connections available within
the same terminal (eg Paris-Intercontinental which is already within T4) against those
involving a change of terminals (eg Brussels-Intercontinental which requires T1-T4
interchange) net of MCT factors. An additional 45,000 passengers are anticipated here. This
gives an overall gain in transfer passengers of 253,000 in this market group (+36%). The
same process is then repeated across each transfer market sector. The fact that Heath, row is
better located geographically in some markets than others is reflected in the current base
transfer flows from the CAA data. For example, although there are many theoretical Europe-
3.5
EuropeconnectionsviaHeathrow,thesegenerateveryt'ew passengers due to the circuitous
routings involved.
Applying the appropriate yields gives the estimated revenue to the airline from these extra
253,000 transfer passengers (which then has to be adjusted down slightly as some were
already using British Airways on one leg of the journey). The balancing loss comes partly
from other carriers at Heathiow but mainly from the foreign hub rivals such as KLM and Air
France. Other scenarios can then also be tested, such as placing the Star Alliance together in
T1 at an enlarged Heathrow.
To assess schedule changes or additional flights, a mock new schedule needs to be created
(with assumptions about how any additional capacity will be used). This then replaces the
existing schedule in the competition analysis with the rival hubs.
Although this is a fairly simplistic model it could be developed further - for exan_ple, to
consider different price levels between the airlines or to give different weightings to taster
and slower connections. Complexity does not necessarily guarantee a more reliable outcome
however! Further ideas are discussed by Bootsma (1997), wor'king for KLM, who suggests
methods for estimating the relative size of city-pair origin & destination (O+D) markets. TNs
can be done either by breaking down published sector flows into the underlying c W pair
markets or grossing up one airline's O+D data to the total market. An accurate Quality
Service Index (QSI) model is shown to be crucial in accomplishing this. This can then be
used to estimate the impact of a new schedule on the true O+D flows.
8 SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
8.1 Range of connections and capacity, constraints
There are limited ways in which individual airlines and airports can improve their
competitiveness as hubs. The most obvious comes from developing a wider range of
destinations or increased frequencies. This is only feasible if the airport has spare capacity -
which may be possible at Amsterdam or Brussels but not so easy at Heathrow or Frankfurt.
Short-haul feeder routes are being squeez_.d out at Heathrow while Schiphol continues to
build its network. It is therefore likely that the smaller hubs will narrow the gap compared to
their rivals as the airports with runway capacity constraints can only increase passenger
throughput by using larger aircraft, which does nothing to expand the range of services.
Paris CDG has a strong local demand, is well located geographically and new runway
infrastructure is planned. After many years of under-performing, Air France is at last realising
the potential of this facility and is well placed to become one of the dominant European
carriers in the years ahead.
At Heath.row the scope for change is more limited; _andfather fights to slots have been
uniformly distributed and one runway is used for take-off and one for landing (for reasons of
noise abatement) which makes it impossible to build up a wave pattern of arrivals and
departures. The proposed Terminal 5 would benefit British Airways as outlined in the
previous section. BA has tried to overcome the lack of a symmetric timetable and the need to
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dependonrandomconnectionsbymovingtodoubledailyIi'equenciesonmanykeylong-haul
routes.This muchimprovesthe chancethat oneof the flightswill makea reasonable
connectionin anygivenmarket.Therealsolutionis mixedmoderunwayoperationswhich
wouldallowairlinestoswaparrivalanddepartureslotstocreateawavepattern.Thecapacity
gainsarehowevermarginaland henceunlikely to offset the environmentalconcerns
accompanyingsuchachange.
TocomplementHeathrow,BritishAirwaysisalsoundertakingamajorexpansionatGatw'ick
wheredespitethe limited capacity(only onerunway)wavesof flights (perhapsbetter
describedasripples!)areoperatedto offsettheproblemsof lowfrequenciesthatexistthere.
A similarpatternto Amsterdamseesthreesetsof arrival and departure waves per day with
most short-haul aircraft based in Europe overnight. Amsterdam itself is now actually facing
slot restrictions tbr the tirst time, although it is environmental pressures rather than capacity
shortfalls that are the problem here (Jones, 1998).
Where major capacity enhancements are under way, this could provide the opening for one or
more other airports to promote itself to major hub status in the future. Milan Malpensa would
at last provide a Mediterranean hub in the major area of business demand and Alitalia's
recently am_ounced alliance with KLM is likely to bring the experience of Schiphol to bear
upon the new airport. Munich has the capability to become a powerful rival to Frankfurt but
there maynot be room for all three of Malpensa, Munich and Zurich to flourish in this region.
A new airport in Berlin could become an important east-west cross-roads if Berlin recovers
its historic importance and the Eastern European markets grow strongly. The new Oslo
Gardermoen is something of a long shot as a hub, being too far north but could probably
attract more in the way of North Atlantic services. Finally, in the UK, Manchester has a large
catchment within 200 km and is well located geographically as a long-haul gateway. With
one of the very few new runways being constructed in Europe, it may overtake some of the
lesser European capitals as a hub for scheduled services.
8.2 Regional hubs
Although there may be no more than half a dozen major intercontinental gateways in Europe,
there is scope to develop a number of regional hubs. These can serve two main fl.mctions: to
relieve pressure on some of the congested _lirports by removing short-haul transfer traffic and
to facilitate journeys which may be cumbersome by surface transport but possess insufficient
demand for dedicated air services. Am example of the former is the British Airways Eurohub
at Birmingham. An example of the latter is the 'niche' hub operated by the French carrier
Regional Airlines at Clermont Fen'and. This is a mini East-West hub linking six cities in
western France (eg Nantes, Toulouse) with points in the Mediterranean, Italy and
Switzerland,
This technique could well be applied elsewhere as there are relatively few gaps in the market
for point to point regional services but a number of airports that are near the threshold for a
wider range of flights. If demand is attracted primarily from surface modes or the major hubs
this process can continue successfully. The Mediterranean region still appears severely under
served tbr travel within Southern Europe - most routes running north-south to major hubs in
Northern Europe. The French regions are still rather under served due to the historical
dominance of Paris.
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8.3 Networksofhubs
In theUSall themajorcarriershavebuiltupnetworksofhubstocoverthemaintrafficflows
in theregion.In Europe,nationalboundarieshavetendedto obstructthistypeof arrangement
andairlineshaveendedupdominatingseveralairportsin closeproximityin their home
country.Forexample,BritishAirwaysatHeathrow,Gatwick,ManchesterandBim:ingham;
Lufthansa t Frankfurt,DusseldorfandMunich.This is lessefficientfrom a competition
viewpointandtheseoperationsareoftendefensiveinnature(ieto blockanothercarrierfrom
gettingin ratherthanbeingviableoperationsin theirownright).Howevertheemphasismay
be changingthroughthe creationof allianceswhichcan reachadditionalmarkets.For
example,Swissairhasbuilt links with SabenandAustrianto extendits influenceinto
northernandeasternEuropeplusTAPtothewest:,givingaveryefficientgeographicspread.
BritishAirwayshasinvestedin TAT/Air Libertein FranceandDeutscheBA in Germany.
Suchmoveshavethepotentialto increasecompetitionby offeringan alternativeto the
entrenchednationalcarriers.Theyhavenot beenverysuccessfulfinanciallyhoweverand
offerfewsynergieswithBA's existingnetwork.Theopportunityto setupa hubin another
EUcountryincreasedwithdomesticderegulationi April 1997(previouslythwartedbvthe
inabilityto providedomesticteed).Whetherthisfreedomis likely to beexercisedhowever
remainsto beseen.As it remainsveryunlikelythatgovernmentswill allow theirnational
carrierto bedrivenoutof business,allianceswithothermajorincumbentscontinuetobea
muchlower-riskmeansof achievingthesamegoals.
8.4 Low cost carriers
Hubs offer the major airlines one of the stronger defences against low cost new entrants.
Contrary to popular opinion, most of the heavily dominated hubs in the US have been left
alone by the low cost carriers. For example, Denver has been avoided by Southwest despite
lying in the middle of its home territory. Northwest has a virtually clear run at Minneapolis
and Detroit. The new entrants tend to focus on either dense local markets, often using a
secondary airport (eg Love Field at Dallas, Midway at Chicago) and/or the busier non-hubs
eg Kansas City, Omaha.
The scope for new entrants in Europe is more limited: shortages of capacity coupled with
high airport charges make opportunities more limited. It is also rare to find the abandoned
inner city airports that have been used so successfully in the US. At London, for example low
cost airlines have been obliged to use Luton or Stansted which pushes up surface access costs
and travel times. Although British Airways is losing some market share in the London
originating traffic - not just to low cost carriers but also to growtl{ by British Midland and
Virgin Atlantic, it has been able to counteract this with an increase in hub traffic. For the
major airlines their strength lies in their networks.
Hubbing tends to increase unit costs and hence has been shunned by most - but not alt - low
cost airlines. In any case, low yield leisure traffic is more willing to wait for chance
connections where necessary if the fare saving is worthwhile. In Europe, Amsterdam, Zurich
and Frankfurt will be difficult to break-into. At London and Paris it is likely to be necessary
to use secondary airports. Brussels presents an interesting situation, where Virgin Express are
operating and marketing a low cost hub network. Brussels also has quite an extensive surface
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catchment area tbr medium distance flights enabling poaching of passengers from
Amsterdam, Dusseldorf, Paris etc. Sabena has favoured co-operation rather than
confrontation with the low cost upstarts (including Citybird on long-haul routes). It appears
somewhat uncertain what the final outcome of this will be.
8.5 High speed rail services
The growth of the high speed rail network in Europe is casting a shadow over a number of
short-haul air services. Unlike point to point traffic, transfer passengers do not want to go to
city centres however and their goal is a hub airport. With few exceptions therefore it will
remain taster to travel by air feeders than rail and because airlines retain control over the
marketing of these services they can be priced and promoted more attractively. Lufthansa
finds it impossible to remove the air services that parallel its 'airport express' trains because
these passengers would be more likely to switch to alternative hubs such as ,,M-nsterdam than
take the train to Frankfurt.
Where rail services can have a complementary, role however is to bring people in from
relatively nearby cities (up to about 300 "kin) where air services are being fbrced out of the
congested hubs. It is ironic that Heathrow is the airport that could probably benefit most from
rail feeders but has the least planned provision of links to the long distance rail network.
9 CONCLUSION
Hubs will continue to offer major geogaphic and mathematical advantages to airlines
operating in a competitive European environment. All major carriers are becoming more
cormnercially orientated and seeking ways to attract traffic from beyond their own national
frontiers. The need to have a sizeable network and frequencies however mean that it is the
largest airlines and airports that tend to dominate this traffic. Airports such as Manchester,
Madrid or Milan are much less important as hubs than they are for local traffic. Similarly,
airlines such as Virgin, Air Liberte, TAP or Olympic are not serious contenders tbr
passengers requiring a connecting journey.
There is vigorous competition between the_i'najor hubs for this traffic. Heathrow suffers from
poor schedules, congestion and an awkward multi-terminal layout which counterbalance its
unrivalled range of intercontinental services. In contrast KLM and Swissair have been adept
at maximising the potential of their smaller scale operations in Amsterdam and Zurich while
Sabena has been quietly building a useful intra-European hub in Brussels. Air France - for
many years the sleeping giant amongst European carriers has finally woken up and probably
has some of the best prospects for the future,, with an excellent geographical location, a
strong traffic base and good airport facilities. There is therefore a tendency for the
competitive position to equalise between the major airports. Capacity constraints may offer
opportunities to less congested locations to develop as hubs. Few cities can support long-haul
services or an extensive European network on the basis of local demand alone. It is hence
necessary to make a strong pitch for the passengers making a myriad of other journeys - for
this is the most footloose traffic of all.
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IATA AIRPORT CODES
AMS-Amsterdam, ATH-Athens, ATL-Atlanta, BRU-Bmssels, CDG-Paris CDG, CPH-
Copenhagen, EWR-New York Newark, FCO-Rome, FRA-Frankfurt, IST-Istanbul, JFK-New
York JFK, LGW-London Gatwick, LHR-London Heathrow, LIN-Milan Linate, MAD-
Madrid, MUC-Munich, OR.D- Chicago O'Hare, ORY-Paris Orly, PilL-Philadelphia, PRG-
Prague, SOF-Sofia, VIE-Vienna, ZRH-Zurich.
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1.INTRODUCTION
Cycles in the economy are a widely recognized phenomenon (see for example Schumpeter,
1939). Although the existence of long term cycles is not clearly proved, medium term
cycles, averaging a 7 to 10 year period, and formerly known as Juglar cycles, are seldom
questioned. The phenomena inducing those cycles, however, are complex and still a subject
o f research.
In air transportation, cycles have been observed and commented upon, especially those
concerning the airlines (periodicity of financial results), and the aeronautic industry (cycles
of orders). Specialized magazines (Avmark Aviation Economist, Airline Business...) release
articles on this subject periodically, and try to prophesy when will the next downturn come
and how bad it is going to be.
Those cycles seem to find their origin, at least partially, in the pattern of demand growth,
which is itself linked to the evolution of economic activity. It has been indeed repeatedly
observed throughout the world that traffic evolution is statistically correlated to economic
growth (usually measured by GDP or GNP growth). Traffic forecasts (Yearly passenger
traffic growth) released every year by several organizations (ICAO l, IATA 2, Boeing,
Airbus...) are based on the assumption of a linear correlation between GDP growth and
traffic growth
Much more, however, can be drawn from the observation of aviation cycles, in relation to
economic cycles. The relations between economic growth, traffic growth and aviation
cycles are indeed an interesting subject of study : can a whole system a relationship be built
between the variables of interest ? How are related traffic, financial results of airlines,
aircraft orders and deliveries ? How can minor variations in traffic, result in airline cycles of
such magnitude (14 MD USD lost between 1990 et 1994) ? Why is air transportation such a
chaotic system ?
As statistical analysis results provided in this paper point out, the answer comes mainly from
the behavior of the actors of this industry. In an oligopolistic sector, like the air
transportation industry, strategic behavior matters. This leads us to try to understand the
dynamic structure of reactions of airlines to fluctuations of traffic and to good and bad
fortunes. A game theory framework (D. Fudenberg, J. Tirole, 1991) can be used to analyze
the interplay of the airlines decisions in tet ms of investment. Do they take a long term view,
or do they have a myopic strategic behavior ?
This is therefore the aim of this paper to analyze aviation cycles by using statistical methods,
and from there to build a model of airline behavior, using a game theory framework, to
account for observed reactions in cycles.
The outline of the paper is the following : First the theory of economic cycles is briefly
reviewed (part 2). Then, using long time series data on world GDP and traffic, the link
between economic cycles and traffic is discussed (part 3), as well as the relevance of other
indicators. In a fourth part, relations and time lags between relevant aviation activity
1 International Civil Aviation Organization
2 International Air Transport Association
variables are studied and their relations with economic cycles discussed. Finally (part 5), a
game theory framework is used to give an explanation of the airlines behavior, which resuks
in an amplification of economic cycles in the airline industry. We conclude by suggesting
ways of smoothing the cycles through a better management of capacity investments.
Can the aviation cycle be broken ?
2. CYCLES AND THE ECONOMY
Historians and economists have observed that fluctuations, more or less important, with
different duration, occur in the economy since the advent of the industrial era. Since Adam
Smith (1776), numerous theories have been put forward to account for economic growth,
and for cycles affecting this growth 3 (for a review of these theories see for example Boyer,
1990). Neglected after world war II, because growth was strong and continuous, with no
more important cycles, those theories have been considered with renewed interest in the
seventies. In those years, the economic miracle of after war decades has faded away, and
been replaced by more troubled times. Important cyclical economic fluctuations reappear,
and with them, attempts to find explanations (Zamovitz, 1985).
Without explaining details of numerous and complex models, it is useful to understand that
basically two types of explanations exist for cycles : Some explanations state that the causes
of cycles are exogenous events (an oil crisis for example), while at the other end of the
spectrum, others consider that cycles are inherent in capitalistic economies (Marx was the
first to provide such an explanation), and can therefore be explained in terms of economic
mechanisms (adjustment of supply and demand, monetary disequilibrium...). As often when
dealing with complex phenomena, the truth certainly lies somewhere in between those
extreme conceptions. More recent research concentrate on modeling the dynamics of
economic systems, using complex mathematics models (dynamic systems, chaos theory...)
and emphasize the fact that previous models of cycles, without being totally mistaken, had
only a partial view of the situation. It is now clear that no simple model can account for
such complex phenomena, even if certain models had some relevance in their times.
3. ECONOMIC CYCLES AND AVIATION CYCLES
In air transportation, strong cyclical phenomena have been noticed, and the pattern seems to
get stronger with time (see for example graph 4.1). Different situations may prevail in
different markets (Europe, USA, Asia), but since the industry tends towards globalization,
and competition becomes worldwide, what affects one market affects others in several
ways. It does not seem, therefore, an oversimplification to speak about global cycles in air
_ _lost major economists have contributed to the theories of growth : Smith, Ricardo, A,lalthus, Marx, Von
Neumann...
Some have tried more particularly to explain cycles :Samuelson, Schumpeter, Hayek...
transportation. The growing interaction of markets may also account, at least partly, for the
amplification of cycles that seem to appear.
As with economic cycles, two explanations are possible : cycles can have external causes
(economic cycles, oil crisis), or can be linked to internal phenomena (behavior of
actors :supply, demand, investment...).
External causes are most of the time deemed responsible for cycles in air transportation. It
is not rare to see the sequence of events represented in the following way :
Graph 3.1 : A too simple view
Airplane Deliveries
Airplane Orders
Airlines Profits
Traffic growth
Economic growth
This analysis is only partly relevant, as I sl_all demonstrate in part 4. It obliterates the role of
the airlines in terms of strategies, and makes profits depend only on external factors, which
is obviously not true in an oligopolistic industry.
The first part of the sequence, however, linking economic growth to traffic growth, can
hardly be disputed.
The correlation between GDP growth and traffic growth has indeed been very oRen
remarked and widely commented upon. GDP growth (or the like) is generally used when
traffic forecasts are computed (although GDP growth is in no way easy to forecast itself f).
Various organizations compute yearly traffic forecasts, on international level (ICAO, IATA,
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We computed the correlation between orders and deliveries with different lags, to see how
much time there is, on average, between orders (Or) and deliveries(Dr).
Table 4. I
Correlation coefficient
between Orders and Deliveries
lLag (years) Values
0
1
2
3
4
Corr(Oy,Dy)
Corr(Oy,Dy+l)
Corr(Oy,Dy+2)
Corr(Oy,D7+3)
Corr(Oy,Dy+4)
0,347
0,643
0,834
0,824
0,494
Data Source :Walsh Aviation (Data from 1968 to1996)
The correlation between the variables is high when the lag is two or three years (0.82 and
0.83), indicating that on average, it takes the airlines somewhere between two and three
years to have airplanes delivered, once ordered.
More interesting and less obvious is the link between results (PT) and orders (07). The
peaks and troughs in orders follow by one year the peaks and troughs in results. The
correlation is very high (0.89) and there is a causality easy to understand: most airlines,
after a good year, choose to invest in renewing and increasing their fleet.
Table 4.2
Correlation between Results and Orders
Lag values
0 Corr(Py, Or) 0,632
1 Corr(Py, Oy+1) 0,887
2 Corr(Py, Oy+2) 0,754
Data Source :Walsh Aviation, ICAO (Data from 1968 to1996)
This does not give much time to manufacturers to think ahead and plan their production
rhythm, since financial results are only know with certainty towards the end of the year
(some years can have good starts but bad endings )). All this explain why manufacturers are
mostly forced to follow cycles and have very little influence on their own production
rhythm.
Graph4.3"OrdersfollowProfits
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These results enable us to draw the first part of the aviation cycle, the one that
manufacturers are most interested about, linking airline profits, aircraft orders and
deliveries
Graph 4.4 • The manufacturers <<curse >>
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4.3 Airlines profitability cycles
If cycles in airline profits enable us to explain the peaks and trough in orders and deliveries,
how can we explain cycles in airlines results ? Where do these cycles come from ?
Contrary to conventional wisdom (see graph 3.1), it is not at all clear that cycles in airlines
results originate from cycles in traffic growth. The correlation between results and traffic or
traffic growth is weak (Corr(Py,,ATrafficy)=0.34), and if downtums in traffic are not
generally good news in terms of results, high traffic growth does not necessarily mean good
results : in 1990 for example, traffic growth is 6.4 percent, and heavy losses (-1500 millions
$) are incurred.
Graph 4.5
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Therefore, traffic growth is not, by far, the only relevant element in explaining airlines
results. Traffic growth is, moreover, not independent on the strategies of the airlines in
terms of pricing. If there is over-capacity at one given point, airlines will lower prices in
order to regain market shares, and traffic growth will be boosted. In order to look at
external determinants of airline results, indicators of economic activity should rather be
used.
Internal factors, like investment pattern or pricing patterns, will also affect profitability.
Among other variables we could analyze, we found that results are somehow correlated
with load factors and deliveries. A high load factor means full planes, indicating that there is
no over-capacity. On the other hand, many deliveries in one year create over-capacity and
mean low prices and low yields, and therefore poor results.
We estimated a regression model explaining airlines results, and came up with three main
statistically significant variables : Economic activity, its variations (GDP and GDP Growth)
and Deliveries.
The estimation was made with data from 1979 to 1996. As previous data were available,
this is a deliberate choice : modem air transportation began atier deregulation occurred and
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marketforcescould interactmore freely.Beforethat date,priceand route regulation
preventedairlinesfromcompeting,bothondomesticandinternationallevel,andtherefore,
explainingtheworkingsof theindustryduringthatperiodisadifferentbusiness.
Table4.3• Resultsasafunctionof GDPandDeliveries
Data sources •
Results = a + fl AGDP 2 + y GDP +8 Deliveries
Results
GDP 8, AGDP
Deliveries
ICAO (World Civil Aviation Statistics), Millions USD
IMF (World Economy Outlook)
Walsh Aviation
Multiple Regression Analysis
Dependent variable " Results
Standard T
Parameter Estimate Error Statistic P-Value
CONSTANT -14886,6 3249,82 -4,58074 0,0004
IAGDp2 353,966 90,1992 3,92427 0,0015
'GDP 10,4859 1,90444 5,50602 0,0001
Deliveries - 17,8026 4,76903 -3,73296 0,0022
Analysis of Variance
Source Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F-Ratio P-Value
Model 3,59273E8 3 1,_9758E8 26,18 0,0000
Residual 6,40402E7 14 4,5743E6
Total (Corr.) 4,23313E8 17
R-squared = 84,8717 percent
:R-squared (adjusted for d.£) = 81,6299 percent
Standard Error of Est. = 2138,76
Mean absolute error = 1591,5
Durbin-Watson statistic = 1,94988
Sources : ICAO, IMF, Walsh Aviation
s Index 1000 in 1965
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This model yields good results. All estimated parameters are statistically significant, and the
adjusted K-squared is 81.6 percent. When the model is re-estimated using only the 16 .first
years, the result of the 176 year (1996) is predicted within 10 percent, showing that the
model is stable and could be used for forecasting.
The model confirms what could be suspected, i.e. that factors internal to air transportation
are important in explaining the airlines profitability. The number of deliveries in one given
year is a good indicator of the amount of new capacity that has to be absorbed by the
market: is has a negative coefficient, indicating that more capacity means lower prices and
lower profitability.
The external factors, summarized by DGP and GDP growth, are also important. The
economic conditions are driving demand and have also an influence on costs.
The model, combining internal and external factors, succeeds in explaining the profitability
of airlines. It gives us the final clue to the understanding of the airline cycle: Although
economic conditions do matter, economic cycles are amplified in the air transportation
industry, by the pattern of investment. Good financial results mean orders, resulting in
deliveries, very otten occurring at odd times, in opposition with the economic conditions.
This leads to over-capacity, lower prices in order to maintain market shares, and bad results.
As the economy gets better (even in bad years, world GDP growth is always positive, so
far !), growing demand gradually absorbs the redundant capacity, and airlines get better.
They start investing again ....
Graph 4.6 : The Airlines Cycle
Capacity Airplane Deliveries
f Demand D(p_ / 2/3yearslagAirplane Orders
Revenues
World _j_ ,:
Economy i::_ 1 yearlag
Airlines Costs
Although this description is somehow a simplified presentation of what really happens, it
gives a fairly good notion of the causes of cycles, explaining why they are so much more
serious in the air transportation industry than in other sectors of the economy.
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4.4 Forecasting profitability
Table 4.4 : Profitability forecastin_ model
Re sults(t) = a + t8 AGDP(t) 2 + y GDP(t) + 80rders(t - 2)1
Data sources :
Results
GDP, AGDP
Orders
OACI (World Civil Aviation Statistics), Millions USD
FMI (Perspectives de l'Economie Mondiale)
Walsh Aviation
Multiple Regression Analysis :
Dependent variable : Results
Standard T
Parameter Estimate Error Statistic P-Value
CONSTANT -12745,9 3980,72 -3,2019 0,0064
Orders(t-2) -5,41081 2,43044 -2,22627 0,0429
AGDP 2 415,601 106,154 3,9151 0,0016
GDP 6,77481 1,7535 3,86359 0,0017
Analysis of Variance
Source Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F-Ratio P-Value
Model 3,28936E8 3 1,09645E8 16,27 0,0001
Residual 9,43719E7 14 6,74_085E6
Total (Corr.) 4,23308E8 17
R-squared = 77,7061 percent
R-squared (adjusted for d.f.) = 72,9288 percent
Standard Error of Est. = 2596,31
Mean absolute error = 2079,85
Durbin-Watson statistic = 1,40952
Sources : ICAO, IMF, Walsh Aviation
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In termsof lbrecasting,morecanbedone,sinceweknowthatthepatternof deliveriesis
stronglydependentonthepatternof orders.A modelcanbeconstructedlinkingresultswith
economiconditionsandpreviousorders.It givessatisfyingresults(adjustedR-squaredof
72.9percent),consideringthatpreviousordersarearoughestimationof thecapacityonthe
marketatagiventime.
It enablesto makeforecastsof airlineresultsdependingon one knownparameter,the
numberof ordersmadetwoyearsbefore(aslongasyourestrictyourforecastto twoyears
ahead,whichseemsareasonablethingto do,consideringtheuncertaintyon theeconomic
environment),and one unknown,the economicgrowth.Dependingon hypothesesof
economicgrowth,scenarioscanthenbeelaboratedconcerningthe financialsituationof
airlines.
5. INVESTMENT AND AIRLINES BEHAVIOR
The airline industry is an oligopoly, which means that there is a limited number of actors in
the industry. The behavior of one of them has therefore consequences in terms of pricing
and total capacity on the market. The economic analysis of oligopoly (Varian, 1992) points
out that behavior of such markets is fairly different from perfectly competitive markets.
More specifically, the outcome of competition can lead to non (pareto) optimal situations.
Such situations can be explained using models derived from game theory.
Let us imagine a situation where two airlines compete on one market (a route or a set of
routes). They have a given market share. Even with correct anticipation of the traffic
growth expected on this market (at current prices), it can be shown that the capacity chosen
by the airlines will almost surely be superior to the expected traffic growth.
In terms of capacity (seats), each airline can have three strategies •
• increase its capacity on the market by less than the expected growth
• increase its capacity on the market by the same amount as the expected growth
• increase its capacity on the market b7 more than the expected growth
The first strategy will never be chosen, since it enables your competitor to gain market share
9
over you.
The second strategy is a non aggressive one, reasonable as long as your opponent does the
same. If he chooses the second strategy, you will loose market share, which is never a good
thing.
This can be summarized in a table, choosing simple figures to represent the gains of the
airlines.
9 We assume that there was no over-capacity in thefirst place.
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Airline A
Airline B
non aggressive strategy
(follow market growth)
aggressive strategy' (invest
Table 5. l : A strategic behavior
non aggressive strategy
(follow market growth)
g(B) = 2
g(B)= -1
aggressive strategy (invest
beyond market growth)
g(A)= -1
beyond market growth)
g(A)= 2
g(A)= 3 g(A) = 1
g(B) = 3
g(B)= 1
where g(A) and g(B) represent the respective gains of airlines A and B.
In terms of collective welfare, the optimal outcome is {g(A)=2, g(B)=2} since it yield a
total gain of 4 _°. It corresponds to each airline matching its capacity increase with traffic
growth. They split equally the benefits of increasing demand.
The outcome of both airlines being aggressive is an over-capacity on the market, leading to
price cuts, in order to boost demand. Profits go down for each airline : {g(A)=l, g(B)=l }
The outcome of one airline being aggressive while the other is not, is for the aggressive one
a large gain, while the other gets less than in any other situation: {g(A)=3, g(B) =- 1} or
{g(A)=-l, g(B)=3}. It could even be the case that being aggressive when your opponent is
not, leads to bigger gains, since with a bigger market share you may be able to raise your
prices n
In any case, being aggressive is a dominant strategy, since whatever your opponent does,
you get more than in the other case (3 or 1, instead of 2 or -1).
This model, known as the _<prisoner's dilemma _), is very often used to characterize this
kind of situations. However simple it may seem, it has a very wide scope, and represents in
an adequate way many real situations. We {epresented a simple case where only two airlines
are competing, but it can be successfully generalized to several competitors (Tirole, 1988).
How can the airlines get out of this situation where profits are more or less exhausted by
competition ? Again, game theory offers us a way out : if the situation is repeated, then
getting along becomes possible. Long term relationships (represented by an infinitely
repeated game) enable cooperation. By cooperating, airlines could share the gains from a
non aggressive behavior.
This kind of reasoning, however, is only valid in a very stable relationship: competitors
have to remain the same all along the game. In the air transportation industry, this is far
from the case : existing airlines can disappear (or exit a market) and new airlines can enter a
m We assume that the consumers" welfare is more or less unchangedin this case
H In this case the consumers' welfare goes down
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market. If an airline thinks one of its competitors may exit a market as a result of an
aggressive behavior, it may have as a goal to provoke the exit, and then the framework of
repeated games does not hold.
It may not be possible, in this case, to get out of the dilemma. Being aggressive and over-
investing may make sense in the long term, in order to eliminate rivals. It may even be in the
(short term) interest of consumers, who may benefit from lower prices. In the long term
however, exits from markets may lead to monopoly power and need to be watched by
regulatory authorities.
6. CONCLUSION : HOW TO SMOOTHE CYCLES
If a tendency to over-capacity, explained by the oligopolistic structure of the airline
industry, is worsened by economic conditions, it leads exactly to what we observe:
investments timed in good economic periods (when airlines can afford to act aggressively)
materialize in the shape of delivered planes (and thus available capacity), a t_w years later,
usually when the economic context is not so favorable (to say the least !). This leads to
huge losses (due to a large disequilibrium between supply and demand) and airlines slowly
get better when this unbalance is reduced by the growth in demand. Then they start
investing again.
To correct this cyclical imbalance between supply and demand, airlines need to adjust in
two ways :
First, they should improve their forecasting abilities : although no model can ever predict a
demand shock, like the gulf war, a model, like the one we estimated, can be used to build
scenarios, and predict how much capacity airlines would want to have in different economic
situations and at different points of the economic cycle. This would give airlines boundaries
of desirable capacity considering economic conditions and competition. This would help
airlines to take advantage of the economic cycles instead of being hit by them, by leading to
a better management of capacity.
Since capacity, even managed in a better way, is not as adjustable as airlines would like in
order to <_ride _ the cycles, another impoatant adjustment is to build more flexible capacity.
Ira fraction of capacity is made flexible, even a marginal one (5 to 10 percent), it may be
enough to cope with unexpected changes in demand, since demand can be predicted with
reasonable accuracy. For example, capacity can be gained in high demand periods by
deferring retirements, or by using short term leases. It can be reduced in low demand
periods by returning leased aircraft or retiring old aircraft.
There are important benefits to be gained, for the individual cartier, but also for the industry
as a whole, if global capacity matches demand better. This may not be easy to achieve,
because it means changing the behavior of all airlines. It will make sense, in order to
influence the whole industry, for airlines or groups of airlines to share insights and
information concerning the evolution of demand. This may prove a difficult evolution in a
very competitive industry, used to the kind of behavior described above, but efforts should
be made towards that goal.
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Abstract: Models of forecast of demand of airports have focused for years on busy central airports.
However, touristicairportswith highseasonalitiespresent an increasinginterest.The appropriatemodels for
demand forecast for suchtouristicairports are analyzed in this paper:,statistical, time-series, econometric,
gravity and fuzzy models. Application of the models are presentedfor the case of a major airport of Easter
Mediterranean,the airportof Rhodes. The impact of the method of forecast in the airportmaster planningis
alsodiscussed.
1. Transport and economic development: a close link
It is established that transport is closely related to the economic activity (Fig. 1). Both
passenger and freight transport follow generally the rate of economic development.
However, each transport mode has a more or less predominant position related to the
distance traveled (Fig. 2). It can be easily seen that for distances more than 800kms, air transport
is by far the principal transport mode.
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Fig. 1: Rates of development of GDP (Gross Domestic Product), passengerand freight transportfor OECD
countries.
At the era of the third technological revolution of telematics, biotechnology and airplanes
(Fig. 3), air transport has increased during the last 25 years with rates higher than the increase of
GDP (Fig. 4), [1].
Concerning elasticities, air transport is highly influenced by the level of income, as it has
been established for many countries all over the world (Fig. 5), [2].
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Fig. 2: Share of each transport mode to passenger traffic in relation to distance.
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Fig. 3: Economic cycles and transport technologies.
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Fig. 5: Relationship between revenue and air transport for various countries.
2. Tourism and air transport
Tourism has become a highly expanding economic activity (Fig. 6, 7), with a great impact
to the economy of countries like France, Italy, Greece, etc (Table 1), [3].
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Fig. 6: Evolution of number of tourists worldwide.
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Fig. 7: Revenues from tourism worldwide.
I
1993 1994 1995
Count_
France
Spain
USA
Italy
China
Gr. Britain
Hungary
Mexico
Poland
Austria
Canada
Czech Republic
Germany
Switzerland
Greece
Hong-Kong
Portugal
Malaysia
Singapore
Thailand
Sum of 20 first
Sum worldwide
Number of tourists (in million)
1990
52.497
37.441
39.539
26.679
10.484
18.013
20.510
17.176
3.400
19.011
15.209
7.278
17.045
13.200
8.873
6.581
8.020
7.446
4.842
5.299
338.543
459.233
1995
60.584
45.125
44.730
29.184
23.368 12
22.700 7
22.087 5
19.870 8
19.225 27
17.750 6
16.854 10
16.600 16
14.535 9
11.835 11
10.600 13
9.598 19
9.513 14
7.936 15
6.595 22
6.532 21
415.221
566.538
Range Range
in 1990 in 1995
1 1
3 2
2 3
4 4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
2O
Table 1: The 20 most important touristic destinations worldwide.
The evolution of tourism is also closely related to the economic activity (Fig. 8). The great
part of tourist trips (particularly of long distance) is realized by air transport (Fig. 9), which is
closely related to the number of tourist trips (Fig. 10), [3].
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Fig. 8: Tourist arrivals and Gross Domestic Product worldwide.
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Fig. 10: Relationship between air transport and tourist trips worldwide.
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The prospects, however, for Europe in the development of tourism are less promising than
in the past. Europe will have lower rates of develoloment of the touristic industry and will absorb
50,8% of the total world toudstic market, compared to 63,6% for 1990 and 56,3% for 2000
(Table 2), [2].
Europe
America
Asia and Pacific
Africa
Middle East
South - East Asia
1990
I%)
62,6
20,4
11,5
3,3
1,5
0,7
2000
(%)
56,3
22,2
15,3
3,6
1,7
0,9
Table 2: Share of the various continents to the tourist market worldwide.
2010
(%)
50,8
22,1
20,3
3,8
1,9
1,1
Receiving increased numbers of tourists is one part of the matter. The second one has to
do with the medium expenditure per toudst (Fig. 11), which is related both to the cost of life but to
the number of days spent, [4].
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Fig. 11: Revenues per tourist for various countries.
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3. The airport of Rhodes and its impact to the economic development of the island
The island of Rhodes (Fig. 12) is situated in the south - east of Greece and its the greatest
one of the complex of Dodecanese. Tourism is the principal factor of the economic activities of
the island (Table 3), [4]. The number of tourists has spectacularly increased during the last 40
years (Table 4), [4].
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Fig. 12: Island of Rhodesand influence area of the airport of Rhodes.
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Activities
Agriculture
Forest and Fishing activities
Commerce
Hotels, Restaurant
Construction
Public services
Education, Health, Justice
Percentage
(%) in 1978
21,9
13,2
14,4
26,3
9,3
12,0
2,9
Percentage
(%) in 1988
14,9
8,9
14,5
36,9
8,8
12,4
3,6
Year
1952
1965
1970
1976
1980
1985
1990
1992
Number of
tourists
arrivals
61.148
130.380
213.657
466.588
610.827
780.211
844.477
935.067
Medium
duration of
s!aying (days)
6,6
8,0
8,1
9,5
9,5
9,4
9,6
9,6
Table 3: Impact of the vadous activities in the total
economic development of Dodecanese.
Table 4: Evolution of number of toudsts
at the island of Rhodes and medium
duration of staying per toudst.
The contribution of the airport has been crucial for this development. The airport (Fig. 13)
has a runway of 3.260m long, to which the great majority of aircraft can land. The terminal is
saturated and important extension works are in progress. The airport is equipped with high
technology air navigation systems, which make it one of the more important in East
Mediterranean. Until 1977 the airport was located in Maritsa. Operation in the airport in Paradissi
(Fig. 13) began in 1977. In a period of 20 years the total number of passengers (Fig. 14) has
increased by 2,7. This increase principally comes from the increase of intemational traffic (Fig.
15), whereas domestic traffic is greatly impaired from the level of tariffs (Fig. 16).
Germany and England constitute 49,2% of the international passengers of the airport, and
Scandinavians countries 18,3% for the year 1997 (Table 5).
As revenues are 6 times higher compared to the expenses of the airport, the Airport
Authority could have the possibility of self-financing the necessary investment.
4. A Survey for the Evaluation of the characteristics of traffic at the airport of Rhodes
4.1. Scope of the Survey
In order to investigate the charactedstic_ of traffic at the airport of Rhodes, a Survey has
been conducted during the summer of 1997. 1166 questionnaires have been completed by both
international and domestic passengers. The questionnaire and analysis of results are given in
next pages. We can conclude the following:
• international passengers have arranged their trip to Rhodes some months ago, with the
help of an agency; in contrary, domestic passengers arrange their travel by themselves
and only some weeks ago
• whereas international passengers come in Rhodes exclusively for toudstic reasons,
16,1% of domestic passengers have a professional motivation for their trip
• the first impression at the moment of entrance in the airport is more or less satisfactory
for the 97,2% of international passengers and for the 93,7% of the domestic
passengers
= most of the services of the airport are evaluated as satisfactory with the exception of
the check-in and waiting areas, the information level and the bar services which must
be improved.
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Fig. 15: International passengers at the airport of Rhodes.
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Fig. 16: Domestic passengers at the airport of Rhodes.
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Fig. 17: Passengers of private and military aircrafts at the airport of Rhodes.
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REPUBLIC OF GREECE
CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY
Survey of the Characteristics and the
Quality of Service at the Airport of Rhodes
Responsible: Assoc. Professor V. Profillidis
Date:l I 8 t199zl
1. Nationality: _ 2. Age: m 3. City in which you are living:
Hour: I I I
Male
4. Sex: Female
5. To which airport are you traveling? 6. What is your final destination:
7. With which air company are you traveling?
8. When did you book your place?
9. Reason of your trip:
Professional
Related to tourism
Public sector servant
Private sector employee
Liberal profession
Military
Congress participant
Studies
Other (clarify)
m
m
m
m
m
m
Non professional
Family - Personal
Medical I I
Tourism - Vacations
I"----'--'--'1
Organised by a tourist office
Non organised by a tourist office L__J
10. Do you visit Rhodes by air for the first time? Yes J---'] No 1"---7
If no, how many times have you visited Rhodes by air? I-----J times
How many days did you spend in Rhodes? _ days
11. Which tourist office, travel agency or air company has organised your trip?
Tourist office Travel agency: Air company:
12. Is your first trip by air? Yes _ _1o
If no, approximately how many times have you traveled by air? _ times
13. You have chosen air transport instead of sea transport for the following reasons:
Great distance Total cost of trip
Travel time Other
Risk of sea sickness (please clarify)
14. How many airports have you visited? I I airports
Which ones?
15. How did you travel to the airport?
Tourist bus
Taxi
Private car
Rented car
Car of relatives
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16.Howmanypeopleaccompaniedyou till the airport?
17.Whatisyour impressionat the momentof entranceat the airport?
Verygood [----"] Good[-'_ Medium _ Bad
18. How do you evaluate the quality of service at the check in?
Personnel behavior: Good [_ Medium _ Bad
Areas: Sufficient _ Tolerable I_] Insufficient
19. How do you evaluate the information from the personnel of the airport?
Good _ Medium _ Bad
20. How do you evaluate the waiting area of the airport?
Sufficient _ Comfortable
Areas Tolerable Seats Medium
Insufficient Non comfortable Good
Aesthetics Medium
Bad
21. How do you evaluate the bar services of the airport?
Good _ Low _Qua/ity Medium Cost NormalBad High Good
Service Medium
Bad
22. How do you evaluate the cleanliness of the airport?
E-Waiting areas, GoodCkeck in Medium _...J
Bad
WC
Good
Medium
Bad
23. How do you evaluate the shops of the airport?
Sufficient _ More of them are required
Which ones
24. What additional services would you expe_t at the airport of Rhodes?
25. What is your profession?
Public sector servant
Private sector employee
Liberal profession
Student / Pupil
Military
Worker -industry
Farmer
Pensioner
Household
m
m
26. Education level:
University
Technical or Professional school
High school
Elementary school
27. How many members has
your family?
We thank you for your cooperation and we wish you a pleasant trip
-14-
members
4.2 Results of Survey to international and domestic passengers at the airport of Rhodes
Age of passenger.
60,0
50,0
40,0
30,0
20,0
10,0
0,0
_ International passengers
Percentage %
_ Domestic passengers
Until 19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50_59 60 and
more
Sex of passenger.
100,0- Percentage %
80,0 i
60,0
40,01
20,01
0,0
Male Female
Reason of trip:
Related to tourism
Public sector servant
Private sectror employee
Employee in airline firm
Liberal profession
Military
Congress participant"
Studies
0 10
Percentage %
100,0
80,0
60,0
40,0
20,0
0,0
!6L1_
Professional
20 30 40 50
Percentage %
* Because of the period of survey (summer period).
We estimate the real percentage higher.
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Non professional
100,0 4
80,0 !
60,0.
40,0.
20,0
0,0
Tourism
Vacations
............... l
--b.0-0_0--- (£1 IO,.5-
Medical Family
Personal
100,0
80,0
60,0
40,0
20,0
0,0
Percentage %
98,4
-4,; ..... ___
1,6
Orgnanized by Non orgnanized
a tourist agency by a tourist agency
Whendidyoubookyourplace*?.
_ International passengers
Percentage %
50,0
40,0
30,0
20,0
10,0
0,0
_ Domestic passengers
1 week 2weeks 3weeks
ago ago ago
* Reference date: 8/1997
1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months 5 months 6 and
ago ago ago ago ago more
months ago
Do you visit Rhodes by air for the first
time?
Percentage %
100,0
80,0
60,0
40,0
20,0
0,0
Yes No
If no, how many times have you visited
Rhodes by air?
Percentage %
40,0 -,¢.......................
30,0_ _-,,,... ............... _I
_ ,====',- -',.0 _ 0,,1|
20,0l]_gg l_g=- _-d -_- -,_ ;o-_,-,_- - gg/
10,0 _ o_ o_ _ __ . o_
0,0
1 2 3 4-s 6-7 8:9 M;.y
time times times times times times times
How many days did you spend in Rhodes?
Percentage %
35,0
30,0
25,0
20,0
15,0
10,0
5,0
0,0
1-3 4-5 6-7 8-9 10-11 12-13 14-15 16-17 18 days
days days days days days days days days and more
Is your first trip by air?
100,0
80,0
60,0
40,0
20,0
0,0
Percentage %
Yes No
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If no, approximately hay many times have you
raveled by air?
Percentage %
60,0_ .. [
50,0 _ ...................... '=:-_
_==- ]
40,0 -_ ..................... = (_
30,0 1- - - - _,._-_ .... -m- .........
200_ _ - to - c_ =o '--
, - .... _ -_.-o _ _)- _5-_: -c¢
10,0
i 2 3 4-5 6;7 8-9 Many
time times times times times times _mes
You have chosen air transport instead of sea transport for the following reasons:
100,0
_ International passengers
Percentage %
80,0 _- ...........
t 57,6
60,0 _ ...........
"'
0,0 _
Travel
time
_ Domestic passengers
83,0
56.0_ .....................
.... 6,_-9,9............
0,0 0,0
I
Risk of Total cost Other
sea sickness of hip reasons
Note. The passenger could choose more than one reasons
Have you visited other airports?
Percentage %
100,0 _- ............. 89,2 .....
8o,o_............ 4
6o,o 
,2,1
20,0 _
0,0
Yes No
If yes, how many airports have you visited?
Percentage %
50,0 I
40,0 _- ...................... =o- -
m _ o530,0I--_--,--,_...............-_--I
1_o_ _-_ _.,.- _N I
20,0 -]-¢6E _ _-d ........... -_II
0,00_
I 2 3 _5 _7 8-9 Many
How did you travel to the airport?
Percentage %
100,0
80,0
60,0
40,0
20,0
0,0
77,9
45,9
14,8- ........ -12,2
0,3 2,4
Tounst
bus
Public
bus
Taxi
.... 1§_9 ...............
8,5 9,4 8,8
Private Car of Rented
car relatives car
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How many people accompanied you till the airport?
_ Intemational passengers
Percentage %
100,0
_ Domestic passengers
80,0
60,0
40,0
20,0
0,0
78,3
...... 30;.8- ..........................
22,7 20,0
3,4 0,0 0,7
No one 1 person 2 persons 3 persons 4 persons 5 persons
What is your impression at the moment of entrance at the airport?
Percentage %
100,0
80,0 i .................................
59,2
60,0 .......... -53,4
t
4o,ot--i6;3......
20,0 _-
0,0
Very
good
Good Medium Bad
How do you evaluate the quality of service at the check in?
Percentage % Percentage %
100,0 ] 100,0
I80,0 80,0
60,0 i 60,0
40,0. ¢ 40,0
20,0 20,0
0,0 0,0
Good Medium Bad Sufficient Tolerable Insufficient
Personnel behavior Check in areas
How do you evaluate the information from the personnel of the airport?
100,0
80,0
60,0
40,0
20,0
0,0
Percentage %
.....................
........ 50;7........
Good Medium Bad
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How do you evaluate the waiting area of the airport?
_ International pa_engers I Domestic passengers
100,0
80,0
60,0
40,0
20,0
0,0
Percentage % 1 Percentage %
Comfortable Meal Jura Non
Sufficient Tolerable Insufficient comfortable
100,0 ,Percentage %
80,01-...... ...... 1.
6o,o .....
4o,o_-- - -_ - _ - _- _ J
0 0 ----
Good Medium Bad
Area Seats Aesthetics
How do you evaluate the bar services of the airport?
100 0 Percentage % Percentage %
' I "¢ 1
80,0 T- ..... _ -_° ......
60,0
40,0
20,0
0,0 Good Medium Bad Low Normal
........... (_
Percentage %
,oo, ==-
8o,oi-...... _ -_ ......
6o,o_-.....
4°'°1-_- _--L_I '- _- oS'- o--
20,0_ £- _- -_-
High Good Medium Bad
Quality Cost Service
How do you evaluate the cleanliness of the airport?
100,0 Percentage % 100,0-Percentage % i
80,0 .................... 80,0 ................... J
64,4 60,9 58,3
60,0 60,0
40,0 40,0
20,0 20,0
0,0 0,0
Good Medium Bad Good Medium Bad
Waiting areas, Check in WC
How do you evaluate the shops of the airport?
Percentage %
100,0,
80,0-
60,0-
40,0
20,0
0,0
95,6 ............
Sumcient More Of them
are required
More shops required: Electrical and electronical miczosets,
Jewels, Pharmacy, Books, Newspapers,
Cigarettes, Clothes
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What additional services would you expect at the airpo_ of Rhodes?
Information about flights on screens, Touristic Information about Rhodes,
Post office, Non smoking waiting areas, Foreign exchanges services.
What is your profession?
International passengers _ Domestic passengers
Percentage %
50,0
40,0 .........................................................I _c° _(°
30,0 ...... <_--_- - _ -cu.....................................
O4 (,0 cO
20,0 _-_-- -_6 .................................
u_ co __
10,0 ,n
_- o o_= 04
0,0 t
Public Private Liberal Student Military Worker in Farmer Pensioner Household
sector sector profession Pupil industry
servant employee
Education level:
Percentage %
50,0
40,0 .............. _384!....
30,4
30,0
35,1
20,0
10,0
0,0
Elementary High school Technical or
school _ Professional
school
I
University
How many members has your family?
60,0
50,0
40,0
30,0
20,0
10,0
0,0
Percentage %
41,5 38,8
I I
1 member 2 members 3 members 4 members 5 and more
members
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5. Forecasting the demand of the airport of Rhodes
5.1 Need and methods of forecast
A civil aviation authority requires demand forecasts at many levels of planing ana for
many purposes. At the strategic level, forecasts are required for long term planning over a time
of 15 to 20 years. More detailed forecasts, but over a similar time span, are required for major
investment projects such as the expansions of terminal and runway etc. By contrast, the medium
range analysis, 5 to 10 years ahead, is the element for the annual planning of the aviation
authority, [5].
There are three main methods of forecasting civil aviation traffic: market surveys, trend
projections and econometric relationships (models), [1], [6]. During last years, a new
methodology of forecasting has been developed; the fuzzy linear or non-linear regression
models, [7].
5.2. Forecasting based on market studies
Traffic forecasting through market surveys aims at analyzing the characteristics of the air
transport market in order to examine empirically how the use of an airport varies between
different sectors of the population of different countries. The results of a survey must be
combined with estimations about social-economic changes and may indicate the possible future
development of demand of an airport, [5].
The questionnaire which has been presented in this paper, includes questions which aim
to estimate the likely future development of demand of the airport (questions No 9, 10,
13 and 24), [4].
5.3. Forecasting by statistical methods
A first step for forecasting airport demand is to collect and study the historical data and
determine the trend curve of demand. When d_edving a forecast by projection from the demand
trend, we assume that all the factors which determined the development of demand at the past,
will continue to operate in the future in the same way as in the past. A trend may be stable in
absolute terms (linear) or in percentage terms (exponential or polynomial). The type of trend
curve which best fits the given historical data may be determined by using different types of
curves. In any case, the period of forecast can not exceed half of the period where historical
data are available. The coefficient which evaluates the degree of approach curve - phenomenon
studied is the Coefficient of Correlation (R_, 0<R2<1). Best correlation succeed when R_ is
close to 1, [1].
Fig. 18 gives a medium-term forecasting for the total passenger demand of the airport of
Rhodes, based on the data of Fig. 14. We used the polynomial trend and the Coefficient of
Determination is very close to 1 (R= =0,92).
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Fig. 18: Forecasting by trend projection for the total passenger demand of the airport of Rhodes.
5.4. Forecasting by econometric method
A future airport traffic demand deduced by projection of historical data does not take into
account the way in which the various socio-economic and other external conditions affect the
development of demand. Econometric forecasting takes into account a quantitative relationship
between the airport demand and one or more variables which influence the development of
demand. The most difficult part of an econometric forecasting is the selection of the relevant
causal variables to be taken into account in forecasting and the specification of the type of
functional relationship existing between the dependent (demand) and independent variables.
Forecast of future development of the independent variables is crucial too.
In the case of the airport of Rhodes, aft('# many trials and error efforts, we concluded that
the critical vadable which influence the development of the international passenger demand is
the rate of exchange equivalence of the Greek currency (drachma) to the currency of origin
country of passengers. For calculating an Equivalence Indicator which represents this evolution
of foreign exchange equivalence of drachma, we accept the index of 100 for the year 1986
(Table 6). All countries participate in the composition of this indicatoratthe percentages of Table 5.
Year
Rate of exchange of drachma to
currencies of origin counties of
demand at the airport of Rhodes
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
100,0 111,3 122,2 127,4 137,6 158,8 178,0 186,5 195,9 192,1 172,7 202,9
Fig. 18: Evolution of exchange rate of drachma to currencies of origin countries of international passengers
at the airport of Rhodes.
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The econometric model derived is an equation of the form:
P =1/2 x [e (°'°°399537XD) x925.332+ D x (O,174746x D2 -43,2117x D +7.548,47) +906.8961
where: P: The annual number of intemational passenger of the airport of Rhodes
D: The exchange rate of drachma per year compared to the currencies of origin
countries passengers of the airport
5.5. Forecasting fuzzy linear regression model
A fuzzy linear regression model has the following form:
Y=A 0 +A 1.x 1+A 2 -x 2 +...+A n .x n
where A_, i=1 ..... n, are symmetrical fuzzy numbers. Since fuzzy numbers are fuzzy sets, their
membership functions can be seen as possibility functions (instead of probability functions of
other methods), so the fuzzy linear regression model becomes a possibilistic one, that can be
used in the context of possibility theory to provide a new methodology for capturing our vague
and incomplete knowledge by means of possibility distributions, in fuzzy linear regression
models, the difference between data and the estimated values is assumed to form an ambiguity
which is due to the system's structure. Moreover, the proposed model seems to bring the
ambiguity of relation back to the system coefficients or our inability to construct an accurate
relationship which enters directly in the model through fuzzy coefficients, [7].
Fig. 19 gives the fuzzy linear regression of the international passenger for the airport of
Rhodes. The fuzzy regression is based on the same variable as the econometric model. The
range of limits of the fuzzy regression depends on the unpredictable events which affect the
demand. In the case of the airport of Rhodes, such unpredictable event was the War in the
Persian Gulf in 1991, which discontinued the upward development of the demand of the airport.
International passengers per year
2.500.000
2.000.000
1.500.000
1.000.000
500.000
0
1986
:?ii_!;:2i:_i_ii_ii_!i_!i_i:i:/2i !_::iiii:i_?iiiiii:.;ii:!i;......- . \
"_ Limits of fuzzy Annual number of
............. linear-re,gres-si-on...... i5t-efn_tio-naI-p-a_,_e5ger ....
I I t I i I I I i I
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Fig. 19: Fuzzy linear regression of the internationalpassengerdemand of the airport of Rhodes.
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Thefuzzyregressionanalysis for the airport of Rhodes gives an equation of the form:
P=(ro+r,x,)+_(Co+c,D,)
where: P: The annual number of international passenger of the airport of Rhodes
D: The exchange rate of drachma per year compared to the currencies of odgin
countries passengers of the airport
ro=636.055,682 r1=7.576.650 co=0 c1=732,673
6. Concluding remarks
In the present paper, forecast models of demand of airports are suggested, with focus at
the airport of Rhodes. Market surveys, statistical methods, econometric models and the fuzzy
method has been used. The accuracy of prediction proves to be satisfactory. However, it is
never possible to fully predict human behavior. For this reason, results must be carefully
examined, analytical and in depth knowledge of social behavior is necessary and the forecaster
must give precisions of the order of mistakes that can occur and of the assumptions on which
forecasts have been developed.
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